Serbia decides its future

Serbia decides its future That should have been a wake-up call, if one was ever needed. This was particularly the case as the storm clouds over Kosovo were rapidly gaining force and it was clear that the drama would play out over the term of the new government. It was predictable that the parties in the ruling coalition would split over Kosovo policy. Nevertheless, each of the coalition partners managed to convince themselves that being part of a flawed government was the least bad choice both for their party and for Serbia. At least in their areas of responsibility, they believed that they could accomplish positive change. They also knew that failure to form a government would have resulted in new elections with probably the same outcome. The end result, however, was a schizophrenic government with rival ministers issuing uncoordinated and incompatible statements on a daily basis. Meanwhile, more and more voters lost confidence in all of the involved parties and the Radicals gained support and credibility. Ironically, the government has finally found something on which they all can whole-heartedly agree: that it should dissolve. The coalition government had irreconcilable differences over the direction, which the country should take, and decided that the best alternative was new Parliamentary elections. For all the faults of this coalition government, the Serbian people should be grateful to it for giving them this historic opportunity. Instead of being helpless bystanders, the future is now directly in the hands of the voters. Moreover, the basic two alternatives are clear: whether or not to continue with integration into the EU despite its actions in Kosovo. Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica has based his political career on two pillars. The first is a strong nationalist approach to questions such as cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Kosovo, and protecting the rights and autonomy of the Republika Srpska. The second was respect for democratic procedures, the rule of law and "evolution not revolution." It was this particular combination, which made him probably the only candidate capable of beating Milosevic in the September 2000 elections. But those heady days are long past. It seems inescapable that if he is in the next government, it will be in coalition with the Radicals. Whether this was inevitable or the fortunes of Balkan politics and pressures of the Western international community will be the subject of many doctoral dissertations in the future. In any case, the battle lines are now clearly drawn. The DSS, the Radical Party, the Socialist Party of Slobodan Milosevic, and Velimir Ilic's People's Party are on one side of the divide and the Democratic Party of President Tadic, G17 Plus, and the LDP of Cedomir Jovanovic on the other. The former support a platform of no cooperation with the European Union unless it formally declares that Kosovo is part of Serbia. As there is no chance on earth for this to happen (having taken the decision to send the EULEX Mission to Kosovo and having a majority of EU countries already recognizing Kosovo independence), this means that for the foreseeable future under a government formed from these parties, Serbia would deliberately isolate itself from the European Union integration process, giving up considerable economic assistance and visa-free entry into the EU. Freed from the restraining hand of the DS and G17 Plus, this new government would also probably take more provocative steps both in regard to Kosovo and against those countries that have recognized Kosovo independence. On the other side of the divide, President Boris Tadic will run a similar campaign as in his recent successful re-election: the twin priorities of continuing to assert Serbia's sovereignty over Kosovo but also pushing hard for fast admittance into the EU as the only plausible alternative for Serbia. G17 Plus may or may not be in a pre-election coalition with him, but in any case will run a campaign along similar lines. These two parties will keep their distance from the LDP of Cedomir Jovanovic in the pre-election period because of his different stance on Kosovo. Anyone who tries to simplistically add up party support to predict the outcome of the elections will probably be making a mistake. The reality is that within almost every Serb is an internal conflict. They are all angry with the West for illegally and unfairly "taking " the cradle of their civilization away and many want to lash out somehow, in some direction in retaliation. But a large number also pragmatically realize that the only viable future for Serbia is integration into the EU as soon as possible. Which of these two options/emotions will be stronger on Election Day is uncertain and may well depend on events in the next two months. The recent Presidential election demonstrates both the tremendous degree of interest in this question and the closeness of the outcome. The next two months are going to be potentially very difficult, if not dangerous. For the "isolationists" to prevail, they must keep Kosovo on center stage and in the headlines. This means that they need to encourage the Kosovo Serbs, supported by Belgrade, to "push the envelope" more and more and to provoke UNMIK/EULEX/KFOR/the Kosovo Government into confrontations. If the Kosovo story fades from the front page, the moderates favoring continuing European integration are likely to prevail. The Prime Minister will continue his tactic of taking hard, nationalistic positions and forcing his political opponents to choose between meekly swallowing their objections and following his lead like sheep or appearing "unpatriotic." Lost in this confrontation is the day-to-day welfare of the Serbs actually living in Kosovo. Part of the strategy from Belgrade is to have them renounce all ties with the Kosovo Government institutions and the newly-formed EULEX Mission. But to do so, particularly in the South of Kosovo, requires a great deal of resources - and creativity - from the government in Belgrade. Given that it will be a minimum of three months before there is a new, fully-functioning government in place in Serbia, it is likely their plight at least to some extent will be if not forgotten, at least not adequately addressed. The European Union also has a significant challenge. It needs to concretely demonstrate to the Serbian people in a convincing way that there is a European future for them. The election results may well depend on whether a majority of Serbian people are convinced this is the case. Meanwhile, the International Community will also need to deal delicately with what are sure to be intentional provocations in Kosovo and possibly in Bosnia as well. A Serbia in self-imposed isolation is not in the interest of anyone. It would adversely impact on the stability of the region as a whole. The EU is well aware of that and short of reversing its policy decisions on Kosovo, will be working to prevent it. At the end of the day, however, the harsh, cold reality is that Serbian isolation is a much bigger problem for the Serbian people than anyone else. Thanks to these upcoming elections, the citizens of Serbia will at least get to make that choice themselves. Battle lines are drawn: Kostunica, Tadic (FoNet, archive) The current coalition government in Serbia was doomed to fail even before it was cobbled together after prolonged negotiations less than one year ago. The incompatibility of the parties was demonstrated during the formation process, when the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS-Kostunica) voted for Toma Nikolic of the Radical Party as Speaker of the Parliament. William Montgomery "A Serbia in self-imposed isolation is not in the interest of anyone. It would adversely impact on the stability of the region as a whole. The EU is well aware of that and short of reversing its policy decisions on Kosovo, will be working to prevent it."

Serbia decides its future

That should have been a wake-up call, if one was ever needed. This was particularly the case as the storm clouds over Kosovo were rapidly gaining force and it was clear that the drama would play out over the term of the new government. It was predictable that the parties in the ruling coalition would split over Kosovo policy.

Nevertheless, each of the coalition partners managed to convince themselves that being part of a flawed government was the least bad choice both for their party and for Serbia. At least in their areas of responsibility, they believed that they could accomplish positive change.

They also knew that failure to form a government would have resulted in new elections with probably the same outcome. The end result, however, was a schizophrenic government with rival ministers issuing uncoordinated and incompatible statements on a daily basis. Meanwhile, more and more voters lost confidence in all of the involved parties and the Radicals gained support and credibility.

Ironically, the government has finally found something on which they all can whole-heartedly agree: that it should dissolve. The coalition government had irreconcilable differences over the direction, which the country should take, and decided that the best alternative was new Parliamentary elections.

For all the faults of this coalition government, the Serbian people should be grateful to it for giving them this historic opportunity. Instead of being helpless bystanders, the future is now directly in the hands of the voters. Moreover, the basic two alternatives are clear: whether or not to continue with integration into the EU despite its actions in Kosovo.

Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica has based his political career on two pillars. The first is a strong nationalist approach to questions such as cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Kosovo, and protecting the rights and autonomy of the Republika Srpska. The second was respect for democratic procedures, the rule of law and "evolution not revolution."

It was this particular combination, which made him probably the only candidate capable of beating Milosevic in the September 2000 elections. But those heady days are long past. It seems inescapable that if he is in the next government, it will be in coalition with the Radicals. Whether this was inevitable or the fortunes of Balkan politics and pressures of the Western international community will be the subject of many doctoral dissertations in the future.

In any case, the battle lines are now clearly drawn. The DSS, the Radical Party, the Socialist Party of Slobodan Milosevic, and Velimir Ilic's People's Party are on one side of the divide and the Democratic Party of President Tadić, G17 Plus, and the LDP of Cedomir Jovanovic on the other. The former support a platform of no cooperation with the European Union unless it formally declares that Kosovo is part of Serbia.

As there is no chance on earth for this to happen (having taken the decision to send the EULEX Mission to Kosovo and having a majority of EU countries already recognizing Kosovo independence), this means that for the foreseeable future under a government formed from these parties, Serbia would deliberately isolate itself from the European Union integration process, giving up considerable economic assistance and visa-free entry into the EU.

Freed from the restraining hand of the DS and G17 Plus, this new government would also probably take more provocative steps both in regard to Kosovo and against those countries that have recognized Kosovo independence.

On the other side of the divide, President Boris Tadić will run a similar campaign as in his recent successful re-election: the twin priorities of continuing to assert Serbia's sovereignty over Kosovo but also pushing hard for fast admittance into the EU as the only plausible alternative for Serbia. G17 Plus may or may not be in a pre-election coalition with him, but in any case will run a campaign along similar lines. These two parties will keep their distance from the LDP of Čedomir Jovanović in the pre-election period because of his different stance on Kosovo.

Anyone who tries to simplistically add up party support to predict the outcome of the elections will probably be making a mistake. The reality is that within almost every Serb is an internal conflict. They are all angry with the West for illegally and unfairly "taking " the cradle of their civilization away and many want to lash out somehow, in some direction in retaliation.

But a large number also pragmatically realize that the only viable future for Serbia is integration into the EU as soon as possible. Which of these two options/emotions will be stronger on Election Day is uncertain and may well depend on events in the next two months. The recent Presidential election demonstrates both the tremendous degree of interest in this question and the closeness of the outcome.

The next two months are going to be potentially very difficult, if not dangerous. For the "isolationists" to prevail, they must keep Kosovo on center stage and in the headlines. This means that they need to encourage the Kosovo Serbs, supported by Belgrade, to "push the envelope" more and more and to provoke UNMIK/EULEX/KFOR/the Kosovo Government into confrontations.

If the Kosovo story fades from the front page, the moderates favoring continuing European integration are likely to prevail. The Prime Minister will continue his tactic of taking hard, nationalistic positions and forcing his political opponents to choose between meekly swallowing their objections and following his lead like sheep or appearing "unpatriotic."

Lost in this confrontation is the day-to-day welfare of the Serbs actually living in Kosovo. Part of the strategy from Belgrade is to have them renounce all ties with the Kosovo Government institutions and the newly-formed EULEX Mission. But to do so, particularly in the South of Kosovo, requires a great deal of resources - and creativity - from the government in Belgrade. Given that it will be a minimum of three months before there is a new, fully-functioning government in place in Serbia, it is likely their plight at least to some extent will be if not forgotten, at least not adequately addressed.

The European Union also has a significant challenge. It needs to concretely demonstrate to the Serbian people in a convincing way that there is a European future for them. The election results may well depend on whether a majority of Serbian people are convinced this is the case. Meanwhile, the International Community will also need to deal delicately with what are sure to be intentional provocations in Kosovo and possibly in Bosnia as well.

A Serbia in self-imposed isolation is not in the interest of anyone. It would adversely impact on the stability of the region as a whole. The EU is well aware of that and short of reversing its policy decisions on Kosovo, will be working to prevent it. At the end of the day, however, the harsh, cold reality is that Serbian isolation is a much bigger problem for the Serbian people than anyone else. Thanks to these upcoming elections, the citizens of Serbia will at least get to make that choice themselves.