One move could completely change the war

This week, Belarus is taking part in Russian-led nuclear military exercises, and last week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky publicly expressed concern about the possibility that Belarus could join the war from the north in support of Russia.

Such a development would not be surprising, writes The Kyiv Independent in its analysis. Belarus has previously taken provocative steps suggesting it could join the war on Russia’s side, most notably in 2024, when it allegedly mobilized a third of its ground forces toward the Ukrainian border.

The role of Minsk in Russia’s aggression

Belarus’s support for Russia since the start of the 2022 invasion has been crucial for Moscow’s military operations. During the first weeks of the war, Russia’s main attempt to seize Kyiv and overthrow the Ukrainian government was launched from Belarusian territory. From there, Russian forces advanced toward areas now associated with some of the worst war crimes, including Bucha and Irpin.

Belarus has also been accused of participating in the deportation of Ukrainian children. Even today, Russian drones and missiles use Belarusian airspace for safer routes to strike targets deep in western Ukraine before they can be intercepted by Ukrainian air defenses.

Lukashenko’s risks and a weak army

Despite the rhetoric from Moscow and Minsk, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko must be aware that an invasion of Ukraine would be extremely unpopular at home. Such a move could further destabilize his already fragile rule.

It would also be a deadly undertaking for the Belarusian army, whose troops lack significant combat experience, while Russia has in recent years used much of its best equipment to compensate for its own battlefield losses in Ukraine.

On the other hand, they would face Ukrainian armed forces, which are not only highly motivated to defend their country but are also among the most combat-experienced armies in the world. Learning from the lessons of 2022, Ukraine has also built fortifications along its northern border with Belarus. Any attempt at a Belarusian invasion would therefore likely be catastrophic and deadly for Belarusian forces.

However, Lukashenko also knows he depends on the Kremlin to remain in power. It is possible that Russian President Vladimir Putin could apply enough pressure on him to draw Belarus directly into the war.

Two possible invasion scenarios

If that happens, two main scenarios are likely. The first would be a Belarusian advance toward Kyiv. It is unlikely, if not impossible, that Belarus could achieve in 2026 what Russia failed to achieve in 2022 with far larger forces and stronger capabilities. Kyiv would almost certainly remain under Ukrainian control.

However, the mere threat to the capital could force Ukraine to redirect troops from critical front-line areas such as Donetsk to defend Kyiv, giving Russia more opportunities elsewhere.

The second scenario involves Belarus bypassing Kyiv entirely and instead attacking western Ukraine in an attempt to cut or disrupt key supply lines from Poland that support Ukraine’s war effort.

This would create significant logistical challenges for Ukraine and require the redeployment of tens of thousands of troops from important positions on the front. In both scenarios, even if Belarus failed to seize or hold territory, the invasion itself could weaken Ukrainian defenses elsewhere and create opportunities for Russia.

How the West could respond

In response to recent concerns about Belarus, the analysis outlines three immediate steps Western partners could take.

First, continue sharing intelligence on Belarusian military activity and the intentions of its leadership. The sooner Ukraine receives warnings, the better prepared it will be.

Second, NATO should conduct surprise military exercises in Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia—countries bordering Belarus. The goal would not be to threaten Belarus, but to demonstrate strength and remind Minsk of NATO’s presence and readiness to defend its territory.

Finally, Western military planners and logistics experts should strengthen alternative supply routes. If routes through Poland are disrupted, corridors through Romania could become increasingly important, and contingency planning must begin now rather than during a crisis.

The possibility of Lukashenko sending Belarusian forces into Ukraine may seem unlikely. However, after more than four years of war and with Russia increasingly desperate to shift the battlefield situation, nothing can be ruled out. Ukraine and its partners, the analysis concludes, must be prepared for the unexpected.