Serbia decides… or divides?

Serbia decides… or divides? The Democratic Party of President Tadic and its G17 Plus coalition partner achieved a great result, capturing 38 percent of the vote and 102 Parliamentary deputy positions. Defying pre-election polls and conventional wisdom, they won 9% more votes than their closest competitors, the Radical Party. They also did well in local elections almost across the board. There is no question that their focus on continuing European integration was the reason for their success. Their tactic of portraying the election as a critical referendum on Serbia's future course was only partially successful, however. It did not energize the electorate to vote, one of DS/G17 Plus' major goals. Turnout was only 61.17 percent, almost seven percent lower than in the recent second round of presidential elections and about the same as that in the last parliamentary elections of 2007. In other words, almost 40 percent of the electorate was not sufficiently concerned or interested to vote, despite the perceived stakes. The DS/G17 Plus strategy was successful, however, in pulling 1/3 of the supporters of the DSS in the last Parliamentary elections into their camp. This was due in large part to the EU's unprecedented actions in waiving the longstanding conditionality surrounding the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) and signing it just before the elections, as well as presenting a road map for the Schengen Visa "White List" at the same time. But most significantly, it was also due to Vojislav Kostunica's venomous attacks on these steps. This backfired and simply alarmed the more moderate supporters of the DSS. His loss of voters in comparison to the last Parliamentary elections is almost the same as the net gain of the DS/G17 Plus/Vuk Draskovic coalition. The DSS and Vojislav Kostunica personally were the big losers in the elections. As significant as the DS/G17 Plus result may be, it by no means guarantees what happens next. The elections once again have demonstrated that there is split in Serbia between two very different mindsets. One believes - passionately - that Serbia's future is as a fully integrated member of the European Union and competitive in the global economy. They want to achieve this goal as soon as possible, notwithstanding events in Kosovo. This includes the DS (Tadic); G17 Plus (Dinkic); the LDP (Jovanovic) and most of the assorted small minority parties. On the other side are the Radicals, the DSS (Kostunica)/NS (Ilic) coalition and at least by their history and campaign rhetoric, the Socialist Party coalition. They believe, probably with as much or more passion, that the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state is such a monstrous crime against the Serbian nation that it must be resisted regardless of the price and that there can be no normal relations with countries or organizations such as the EU that are complicit in facilitating it. To even think of "business as usual" with countries that recognize an independent Kosovo is, to this side, traitorous. They are willing (and some even eager) to look eastward towards Russia rather than westward. These three parties have a razor thin majority of 128 seats (out of 250) in the new Parliament. If turnout would have been at the levels of the recent second round of presidential elections, it is very possible that this razor thin margin would have been in favor of DS/G17 Plus with very different implications for Serbia's future. Significantly, the support for the Radicals was at the same levels as in the January 2007 Parliamentary elections. They showed no gain despite events in Kosovo. This at least in large measure was due to the fear of many Serbian voters over the prospect of isolation or slowdown in the EU integration process. Absent the concrete steps taken by the European Union prior to the election, the result could have been very different. At this point it is impossible to say whether the DS/G17 Plus or the Radical Party will lead the negotiated coalition, which forms the new Government. The Socialist Party founded and led for ten years by Slobodan Milosevic is in the enviable position of being essential for a successful coalition by either the Radicals or the Democratic Party/G17 Plus under almost any realistic scenario. It is a party unsure of where they are going or what they stand for. Many in the leadership want to move to become a normal center-left party and escape the Milosevic legacy. But they are dependent on a rank and file that is locked into the Milosevic past. Forming a coalition with the Democratic Party/G17 Plus would go a long way to help that transition to legitimacy, but it would severely risk alienating their base. For at least five years now, this party has consistently flirted with moderation, but has just as consistently been afraid to really break with its past. In any case the Socialist Party leaders will want to play a little "hard to get" with both groups to get the best deal possible. While anything is possible in politics (especially Serbian politics!) it does seem that Vojislav Kostunica has burned his bridges with the DS/G17 Plus coalition. His talks with the Radical Party the day after the elections left both parties claiming "significant consensus about the nature, goals of programs" of the next government and that "great understanding" exists between the parties. On Tuesday, it was announced that the two parties "harmonized a proposal on an agreement which is to define the character and program goals of the new "national Serbian government." The rapid-fire announcements by the DSS and the Radical Party were deliberately done to undercut the momentum of the DS/G17 Plus coalition generated by their election result. They wanted to stop any air of inevitability of a DS/G17 Plus government. The DS/G17 Plus dilemma is that any successful coalition scenario for them involves the Socialist Party. This has major problems not only of perception, but also in how stable such a government would be and what policy redlines the Socialists would insist upon, as well as what Ministerial positions they would take. Many of their stated policy positions on both political and economic issues are very different or even in opposition to those of DS/G17 Plus. There are two possible scenarios: a coalition simply with the Socialists or a coalition with both the LDP and the Socialists. Getting the LDP to agree to a coalition involving any Socialists is probably impossible - for either party. They are on very different ends of the political spectrum. The LDP alone will not bring enough deputies to the table to make a government coalition possible. The only realistic alternative for the DS/G17 Plus is a coalition simply with the Socialist Party. In sum, Serbia's future course is still very much in doubt. What is certain is that any DS/G17 Plus coalition with the Socialists would be fragile and subject to problems on so-called national questions both within its coalition and also in Parliament. There would be constant pressure on it to demonstrate that they are not "traitors" on the Kosovo question. There would be consistent efforts to drive wedges between DS/G17 Plus and their Socialist partners. The philosophical differences between them would crop up constantly and threaten the government's existence. And this is the most optimistic scenario! A Radical coalition with the DSS and the Socialists seems to be the more likely, given the similarity of so many of their positions and the timidity shown - at least thus far - by the Socialist leadership to move away from its voter base of support. For this reason, it would also be more stable. At the same time, it would have a profoundly negative impact on Serbia's image in the world and its relations with most Western countries, the EU, and the OSCE. Enviable position: SPS leader Ivica Dacic speaks to reporters (Tanjug) For those looking for clarity, the recent parliamentary elections brought some answers, but Serbia's future course is still uncertain. It principally depends on the results of the on-going negotiations over the composition of a coalition government. William Montgomery "A Radical coalition with the DSS and the Socialists seems to be the more likely. At the same time, it would have a profoundly negative impact on Serbia's image in the world and its relations with most Western countries, the EU, and the OSCE."

Serbia decides… or divides?

The Democratic Party of President Tadić and its G17 Plus coalition partner achieved a great result, capturing 38 percent of the vote and 102 Parliamentary deputy positions. Defying pre-election polls and conventional wisdom, they won 9% more votes than their closest competitors, the Radical Party. They also did well in local elections almost across the board. There is no question that their focus on continuing European integration was the reason for their success.

Their tactic of portraying the election as a critical referendum on Serbia's future course was only partially successful, however. It did not energize the electorate to vote, one of DS/G17 Plus' major goals. Turnout was only 61.17 percent, almost seven percent lower than in the recent second round of presidential elections and about the same as that in the last parliamentary elections of 2007. In other words, almost 40 percent of the electorate was not sufficiently concerned or interested to vote, despite the perceived stakes.

The DS/G17 Plus strategy was successful, however, in pulling 1/3 of the supporters of the DSS in the last Parliamentary elections into their camp. This was due in large part to the EU's unprecedented actions in waiving the longstanding conditionality surrounding the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) and signing it just before the elections, as well as presenting a road map for the Schengen Visa "White List" at the same time.

But most significantly, it was also due to Vojislav Koštunica's venomous attacks on these steps. This backfired and simply alarmed the more moderate supporters of the DSS. His loss of voters in comparison to the last Parliamentary elections is almost the same as the net gain of the DS/G17 Plus/Vuk Draskovic coalition. The DSS and Vojislav Koštunica personally were the big losers in the elections.

As significant as the DS/G17 Plus result may be, it by no means guarantees what happens next. The elections once again have demonstrated that there is split in Serbia between two very different mindsets. One believes - passionately - that Serbia's future is as a fully integrated member of the European Union and competitive in the global economy. They want to achieve this goal as soon as possible, notwithstanding events in Kosovo. This includes the DS (Tadić); G17 Plus (Dinkić); the LDP (Jovanović) and most of the assorted small minority parties.

On the other side are the Radicals, the DSS (Koštunica)/NS (Ilić) coalition and at least by their history and campaign rhetoric, the Socialist Party coalition. They believe, probably with as much or more passion, that the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state is such a monstrous crime against the Serbian nation that it must be resisted regardless of the price and that there can be no normal relations with countries or organizations such as the EU that are complicit in facilitating it. To even think of "business as usual" with countries that recognize an independent Kosovo is, to this side, traitorous. They are willing (and some even eager) to look eastward towards Russia rather than westward. These three parties have a razor thin majority of 128 seats (out of 250) in the new Parliament.

If turnout would have been at the levels of the recent second round of presidential elections, it is very possible that this razor thin margin would have been in favor of DS/G17 Plus with very different implications for Serbia's future.

Significantly, the support for the Radicals was at the same levels as in the January 2007 Parliamentary elections. They showed no gain despite events in Kosovo. This at least in large measure was due to the fear of many Serbian voters over the prospect of isolation or slowdown in the EU integration process. Absent the concrete steps taken by the European Union prior to the election, the result could have been very different.

At this point it is impossible to say whether the DS/G17 Plus or the Radical Party will lead the negotiated coalition, which forms the new Government.

The Socialist Party founded and led for ten years by Slobodan Milošević is in the enviable position of being essential for a successful coalition by either the Radicals or the Democratic Party/G17 Plus under almost any realistic scenario. It is a party unsure of where they are going or what they stand for. Many in the leadership want to move to become a normal center-left party and escape the Milošević legacy.

But they are dependent on a rank and file that is locked into the Milošević past. Forming a coalition with the Democratic Party/G17 Plus would go a long way to help that transition to legitimacy, but it would severely risk alienating their base. For at least five years now, this party has consistently flirted with moderation, but has just as consistently been afraid to really break with its past. In any case the Socialist Party leaders will want to play a little "hard to get" with both groups to get the best deal possible.

While anything is possible in politics (especially Serbian politics!) it does seem that Vojislav Koštunica has burned his bridges with the DS/G17 Plus coalition. His talks with the Radical Party the day after the elections left both parties claiming "significant consensus about the nature, goals of programs" of the next government and that "great understanding" exists between the parties. On Tuesday, it was announced that the two parties "harmonized a proposal on an agreement which is to define the character and program goals of the new "national Serbian government."

The rapid-fire announcements by the DSS and the Radical Party were deliberately done to undercut the momentum of the DS/G17 Plus coalition generated by their election result. They wanted to stop any air of inevitability of a DS/G17 Plus government.

The DS/G17 Plus dilemma is that any successful coalition scenario for them involves the Socialist Party. This has major problems not only of perception, but also in how stable such a government would be and what policy redlines the Socialists would insist upon, as well as what Ministerial positions they would take. Many of their stated policy positions on both political and economic issues are very different or even in opposition to those of DS/G17 Plus.

There are two possible scenarios: a coalition simply with the Socialists or a coalition with both the LDP and the Socialists. Getting the LDP to agree to a coalition involving any Socialists is probably impossible - for either party. They are on very different ends of the political spectrum. The LDP alone will not bring enough deputies to the table to make a government coalition possible. The only realistic alternative for the DS/G17 Plus is a coalition simply with the Socialist Party.

In sum, Serbia's future course is still very much in doubt. What is certain is that any DS/G17 Plus coalition with the Socialists would be fragile and subject to problems on so-called national questions both within its coalition and also in Parliament. There would be constant pressure on it to demonstrate that they are not "traitors" on the Kosovo question. There would be consistent efforts to drive wedges between DS/G17 Plus and their Socialist partners. The philosophical differences between them would crop up constantly and threaten the government's existence. And this is the most optimistic scenario!

A Radical coalition with the DSS and the Socialists seems to be the more likely, given the similarity of so many of their positions and the timidity shown - at least thus far - by the Socialist leadership to move away from its voter base of support. For this reason, it would also be more stable. At the same time, it would have a profoundly negative impact on Serbia's image in the world and its relations with most Western countries, the EU, and the OSCE.