What the death of Larijani means for Iran and the conflict in the Middle East?

“He is one of the few people who can still meet with the leader, and his task is to save the system,” the official said.

The man he was referring to was Ali Larijani, Iran’s head of national security, who is now, according to Israeli claims, dead—the latest in a series of killed high-ranking officials and possibly the most important so far, writes The Telegraph.

The man who pulled the strings

The alleged killing of Larijani is notably different from the attack in which Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed. Khamenei was the head of state, religious authority, and constitutional supreme commander. Larijani, on the other hand, was the man who made the system function.

• Larijani decided: Iran will not negotiate with the United States

It was believed that since June of last year, he had been the de facto leader of Iran and one of the few true diplomats the Islamic Republic had for decades.

His role included managing the flow of information between institutions, coordinating diplomatic channels, suppressing factional conflicts, and implementing controlled succession to prevent the system from collapsing into competing centers of power.

Now the question arises whether there is anyone else in Iran with the institutional knowledge, trust, and practical experience needed to keep the system together. All signs indicate that the answer is – no.

A complex system on the brink of collapse

The Iranian Islamic Republic was designed as a complex system of overlapping institutions, with intentionally competing centers of power. For it to function, constant coordination from the Supreme Leader’s office was required.

The president leads the civilian government but answers to the Supreme Leader. The Revolutionary Guard controls much of the economy and the security apparatus but is formally subordinate to the leader. The Assembly of Experts elects the Supreme Leader, but it operates at his will, while the Guardian Council vets candidates according to criteria defined by the leader himself.

This structure prevents any single institution from gaining too much power, but it also means that nothing can function without central coordination. The system’s weakness lies in its dependence on someone who understands all its parts and can align them.

Larijani’s deep knowledge of the system cannot be quickly transferred or easily replaced. He knew which clerics in Qom held real influence and which were merely titular. He spent decades building relationships with Russian officials, Chinese diplomats, and regional powers. He knew how to structure negotiations so that hardliners could accept compromises without losing face.

Consequences for the war

When Qassem Soleimani was killed in 2020, Iran replaced the commander of the elite Quds Force with Esmail Gani. When nuclear scientists were killed, new ones could be trained.

But there is no mechanism to replace someone who knows how to coordinate the entire system, because that role was never formally defined or recognized.

The question Iran now faces is not whether individual institutions can survive – because they can – but whether the system as a whole can function without the people who knew how to coordinate it.

With Larijani’s death, Iran has lost the person who could credibly negotiate with the United States.

He was the only one trusted by both Iranian hardliners and foreign governments to reach an agreement. This may suit Israel, which seeks the fall of the Islamic Republic, but those hoping for a quick exit from a war that is triggering a global energy crisis could be left disappointed.