Russia asserts itself – part II

Russia asserts itself – part II It was called the "Cold War," but in fact it was filled with clashes of surrogate powers around the world; nuclear showdowns such as the Cuban Missile Crisis; brutal use of force to maintain its rule on the part of Communist authorities in Eastern Europe; and the expenditure of hundreds of billions of dollars to build up massive amounts of armaments by both sides. For people under thirty, this means absolutely nothing. For those over forty, particularly in Europe, it has left searing memories. Like the villain in an American horror film that seemingly cannot be killed, the "Cold War" came back into our lives last week with the Russian invasion of Georgia, an independent country faced with two breakaway areas, both of which have long been funded, supported, and protected by Russia. More importantly it brought to the fore questions of whether Russia would follow similar steps in other countries in its "Near Abroad" where 25 million ethnic Russians live or where there are other ethnic groups refusing to accept the authority of the central government. The most significant result of the Georgian conflict was a hardening of the general public attitude in the West towards Russia. In the countries closest to Russia, it brought back long-held suspicions and fears over the nature of Russia itself. The best example is the speed with which an agreement between the United States and Poland for the establishment of a base on Polish territory for the U.S. anti-missile program, which had been delayed for a year and one-half, was signed virtually overnight. More importantly, the U.S. at Polish request promised to station a battery of Patriot missiles manned by U.S. soldiers on Polish soil and also promised to respond to any aggression against Poland without waiting for NATO to act. Both of these additions reflect concern over Russian intentions and concern about the strength of NATO's long-standing policy of "an attack on one is an attack on all." This is an absolutely critical moment in the evolution of Russian relations with the West. The primary challenge now is to walk the very fine line between taking too aggressive a response (which could significantly increase the stakes for both sides) and doing too little (and thus encouraging further Russian provocations). Just as Secretary of State Rice reminded Russia that this "was not 1968" when Czechoslovakia was invaded by Warsaw Pact forces to restore a hard-line Communist government in that country, NATO also needs to keep in mind that the situation now is also different from that earlier period. The temptation is to begin to compare the current Russia with the former Soviet Union and act accordingly. It just isn't the case yet and doesn't have to go that way in the future. But by our actions, we could well make it into a self-fulfilling prophecy. The challenges facing the United States and most of the countries of "Old Europe" are very different. For the United States, we have to accept that the rise of an aggressive, assertive Russia burdened by "Cold War thinking" both views its "Near Abroad" as rightly falling under its sphere of influence and will no longer accept further advances of NATO into it. For years, the cost of ignoring Russian concerns was minor. That is no longer the case and we need to evaluate carefully what this means for our policies. If we continue our present course, it will inevitably lead to an exacerbation of the conflict and push Russia even further down the road towards an openly adversarial relationship. If we do not wish this to occur, then we must pull back from our rhetoric and military collaboration with Georgia and Ukraine. While this will not be easy, the reality is that the very idea of Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO was always problematic. Both have severe internal problems, which NATO by its own policies would judge as too severe to permit membership. For "Old Europe" it means getting its act together and agreeing with the United States on one or two significant measures to take to make it clear to Russia that it will pay a price for its continued presence in Georgia and for any similar actions in the future. These should be non-military measures such as denying WTO membership, stopping work on a Trade and Security Agreement with the EU, or suspending meetings of the G-8 countries. It is absolutely critical that Russia perceives that NATO is willing and able to respond to its challenge. If Putin perceives weakness and indecision, it will only embolden him even more. It is equally critical to define these issues clearly in order to confine our immediate response to them and not to start "upping the ante" by adding new ones to the bundle. The reality is that the world is filled with major problems. This starts with the whole bundle of issues called the Middle East, including the Israeli problem; Iraq; Afghanistan; Pakistan; the rise of Muslim fundamentalism; and Al Qaeda and its offshoots. A second is the growing disparity between supply and demand for energy. A third is the growing worldwide food shortages. A fourth is the spread of recession from the United States to Europe and perhaps beyond. A fifth is the whole question of the impact of global warming and how to deal with it. A sixth is fitting China, India, and other rapidly expanding economic powers into the world of globalization smoothly. When put in this context, this whole affair with Russia should be pretty far down the scale of priorities. It will be a mistake and waste of our energy to focus on it excessively. Moreover, it will be counter-productive. The stronger the rhetoric, the worse and more dangerous this relationship can become. While in an ideal world, the countries of the Russian near-abroad should have every right to develop strong ties with the West and with NATO, Realpolitik dictates that picking a major battle with Russia over it is simply not wise at this time. While this may sound unprincipled, the fact is that there are a lot of serious human rights issues - and aggressive countries - around the world and we do not have the resources or ability to engage in battles to "free" each one of them. Just as during the Cold War, we had to accept our inability to "free" Eastern Europe from Communist domination, we have to accept that there are limits to how far NATO should go in Georgia and Ukraine. Major NATO members need to privately reaffirm to themselves that an attack on one really remains an attack on all and to agree on a mechanism to ensure that any threat to any of its members will be met with an instantaneous response. Putin needs to be informed privately by a key European country such as Germany that this is the case and it is a redline not to be crossed. At the same time, NATO members on the periphery of Russia need to be quietly warned to avoid provoking the new bully in the neighborhood. The West can and should continue or reinforce certain types of contacts with Georgia and Ukraine, but not in the military area. In sum, this problem needs to be contained. It cannot be allowed either to impact on the broad range of Russian relations with the West or to go unchallenged. We need to choose our battles and our enemies very carefully. This is not the time nor the place nor the issue for a showdown with Russia, as reprehensible as its actions have been. Inform him privately: Vladimir Putin (Beta) For almost half a century, the central geo-political struggle in the world was between NATO and its like-minded allies on one side and the Warsaw Pact on the other. William Montgomery "We need to choose our battles and our enemies very carefully. This is not the time nor the place nor the issue for a showdown with Russia, as reprehensible as its actions have been."

Russia asserts itself – part II

It was called the "Cold War," but in fact it was filled with clashes of surrogate powers around the world; nuclear showdowns such as the Cuban Missile Crisis; brutal use of force to maintain its rule on the part of Communist authorities in Eastern Europe; and the expenditure of hundreds of billions of dollars to build up massive amounts of armaments by both sides. For people under thirty, this means absolutely nothing. For those over forty, particularly in Europe, it has left searing memories.

Like the villain in an American horror film that seemingly cannot be killed, the "Cold War" came back into our lives last week with the Russian invasion of Georgia, an independent country faced with two breakaway areas, both of which have long been funded, supported, and protected by Russia.

More importantly it brought to the fore questions of whether Russia would follow similar steps in other countries in its "Near Abroad" where 25 million ethnic Russians live or where there are other ethnic groups refusing to accept the authority of the central government.

The most significant result of the Georgian conflict was a hardening of the general public attitude in the West towards Russia. In the countries closest to Russia, it brought back long-held suspicions and fears over the nature of Russia itself. The best example is the speed with which an agreement between the United States and Poland for the establishment of a base on Polish territory for the U.S. anti-missile program, which had been delayed for a year and one-half, was signed virtually overnight.

More importantly, the U.S. at Polish request promised to station a battery of Patriot missiles manned by U.S. soldiers on Polish soil and also promised to respond to any aggression against Poland without waiting for NATO to act. Both of these additions reflect concern over Russian intentions and concern about the strength of NATO's long-standing policy of "an attack on one is an attack on all."

This is an absolutely critical moment in the evolution of Russian relations with the West. The primary challenge now is to walk the very fine line between taking too aggressive a response (which could significantly increase the stakes for both sides) and doing too little (and thus encouraging further Russian provocations).

Just as Secretary of State Rice reminded Russia that this "was not 1968" when Czechoslovakia was invaded by Warsaw Pact forces to restore a hard-line Communist government in that country, NATO also needs to keep in mind that the situation now is also different from that earlier period.

The temptation is to begin to compare the current Russia with the former Soviet Union and act accordingly. It just isn't the case yet and doesn't have to go that way in the future. But by our actions, we could well make it into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The challenges facing the United States and most of the countries of "Old Europe" are very different.

For the United States, we have to accept that the rise of an aggressive, assertive Russia burdened by "Cold War thinking" both views its "Near Abroad" as rightly falling under its sphere of influence and will no longer accept further advances of NATO into it. For years, the cost of ignoring Russian concerns was minor. That is no longer the case and we need to evaluate carefully what this means for our policies.

If we continue our present course, it will inevitably lead to an exacerbation of the conflict and push Russia even further down the road towards an openly adversarial relationship. If we do not wish this to occur, then we must pull back from our rhetoric and military collaboration with Georgia and Ukraine.

While this will not be easy, the reality is that the very idea of Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO was always problematic. Both have severe internal problems, which NATO by its own policies would judge as too severe to permit membership.

For "Old Europe" it means getting its act together and agreeing with the United States on one or two significant measures to take to make it clear to Russia that it will pay a price for its continued presence in Georgia and for any similar actions in the future. These should be non-military measures such as denying WTO membership, stopping work on a Trade and Security Agreement with the EU, or suspending meetings of the G-8 countries.

It is absolutely critical that Russia perceives that NATO is willing and able to respond to its challenge. If Putin perceives weakness and indecision, it will only embolden him even more. It is equally critical to define these issues clearly in order to confine our immediate response to them and not to start "upping the ante" by adding new ones to the bundle.

The reality is that the world is filled with major problems. This starts with the whole bundle of issues called the Middle East, including the Israeli problem; Iraq; Afghanistan; Pakistan; the rise of Muslim fundamentalism; and Al Qaeda and its offshoots. A second is the growing disparity between supply and demand for energy. A third is the growing worldwide food shortages.

A fourth is the spread of recession from the United States to Europe and perhaps beyond. A fifth is the whole question of the impact of global warming and how to deal with it. A sixth is fitting China, India, and other rapidly expanding economic powers into the world of globalization smoothly.

When put in this context, this whole affair with Russia should be pretty far down the scale of priorities. It will be a mistake and waste of our energy to focus on it excessively. Moreover, it will be counter-productive. The stronger the rhetoric, the worse and more dangerous this relationship can become. While in an ideal world, the countries of the Russian near-abroad should have every right to develop strong ties with the West and with NATO, Realpolitik dictates that picking a major battle with Russia over it is simply not wise at this time.

While this may sound unprincipled, the fact is that there are a lot of serious human rights issues - and aggressive countries - around the world and we do not have the resources or ability to engage in battles to "free" each one of them. Just as during the Cold War, we had to accept our inability to "free" Eastern Europe from Communist domination, we have to accept that there are limits to how far NATO should go in Georgia and Ukraine.

Major NATO members need to privately reaffirm to themselves that an attack on one really remains an attack on all and to agree on a mechanism to ensure that any threat to any of its members will be met with an instantaneous response. Putin needs to be informed privately by a key European country such as Germany that this is the case and it is a redline not to be crossed.

At the same time, NATO members on the periphery of Russia need to be quietly warned to avoid provoking the new bully in the neighborhood. The West can and should continue or reinforce certain types of contacts with Georgia and Ukraine, but not in the military area.

In sum, this problem needs to be contained. It cannot be allowed either to impact on the broad range of Russian relations with the West or to go unchallenged. We need to choose our battles and our enemies very carefully. This is not the time nor the place nor the issue for a showdown with Russia, as reprehensible as its actions have been.