Kosovo: NATO's troop reduction

Kosovo: NATO's troop reduction Details on which participating countries reduced their troops are not yet available. According to STRATFOR’s KFOR sources, all countries contributing to KFOR will reduce their contingents relative to the overall reduction. KFOR’s troop reduction is meant to further streamline the NATO presence into a more flexible response force. However, by limiting NATO forces’ local law enforcement roles, the new mission could see the remaining Serb enclaves in Kosovo left to their own devices. At its initial deployment in June 1999, KFOR numbered around 50,000 troops. The force entered Kosovo following the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, by which the conflict between the Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO ended and Belgrade agreed to withdraw its military and paramilitary forces from its province of Kosovo. At that time, KFOR essentially represented the only semblance of law and order in Kosovo and was largely expected to provide overall security, local law enforcement as well as protection for minorities — primarily the Serbs — at risk of retaliation from the majority ethnic Albanian population. Over time, however, KFOR’s mandate has evolved, allowing its troop numbers to decrease significantly. First, Kosovo’s own police forces have been trained through cooperation with the European Union’s law enforcement mission to Kosovo (EULEX) and are capable — their own alleged involvement in illegal activities notwithstanding — of taking over most local law enforcement in the Albanian-majority areas of Kosovo. In areas of Kosovo where Serbs live, particularly in the north, law enforcement is handled by some of the EULEX’s 1,400-strong international police contingent. The 2008 financial crisis, which has imposed budgetary constraints on most of the KFOR participating member states, added more motivation for a troop reduction. The troop reduction is accompanied by a change in KFOR’s structure. The force’s five “Task Forces” — split geographically into North, South, West, East and Center, and each lead by a different participating country — will be renamed as “Battle Groups.” The name change is not merely semantic; according to KFOR sources, it signifies an evolution in strategy from one of armed forces focused on security and law enforcement, primarily inside their own sectors, to one of mobile and responsive units ready to deploy wherever needed in Kosovo. The borders between different sectors will essentially disappear — a change that was made in principle in 2005 but will now be implemented more vigorously — allowing KFOR to deploy troops from any part of the country to wherever they are needed. Therefore, the troop reduction is not as significant a development as the change in KFOR’s mission statement. While the overall number of NATO troops in Kosovo is decreasing, the actual number of NATO troops available in emergency situations is increasing, because it will be easier for troops from different sectors to deploy where necessary. This also means that the approximately 1,500-strong U.S. contingent in the East sector will be much more capable of reacting to the often-volatile North sector. Although KFOR has not stated this explicitly, the situation in the mainly Serb-populated area north of the River Ibar is still tense, with frequent conflicts arising particularly over the building of homes for returning Albanian inhabitants. There also is the danger that anti-Serb violence in the rest of Kosovo — where Serbs mainly live in KFOR-protected enclaves — could flare up at any time, as they did during the March 2004 anti-Serb rioting. The new KFOR strategy of being able to quickly respond wherever needed is in part a response to this continued tension in the north. However, a reduction in KFOR’s local law enforcement role could, as a side effect, make life very difficult for Serb enclaves outside of northern Kosovo. Many of these enclaves are tiny, numbering only a few dozen people, and cannot rely on the local Kosovo police for law enforcement due to mistrust on both sides of the ethnic divide. Were KFOR to abandon its local law enforcement role in the cases of those enclaves, the likely outcome will be their eventual disappearance as Serbs empty the enclaves and move either to North Kosovo or Serbia. The end result will be a Kosovo where the divisions between the Serb north and Albanian whole are crystallized. This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR KFOR troops in the enclave of Gracanica (Beta, file) NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) on Feb. 1 formally reduced its troop levels from approximately 12,600 to 10,000. STRATFOR "Were KFOR to abandon its local law enforcement role in the cases of those enclaves, the likely outcome will be their eventual disappearance as Serbs empty the enclaves."

Kosovo: NATO's troop reduction

Details on which participating countries reduced their troops are not yet available. According to STRATFOR’s KFOR sources, all countries contributing to KFOR will reduce their contingents relative to the overall reduction.

KFOR’s troop reduction is meant to further streamline the NATO presence into a more flexible response force. However, by limiting NATO forces’ local law enforcement roles, the new mission could see the remaining Serb enclaves in Kosovo left to their own devices.

At its initial deployment in June 1999, KFOR numbered around 50,000 troops. The force entered Kosovo following the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, by which the conflict between the Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO ended and Belgrade agreed to withdraw its military and paramilitary forces from its province of Kosovo.

At that time, KFOR essentially represented the only semblance of law and order in Kosovo and was largely expected to provide overall security, local law enforcement as well as protection for minorities — primarily the Serbs — at risk of retaliation from the majority ethnic Albanian population.

Over time, however, KFOR’s mandate has evolved, allowing its troop numbers to decrease significantly. First, Kosovo’s own police forces have been trained through cooperation with the European Union’s law enforcement mission to Kosovo (EULEX) and are capable — their own alleged involvement in illegal activities notwithstanding — of taking over most local law enforcement in the Albanian-majority areas of Kosovo.

In areas of Kosovo where Serbs live, particularly in the north, law enforcement is handled by some of the EULEX’s 1,400-strong international police contingent. The 2008 financial crisis, which has imposed budgetary constraints on most of the KFOR participating member states, added more motivation for a troop reduction.

The troop reduction is accompanied by a change in KFOR’s structure. The force’s five “Task Forces” — split geographically into North, South, West, East and Center, and each lead by a different participating country — will be renamed as “Battle Groups.” The name change is not merely semantic; according to KFOR sources, it signifies an evolution in strategy from one of armed forces focused on security and law enforcement, primarily inside their own sectors, to one of mobile and responsive units ready to deploy wherever needed in Kosovo.

The borders between different sectors will essentially disappear — a change that was made in principle in 2005 but will now be implemented more vigorously — allowing KFOR to deploy troops from any part of the country to wherever they are needed.

Therefore, the troop reduction is not as significant a development as the change in KFOR’s mission statement. While the overall number of NATO troops in Kosovo is decreasing, the actual number of NATO troops available in emergency situations is increasing, because it will be easier for troops from different sectors to deploy where necessary. This also means that the approximately 1,500-strong U.S. contingent in the East sector will be much more capable of reacting to the often-volatile North sector.

Although KFOR has not stated this explicitly, the situation in the mainly Serb-populated area north of the River Ibar is still tense, with frequent conflicts arising particularly over the building of homes for returning Albanian inhabitants. There also is the danger that anti-Serb violence in the rest of Kosovo — where Serbs mainly live in KFOR-protected enclaves — could flare up at any time, as they did during the March 2004 anti-Serb rioting. The new KFOR strategy of being able to quickly respond wherever needed is in part a response to this continued tension in the north.

However, a reduction in KFOR’s local law enforcement role could, as a side effect, make life very difficult for Serb enclaves outside of northern Kosovo. Many of these enclaves are tiny, numbering only a few dozen people, and cannot rely on the local Kosovo police for law enforcement due to mistrust on both sides of the ethnic divide.

Were KFOR to abandon its local law enforcement role in the cases of those enclaves, the likely outcome will be their eventual disappearance as Serbs empty the enclaves and move either to North Kosovo or Serbia. The end result will be a Kosovo where the divisions between the Serb north and Albanian whole are crystallized.

This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR