Kosovo blues

Kosovo blues The image of Kosovo, which the Serbian people see and believe in, is totally different from that seen by the Kosovo Albanians in every way: culturally, historically, and linguistically. Both are busy fortifying their own particular viewpoint. The key dilemma for the International Community is how to prevent these parallel worlds from colliding. On February 17, the Kosovo Assembly issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Until today this independence has been recognized by the United States, most of the European Union, and many of the neighboring countries. A total of 43 countries in all. On June 11, its Constitution came into effect and immediately after that, the President of Kosovo signed into force 41 different implementing laws based on the Ahtisaari Plan for the future status of Kosovo. All of the above was grounded heavily in the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo promulgated on May 15, 2001 by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Hans Haekkerup. This document laid out the responsibilities of Parliament, the President, and the outlines of various ministries and the judicial system. At the present time, Prime Minister Thaci and his new government are fully occupied in setting up this new government, as well as lobbying additional countries to recognize it. Every Kosovo Albanian fully believes that the entire territory of Kosovo is united and subject to all the rules of regulations of the Kosovo Government as defined by the above documents. They fully expect the International Community to enforce this. Meanwhile, Serbia as well as the Kosovo Serbs is contesting these acts in every possible way short of military force. They have the full support of Russia, which has blocked any and all steps in the UN Security Council, which directly or indirectly would recognize this independence. Out of sympathy for the Serbian position, caution, or apathy, around 140 UN member-countries have not taken action thus far to recognize Kosovo. The Serbs have now announced that on June 28 (the Anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389) a Parliamentary Assembly will be formed in the Serbian-controlled areas of Kosovo. This is one more step in what most international observers in Pristina will privately acknowledge is an effective de facto partition of Kosovo. The strength of the Serbian/Russian position has helped to create confusion and uncertainty within the International Community in Kosovo. No one is really sure just how to respond to the Serbian refusal to respect the authority of the Kosovo Government or the blatant efforts to bring the Serbian controlled areas of Kosovo openly under the authority of Serbia and its administrative structures. Because of the inability to phase out UNMIK as planned (due to Russian blockage in the Security Council), the exact roles of UNMIK, the new EU Mission (EULEX) and the International Civilian Representative (chosen by the International Steering Group composed of key countries supporting Kosovo Independence) are uncertain and can best be described as a work in progress. Adding to the confusion, there are differing views within UNMIK as to the speed, which the new Kosovo Government should assume full responsibility in certain areas such as privatization, despite now having laws on the books, which give them that authority. Despite everything which has transpired thus far, the Western International Community STILL does not fully grasp the extent of the Serbian attachment to Kosovo. It makes the erroneous assumption that if the DS is successful in forming the next Serbian government, it will quietly let this issue die. This is wishful thinking. The reality is that there will be no letup in the de facto partition of Kosovo; no change in the strong diplomatic position taken by Serbia in all international fora; and no recognition of Kosovo government authority. While a Radical-led government with the participation of Vojislav Kostunica would undoubtedly take more provocative steps and would use stronger rhetoric, for the foreseeable future there will be major problems over Kosovo regardless of what parties end up governing Serbia. The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon has been pressed hard by all sides. He has tried to walk a very fine line, respecting UN Security Council 1244 on the one hand, and not condemning the Unilateral Declaration of Independence on the other. The recent letters sent to President Tadic and President Sejdiu were important both for what they said and for what they did not say. He, for example, did not give Sejdiu any title at all in his letter, referring to him only as "Your Excellency" in contrast to addressing Tadic as President of the Republic of Serbia. He also without directly saying so, acknowledged the Serbian boycott of Kosovo institutions and their refusal to accept the EU Mission by stating that for a "limited duration" the police in the Serbian areas would report via international authority to his Special Representative; that additional local and district courts can be created in these areas; and even went so far as to decree that the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo would retain the sole right to preserve and reconstruct its religious, historical, and cultural sites in Kosovo and will remain under the direct authority of its religious seat in Belgrade. At the same time, the UN Secretary-General implicitly accepted - by not directly challenging - the reduction of UNMIK authorities and the establishment of the Kosovo Government as a more-or-less sovereign entity. He also created what should be sufficient cover for the EU Mission to set up under the umbrella of UNMIK. While a lot of details will have to be worked out, the way forward may now be clearer than it was. One might say it gives both sides room to continue to believe in their own parallel universe. The positions taken by the UN Secretary-General have themselves become controversial, with both Russia and Serbia calling the proposed reconfiguration of UNMIK "illegal." For at least several more weeks, the Thaci government will be focused on getting up and running; staffing; and developing basic policies on all sorts of issues. Just establishing effective diplomatic representation around the world in key capitals will be a major undertaking, for example. But at some point, probably in the fall, attention is going to turn to the Serbian lack of respect for Kosovo governmental institutions and the de facto partition of the North. They will see that after some confusion with key figures such as the EU Representative, Peter Feith; the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Joachim Ruecker; and his Deputy, Larry Rossin taking strong positions against any parallel structures or attempts at partition, the rhetoric of the International Community has now changed. Ruecker and Rossin are being replaced. This is now by chance or coincidence. The realities of the difficulties and dangers of trying to force their way into Serbian areas are becoming more apparent to the EU and U.S. authorities. Thus far world attention has focused almost entirely on the Serbian reaction to Independence. At some point the Kosovo Albanian reaction to the Serbian actions will demand equal attention and concern. There is no doubt that the Kosovo Albanians will feel let down – or even betrayed – by the International Community and will come under strong domestic pressure to "do something about it." While for the first several months, the new Kosovo Government will be able to point to achievements and progress, the "Independence Honeymoon" will soon be over. The Serbian diplomatic offensive has had and will continue to have a negative impact on Kosovo's ability to have normal international contacts with many international organizations. The difficult relationship with Serbia will make trade and other economic ties with what should be its most important partner all but impossible (other than with the Serbian-controlled areas). The personal and policy conflicts among the Kosovo Albanian parties will begin to have more importance and the Thaci government will find itself challenged for lack of progress on economic growth and "softness" in dealing with the Serbs. Relations with the International Community will get tenser. All of the above probably describes the birth of yet another "frozen conflict" in the world. At the same time, viewed from the ground the conflict seems anything but frozen. Quite the contrary. The challenge for the international players may well be exactly that: to see that this raw wound with all of its emotion and anger does become "frozen." Preventing parallel worlds from colliding? KFOR in Kosovska Mitrovica (FoNet) A philosopher once said that what differentiates humans from all other species on earth was the ability to simultaneously believe in two concepts contradictory to each other. That comes to mind frequently when it comes to the question of Kosovo. William Montgomery "This probably describes the birth of yet another 'frozen conflict' in the world. At the same time, viewed from the ground the conflict seems anything but frozen. Quite the contrary. The challenge for the international players may well be exactly that: to see that this raw wound with all of its emotion and anger does become 'frozen.'"

Kosovo blues

The image of Kosovo, which the Serbian people see and believe in, is totally different from that seen by the Kosovo Albanians in every way: culturally, historically, and linguistically. Both are busy fortifying their own particular viewpoint. The key dilemma for the International Community is how to prevent these parallel worlds from colliding.

On February 17, the Kosovo Assembly issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Until today this independence has been recognized by the United States, most of the European Union, and many of the neighboring countries. A total of 43 countries in all. On June 11, its Constitution came into effect and immediately after that, the President of Kosovo signed into force 41 different implementing laws based on the Ahtisaari Plan for the future status of Kosovo.

All of the above was grounded heavily in the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo promulgated on May 15, 2001 by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Hans Haekkerup. This document laid out the responsibilities of Parliament, the President, and the outlines of various ministries and the judicial system.

At the present time, Prime Minister Thaci and his new government are fully occupied in setting up this new government, as well as lobbying additional countries to recognize it. Every Kosovo Albanian fully believes that the entire territory of Kosovo is united and subject to all the rules of regulations of the Kosovo Government as defined by the above documents. They fully expect the International Community to enforce this.

Meanwhile, Serbia as well as the Kosovo Serbs is contesting these acts in every possible way short of military force. They have the full support of Russia, which has blocked any and all steps in the UN Security Council, which directly or indirectly would recognize this independence. Out of sympathy for the Serbian position, caution, or apathy, around 140 UN member-countries have not taken action thus far to recognize Kosovo.

The Serbs have now announced that on June 28 (the Anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389) a Parliamentary Assembly will be formed in the Serbian-controlled areas of Kosovo. This is one more step in what most international observers in Pristina will privately acknowledge is an effective de facto partition of Kosovo.

The strength of the Serbian/Russian position has helped to create confusion and uncertainty within the International Community in Kosovo. No one is really sure just how to respond to the Serbian refusal to respect the authority of the Kosovo Government or the blatant efforts to bring the Serbian controlled areas of Kosovo openly under the authority of Serbia and its administrative structures.

Because of the inability to phase out UNMIK as planned (due to Russian blockage in the Security Council), the exact roles of UNMIK, the new EU Mission (EULEX) and the International Civilian Representative (chosen by the International Steering Group composed of key countries supporting Kosovo Independence) are uncertain and can best be described as a work in progress.

Adding to the confusion, there are differing views within UNMIK as to the speed, which the new Kosovo Government should assume full responsibility in certain areas such as privatization, despite now having laws on the books, which give them that authority.

Despite everything which has transpired thus far, the Western International Community STILL does not fully grasp the extent of the Serbian attachment to Kosovo. It makes the erroneous assumption that if the DS is successful in forming the next Serbian government, it will quietly let this issue die. This is wishful thinking.

The reality is that there will be no letup in the de facto partition of Kosovo; no change in the strong diplomatic position taken by Serbia in all international fora; and no recognition of Kosovo government authority. While a Radical-led government with the participation of Vojislav Koštunica would undoubtedly take more provocative steps and would use stronger rhetoric, for the foreseeable future there will be major problems over Kosovo regardless of what parties end up governing Serbia.

The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon has been pressed hard by all sides. He has tried to walk a very fine line, respecting UN Security Council 1244 on the one hand, and not condemning the Unilateral Declaration of Independence on the other. The recent letters sent to President Tadić and President Sejdiu were important both for what they said and for what they did not say. He, for example, did not give Sejdiu any title at all in his letter, referring to him only as "Your Excellency" in contrast to addressing Tadić as President of the Republic of Serbia.

He also without directly saying so, acknowledged the Serbian boycott of Kosovo institutions and their refusal to accept the EU Mission by stating that for a "limited duration" the police in the Serbian areas would report via international authority to his Special Representative; that additional local and district courts can be created in these areas; and even went so far as to decree that the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo would retain the sole right to preserve and reconstruct its religious, historical, and cultural sites in Kosovo and will remain under the direct authority of its religious seat in Belgrade.

At the same time, the UN Secretary-General implicitly accepted - by not directly challenging - the reduction of UNMIK authorities and the establishment of the Kosovo Government as a more-or-less sovereign entity. He also created what should be sufficient cover for the EU Mission to set up under the umbrella of UNMIK. While a lot of details will have to be worked out, the way forward may now be clearer than it was. One might say it gives both sides room to continue to believe in their own parallel universe. The positions taken by the UN Secretary-General have themselves become controversial, with both Russia and Serbia calling the proposed reconfiguration of UNMIK "illegal."

For at least several more weeks, the Thaci government will be focused on getting up and running; staffing; and developing basic policies on all sorts of issues. Just establishing effective diplomatic representation around the world in key capitals will be a major undertaking, for example. But at some point, probably in the fall, attention is going to turn to the Serbian lack of respect for Kosovo governmental institutions and the de facto partition of the North. They will see that after some confusion with key figures such as the EU Representative, Peter Feith; the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Joachim Ruecker; and his Deputy, Larry Rossin taking strong positions against any parallel structures or attempts at partition, the rhetoric of the International Community has now changed. Ruecker and Rossin are being replaced. This is now by chance or coincidence.

The realities of the difficulties and dangers of trying to force their way into Serbian areas are becoming more apparent to the EU and U.S. authorities. Thus far world attention has focused almost entirely on the Serbian reaction to Independence. At some point the Kosovo Albanian reaction to the Serbian actions will demand equal attention and concern. There is no doubt that the Kosovo Albanians will feel let down – or even betrayed – by the International Community and will come under strong domestic pressure to "do something about it."

While for the first several months, the new Kosovo Government will be able to point to achievements and progress, the "Independence Honeymoon" will soon be over. The Serbian diplomatic offensive has had and will continue to have a negative impact on Kosovo's ability to have normal international contacts with many international organizations. The difficult relationship with Serbia will make trade and other economic ties with what should be its most important partner all but impossible (other than with the Serbian-controlled areas).

The personal and policy conflicts among the Kosovo Albanian parties will begin to have more importance and the Thaci government will find itself challenged for lack of progress on economic growth and "softness" in dealing with the Serbs. Relations with the International Community will get tenser.

All of the above probably describes the birth of yet another "frozen conflict" in the world. At the same time, viewed from the ground the conflict seems anything but frozen. Quite the contrary. The challenge for the international players may well be exactly that: to see that this raw wound with all of its emotion and anger does become "frozen."