Independence, partition, and frozen conflicts

Independence, partition, and frozen conflicts Despite the passionate objections of the Serbs (encouraged and supported by Russia), it is now a certainty that the Kosovo Albanians, under the leadership of Hashim Thaci and in very close consultation with the United States and key players in the European Union, within the next two months will initiate the beginning of the process of unilaterally declaring independence. The exact timing will depend on whether a specific date in January is set within the next week for Serbian Presidential elections. If it is, the process will be delayed until the elections are completed. If it is not, the process will begin sooner. I say process because it is deliberately designed to not be one specific event, but a series of measures and actions, which will take place over a few months. One of the purposes is to reduce the adverse reaction from Serbia. But another is to permit implementation of elements of the Ahtisaari plan to demonstrate the commitment of the Kosovo Albanian government to all the elements of that plan. The Serbs will not believe for a second in the sincerity of these promises and will make that abundantly clear. But the Kosovo Albanians know very well that their consistent signs of good faith on this issue is an important part of the price of getting most of the EU countries to agree to recognize Kosovo's eventual unilateral declaration of independence. Just as was delaying unilateral actions and going through the recent process of Troika negotiations, which everyone knew from the beginning would be fruitless. The Kosovo Albanians have consistently been told that they cannot put one foot wrong as this process plays itself out and that they must resist responding to any provocations. One can be sure that virtually every statement and act, which the new Kosovo government takes after its formation, will include conciliatory language regarding the Serbs and other minorities. While there is now in place a "coalition of the willing" within the EU to proceed down this path, it is fragile. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, Serbian authorities know very well that this process of independence is coming. One certain step they will take is that neither the Serbian government nor the Kosovo Serbs themselves will accept the declaration of independence. Both will immediately take steps to underscore that in their view Kosovo is and will always be a part of Serbia. What this means for sure is that similar to Croatia and Bosnia in 1990-91, the Kosovo Serbs will reject any authority of the Kosovo government over these areas. In contrast to the situations in Croatia and Bosnia, however, they will not set up independent governments, but will significantly strengthen their ties with Serbia proper. In other words, we are looking at a form of …partition. By boycotting the recent elections in Kosovo, the Serbs lost control of five opcinas in which they are a majority. By its unwillingness to enforce the results of that election, UNMIK, KDOR, and the OSCE have shown that they want to avoid a confrontation with the Kosovo Serbs. This is an important signal as to how they will be inclined to react to a partition. The "best case scenario" of the U.S. and EU following independence is that the way the Serbs set up their enclaves is not sufficiently provocative and aggressive that they have to be dealt with immediately, either by the International Community or the new government in Kosovo. In other words, they are looking for a variation of …a frozen conflict. Under this scenario, gradually over time the breakaway areas would fade away as the benefits of belonging to a Kosovo coming ever closer to the EU becomes apparent. While this may take "heavy lifting," it would be one of the major tasks of the new International Representative to be appointed by the EU. The usual conditionality and "soft power" of the EU would be used both in Serbian proper and with the breakaway enclaves. There is one big problem with this scenario, however, and that is the likely Serbian reaction. If one wants to understand how many Serbs, including Prime Minister Kostunica see Kosovo, think of how a mother or father would feel if told by the authorities that one of their children was going to be taken away. Looked at it in this light, it becomes easier to understand why appeals to reason, pragmatism, and offers of various "carrots" have not been successful and have even been counter-productive. It also explains why the reaction to independence will be exceptionally strong, even if the ultimate cost to Serbia and to the Kosovo Serbs of their actions may be very high. What this means is that it is highly doubtful that the strategy of permitting this sort of "frozen conflict" will actually be successful. First of all, we should never forget the high possibility of totally random, unplanned acts of violence by individuals or small groups of either ethnicity. These acts can take on a life of their own. The March, 2004 riots, for example, were started by the drive-by shooting death of a Kosovo Serb and the subsequent drowning deaths of three Kosovo Albanian youngsters in the same area. Secondly, the Prime Minister and many other Serbs truly will not want the "best case" scenario to work, because it would mean that they "lost" Kosovo. So it seems inevitable to me that instead of a "soft" partition such as the International Community would want, the Serbs will make it very "hard" indeed…and permanent. The challenge then will be how will KFOR, the International Community and the Kosovo Albanians react? At the same time, the Serbian government will undoubtedly take other steps, which will make ordinary life more difficult in Kosovo, even if it means increased difficulties for at least some of the Kosovo Serbs as well. A classic example is the blockage thus far by Serbia of the annual renewal of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. Probably the most important task, which the OSCE in Kosovo will perform, is to monitor the degree of decentralization and the treatment of minorities. Their presence, therefore, is of utmost importance to Kosovo Serbs. Blocking it is a self-inflicted wound not only because of its impact in Kosovo, but also because of the impression it makes on most of the other OSCE-member countries. Finally, it is hard to see how even this best-case scenario can unfold without at the same time totally destabilizing the Serbian political scene. Given the conflicting goals and interests of the ruling coalition, it is hard to see how it can survive the inevitable push to take exceptionally strong retaliatory measures. It is also a big mistake to underestimate the strength of Serbian "inat." They may well know full well that they will be hurting themselves more than anyone else with some of their actions, but that doesn't mean that they won't go ahead anyway. How will they react? KFOR in northern Kosovo (Beta) Over the past year, among the possible solutions that have been mentioned for Kosovo have been independence, partition and a "frozen conflict." At first glance it appears that these three are radically different and in fact, mutually exclusive. However, it now turns out that the best-case scenario for the next year involves all three. William Montgomery It is also a big mistake to underestimate the strength of Serbian "inat." They may well know full well that they will be hurting themselves more than anyone else with some of their actions, but that doesn't mean that they won't go ahead anyway.

Independence, partition, and frozen conflicts

Despite the passionate objections of the Serbs (encouraged and supported by Russia), it is now a certainty that the Kosovo Albanians, under the leadership of Hashim Thaci and in very close consultation with the United States and key players in the European Union, within the next two months will initiate the beginning of the process of unilaterally declaring independence.

The exact timing will depend on whether a specific date in January is set within the next week for Serbian Presidential elections. If it is, the process will be delayed until the elections are completed. If it is not, the process will begin sooner.

I say process because it is deliberately designed to not be one specific event, but a series of measures and actions, which will take place over a few months. One of the purposes is to reduce the adverse reaction from Serbia. But another is to permit implementation of elements of the Ahtisaari plan to demonstrate the commitment of the Kosovo Albanian government to all the elements of that plan.

The Serbs will not believe for a second in the sincerity of these promises and will make that abundantly clear. But the Kosovo Albanians know very well that their consistent signs of good faith on this issue is an important part of the price of getting most of the EU countries to agree to recognize Kosovo's eventual unilateral declaration of independence. Just as was delaying unilateral actions and going through the recent process of Troika negotiations, which everyone knew from the beginning would be fruitless.

The Kosovo Albanians have consistently been told that they cannot put one foot wrong as this process plays itself out and that they must resist responding to any provocations. One can be sure that virtually every statement and act, which the new Kosovo government takes after its formation, will include conciliatory language regarding the Serbs and other minorities. While there is now in place a "coalition of the willing" within the EU to proceed down this path, it is fragile.

Despite rhetoric to the contrary, Serbian authorities know very well that this process of independence is coming. One certain step they will take is that neither the Serbian government nor the Kosovo Serbs themselves will accept the declaration of independence. Both will immediately take steps to underscore that in their view Kosovo is and will always be a part of Serbia.

What this means for sure is that similar to Croatia and Bosnia in 1990-91, the Kosovo Serbs will reject any authority of the Kosovo government over these areas. In contrast to the situations in Croatia and Bosnia, however, they will not set up independent governments, but will significantly strengthen their ties with Serbia proper. In other words, we are looking at a form of …partition.

By boycotting the recent elections in Kosovo, the Serbs lost control of five opcinas in which they are a majority. By its unwillingness to enforce the results of that election, UNMIK, KDOR, and the OSCE have shown that they want to avoid a confrontation with the Kosovo Serbs. This is an important signal as to how they will be inclined to react to a partition.

The "best case scenario" of the U.S. and EU following independence is that the way the Serbs set up their enclaves is not sufficiently provocative and aggressive that they have to be dealt with immediately, either by the International Community or the new government in Kosovo. In other words, they are looking for a variation of …a frozen conflict.

Under this scenario, gradually over time the breakaway areas would fade away as the benefits of belonging to a Kosovo coming ever closer to the EU becomes apparent. While this may take "heavy lifting," it would be one of the major tasks of the new International Representative to be appointed by the EU. The usual conditionality and "soft power" of the EU would be used both in Serbian proper and with the breakaway enclaves.

There is one big problem with this scenario, however, and that is the likely Serbian reaction. If one wants to understand how many Serbs, including Prime Minister Koštunica see Kosovo, think of how a mother or father would feel if told by the authorities that one of their children was going to be taken away.

Looked at it in this light, it becomes easier to understand why appeals to reason, pragmatism, and offers of various "carrots" have not been successful and have even been counter-productive. It also explains why the reaction to independence will be exceptionally strong, even if the ultimate cost to Serbia and to the Kosovo Serbs of their actions may be very high.

What this means is that it is highly doubtful that the strategy of permitting this sort of "frozen conflict" will actually be successful. First of all, we should never forget the high possibility of totally random, unplanned acts of violence by individuals or small groups of either ethnicity. These acts can take on a life of their own. The March, 2004 riots, for example, were started by the drive-by shooting death of a Kosovo Serb and the subsequent drowning deaths of three Kosovo Albanian youngsters in the same area.

Secondly, the Prime Minister and many other Serbs truly will not want the "best case" scenario to work, because it would mean that they "lost" Kosovo. So it seems inevitable to me that instead of a "soft" partition such as the International Community would want, the Serbs will make it very "hard" indeed…and permanent. The challenge then will be how will KFOR, the International Community and the Kosovo Albanians react?

At the same time, the Serbian government will undoubtedly take other steps, which will make ordinary life more difficult in Kosovo, even if it means increased difficulties for at least some of the Kosovo Serbs as well. A classic example is the blockage thus far by Serbia of the annual renewal of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo.

Probably the most important task, which the OSCE in Kosovo will perform, is to monitor the degree of decentralization and the treatment of minorities. Their presence, therefore, is of utmost importance to Kosovo Serbs. Blocking it is a self-inflicted wound not only because of its impact in Kosovo, but also because of the impression it makes on most of the other OSCE-member countries.

Finally, it is hard to see how even this best-case scenario can unfold without at the same time totally destabilizing the Serbian political scene. Given the conflicting goals and interests of the ruling coalition, it is hard to see how it can survive the inevitable push to take exceptionally strong retaliatory measures.

It is also a big mistake to underestimate the strength of Serbian "inat." They may well know full well that they will be hurting themselves more than anyone else with some of their actions, but that doesn't mean that they won't go ahead anyway.