Playing "chicken"

Playing "chicken"

In exchange for this "carrot," the majority Kosovo Albanians would have to accept a band of specific conditions, which would give the Serbian minority as many or more rights and privileges than any other minority in Europe.

The United States, with the reluctant and uneven backing of the European Union, is pressing for the Security Council to act quickly and endorse the package exactly as written.  Russia continues to state emphatically that it opposes any solution not acceptable to both sides (meaning to Serbia).

As Serbia refuses to accept any step, which in any way would even hint at independence for Kosovo, the implication is that the UN Security Council will be at a total impasse, both in terms of the substance of the Resolution and also on the speed of its passage. 

This reminds me of the American game of "chicken." The best example is two teenagers in cars deliberately heading at each other at full speed. The first one to swerve away "loses." Like those two crazy teenagers, the United States and Russia are on a collision course in the UN over Kosovo.

The analogy breaks down at this point, however, as in the case of the two teenagers, if neither backs down, the result is that both are killed in a fiery crash with little collateral damage. In the Kosovo case, the direct impact of this international game of "chicken" will not principally be on the United States or Russia. It will be on the people of this region. 

An outright veto by Russia or even a prolonged stalemate with no prospect of resolution will seriously destabilize Kosovo, Serbia, and potentially other countries in this region as well. As the European Union Enlargement Commissioner, Olli Rehn, said at the European Parliament in Brussels, such an impasse would trigger "the risk of instability and even chaos in the Balkans…it would be Europe that would have to pay the price, not Russia, not the United States."

In the game of "chicken," the most important rule is that one must not show any signs of doubt, wavering, or vacillation. Because to do so will telegraph weakness to your opponent, bolstering his confidence.

In keeping with this principle, neither the United States nor Russia has been willing to show any "give" in their positions. As one European Diplomat described the US/EU approach, there is "no Plan B."

The Russian approach is to delay, delay, and delay. This will accomplish two things. First of all, it will demonstrate to Serbia that it is keeping its word without actually casting a veto. But far more importantly, it will put immense pressure on the United States.

It will be up to the U.S. with its NATO/EU allies in Kosovo to keep the lid on what is bound to be ever-increasing frustration, rage, and fears of a sellout on the part of the Kosovo Albanian population. It will also lead to scenarios where it is either impatient Kosovo Albanians or Western countries, which will be to blame for breaking the current uneasy status quo.

What is very important for the Serbian people to understand, however, is that Russia's objective is not to help Serbia, but to turn it away from its Westward path to Euro/Atlantic integration and have it look to Russia instead. If it were up to Russia, Slobodan Milosevic would still rule Serbia. Following the September 24, 2000 elections, Russia did not intervene to encourage Milosevic to accept the results.

Quite the contrary, they were visibly uncomfortable with the DOS victory and the diminished relationship between Russia and Serbia over the next several years was one result. Russia will be happy with an isolated Serbia, cut off from the EU, and even facing sanctions again. So the Russian support, like the famous Trojan Horse, needs to be carefully considered.

The United States is now beginning its campaign with the help of the European Union to bring Russia around.  Richard Holbrooke's recent column, which states clearly that Russia will be to blame if its obstructionism with the Resolution results in violence or even war, will be one of the central points in those discussions.

Some observers have seen Vladimir Putin's recent speech in Germany in which he directly attacked the United States and its global policies as the official beginning of a new "Cold War." Certainly, Russia has been blatant in its use of oil and gas as political weapons; in its bullying of the "near abroad" countries; in its restrictions on democratic principles in Russia itself; and its desire to play a more important role on the international stage.

It faces scrutiny in how it deals with the Iran nuclear issue in particular. But there is also no question that definitive Russian blockage of a UN Resolution, either by veto or prolonged delay, that results in violence and destabilization in the Balkans will further the gap between Russia and the West significantly.

The other danger is that the two key players in this show, the United States and Russia, are by no means in full control of the situation. On any given day, Kosovo Albanians or Serbs could unilaterally take steps, which are so provocative; the other side will feel obliged to respond. Then we are off to the races!

There are a lot of scenarios to consider, each with a number of permutations. One point, however, is certain: no Resolution at all or a Russian veto will lead to violence, which probably will be impossible to contain. Where that leads is anyone's guess, but at the very least both Serbia proper and Kosovo would find themselves engulfed in nationalism and drifting further from the EU.

During the fighting from 1991-95 in Bosnia and Croatia, the United States never lost sight of the problems of Kosovo. This was because for all the horrors of Bosnia and Croatia, the violence was geographically contained. Our worry at that time was that violence in Kosovo had the potential to spill across Yugoslavia's borders into Macedonia.

That in turn had the potential of involving Bulgaria, Greece and others. It is precisely for that reason that in December 1992 the United States unilaterally issued the "Christmas warning" to Milosevic that if he provoked violence in Kosovo as was occurring in Bosnia and Croatia, the United States would react with all available means, including military force.

This was an extraordinary step for a couple of reasons. One, it was done unilaterally with no advance agreement with NATO. Two, it was issued when Kosovo was comparatively quiet and Bosnia and Croatia were in agony. Those same cross-border concerns again are beginning to dawn on Western diplomats.

My strong recommendation at this point is that we stop this game of "chicken" and come to a compromise UN Security Council Resolution. It would accept all of Ahtisaari's recommendations (including establishing the EU to replace UNMIK an setting up the Office of International Representative) with one extremely important difference.

The Resolution would explicitly forbid any steps towards independence for one year from its passage. During that time, the Kosovo government along with the International Civilian Representative from the EU would have a chance to consolidate and implement the rest of Ahtisaari's recommendations. After that period, the International Civilian Representative would issue a report for the UN Security Council consideration with his/her recommendations on whether the rest of the Ahtisaari plan is ready to be implemented.

This is not an ideal solution by any means and it will fall heavily on the United States to take the tough job of seeing that the Kosovo Albanians would accept it. But on the other hand, granting full independence, despite all the mitigating factors mentioned by its proponents, would be a major step. It is reasonable to see how the rest of the Ahtisaari recommendations fare before taking it.