Saddam's revenge

Saddam's revenge His brutality and murderous ways, while never to be forgotten, are now accompanied by a grudging acknowledgement of the difficulty of ruling Iraq using any tactics, force, or strategy. That problem was envisioned in a League of Nations report in 1925, as Iraq was being created out of the remains of the Ottoman Empire. It stated that "serious difficulties may arise out of the differences which in some cases exist in regard to political ideas between the Shiites of the South and the Sunnites of the North, the racial differences between Arabs and Kurds, and the necessity of keeping the turbulent tribes under control…these difficulties might be fatal to the very existence of the State if it were left without support and guidance." I remember coming across a two-week-old edition of the U.S. military newspaper "Stars and Stripes," while serving at an isolated border post in Vietnam in 1969. The paper contained a long article describing the Congressional testimony by top generals about how "there was light at the end of the tunnel" in the Vietnam War. Reams of specific examples of progress were listed: number of enemy dead; captured supplies; damage done by our aircraft in bombing runs; and more and more areas being considered "secure." I am sorry that I did not save that paper and have it framed, as it had a significant impact on my own development. For the first time, at a relatively young age, I realized just how fallible and ill informed our leaders could be. As a mere sergeant living with ten other Americans in the middle of the jungle with no access to special intelligence information, it was abundantly clear that our enemies were far more dedicated and professional than our Vietnamese allies and that the most we could ever hope to achieve as we had defined the war was a relative status quo with a corresponding unacceptably high level of casualties and resource expenditures. I remember a similar feeling when traveling around the former Yugoslavia by car in 1990 and 1991 and the returning to Washington to read official reports from the American Embassy and internal memoranda about how it was still possible to keep Yugoslavia together. It was so very clear to me - from the ground level - that it was simply, for better or worse, too late to save Yugoslavia. While we should have been concentrating all of our efforts to ensure that the breakup took place non-violently, we instead were wasting our time in trying to keep it together. These experiences came flooding back to me this week while watching the testimony about Iraq before Congress of two of our brightest career professionals, General David Patraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker. The reality - which everybody reading this column instinctively knows - is that Iraq is now so divided into a witches brew of competing ethnic groups and splinter groups within each of them (all subject to influence by powerful outside forces such as Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Saudi Arabia) that there is absolutely no way, short of an absolutely brutal dictatorship, to put it all together again. Virtually all the political benchmarks laid down months ago as concrete indicators of success have not been met and will not be met in the foreseeable future. Our current position is sort of like holding a tiger tightly by its tail. As bad as your situation is, letting go could instantly make it a lot worse. So President Bush is holding onto the tiger's tail as fiercely as he can. I have very mixed emotions; therefore, about the testimony of these two consummate professionals. While believing in their integrity, I also believe their very strengths (including a fierce will to succeed, previous success in difficult postings, loyalty to their President, and strong patriotism) prevent them from admitting, perhaps even to themselves, that the United States cannot succeed in its latest goal of achieving some sort of workable government in place consisting of all ethnic groups. Therefore, with all due respect, these two career officers have done a great disservice to the United States…and to Iraq. They are providing the Bush Administration with the excuse needed to continue its current policies and avoid coming to terms with reality. The common thread running through all three of my examples is that failure to recognize the true situation and take the painful steps to deal with it has led to needless, continued violence, instability, and tragedy. Nothing is ultimately gained, but much is lost while fighting to realize an unachievable goal. Patraeus and Crocker had a unique opportunity to change that dynamic and to force the debate in Iraq to where it should be: a realization that we have lost the capability to bring about any of the positive solutions we wanted for Iraq. We need to set a deadline for our troop withdrawal, but at the same time, work to leave Iraq in the least-bad situation we can. That is precisely the nature of the debate we should now be having. All options should be on the table, including partition and autonomy for each of the three ethnic groups. Instead, their testimony, which had months ago been advertised as a key turning point in the war, has been transformed into an excuse for continuing business as usual. It guarantees that the United States of America will have over one hundred thousand troops in Iraq as of Election Day, 2008 and that the hard decisions on what to do about Iraq will be handed over to the next President. President Bush will embrace the report of these two officers, indicate a willingness to withdraw a certain number of troops (to around the pre-surge levels of 130,000) in the next several months, and announce a new round of consultations/evaluations in the early months of next year. He will try to sell it as the "way forward" when it actually is "running in place." The real irony in this situation is that I can guarantee absolutely that around two or three years from now, President Bush and Vice President Cheney will be doing the rounds of television talk shows to criticize the actions (whatever they are) of their successors, claiming that they would have handled the situation differently and better. My only question is whether the President cynically knows what he is doing and is deliberately stretching out the process to avoid having responsibility for the inevitable tough decisions to come or if he is really so far out of touch with reality that he actually believes his plan can succeed. Either is possible. But in the meantime, we can expect a continuation of the suicide bombings, support for Islamic Jihadism, and ever-widening ethnic and sectarian divisions in Iraq for the foreseeable future. This isn't the worst aspect, however. The worst is that by prolonging the agony for the United States and Iraq, it will make it impossible - or at least far harder - for the next President to tackle the scores of other important issues, which have been neglected for the past eight years. General David Petraeus: A disservice to the U.S. and Iraq? (FoNet) Wherever his spirit lies today, Saddam Hussein has to be very satisfied. While perhaps not exactly in the manner he envisioned, his countrymen have fought the United States and its allies to a standstill and left them searching for an exit strategy. We need to set a deadline for our troop withdrawal, but at the same time, work to leave Iraq in the least-bad situation we can. That is precisely the nature of the debate we should now be having. All options should be on the table, including partition and autonomy for each of the three ethnic groups.

Saddam's revenge

His brutality and murderous ways, while never to be forgotten, are now accompanied by a grudging acknowledgement of the difficulty of ruling Iraq using any tactics, force, or strategy. That problem was envisioned in a League of Nations report in 1925, as Iraq was being created out of the remains of the Ottoman Empire.

It stated that "serious difficulties may arise out of the differences which in some cases exist in regard to political ideas between the Shiites of the South and the Sunnites of the North, the racial differences between Arabs and Kurds, and the necessity of keeping the turbulent tribes under control…these difficulties might be fatal to the very existence of the State if it were left without support and guidance."

I remember coming across a two-week-old edition of the U.S. military newspaper "Stars and Stripes," while serving at an isolated border post in Vietnam in 1969. The paper contained a long article describing the Congressional testimony by top generals about how "there was light at the end of the tunnel" in the Vietnam War.

Reams of specific examples of progress were listed: number of enemy dead; captured supplies; damage done by our aircraft in bombing runs; and more and more areas being considered "secure."

I am sorry that I did not save that paper and have it framed, as it had a significant impact on my own development. For the first time, at a relatively young age, I realized just how fallible and ill informed our leaders could be.

As a mere sergeant living with ten other Americans in the middle of the jungle with no access to special intelligence information, it was abundantly clear that our enemies were far more dedicated and professional than our Vietnamese allies and that the most we could ever hope to achieve as we had defined the war was a relative status quo with a corresponding unacceptably high level of casualties and resource expenditures.

I remember a similar feeling when traveling around the former Yugoslavia by car in 1990 and 1991 and the returning to Washington to read official reports from the American Embassy and internal memoranda about how it was still possible to keep Yugoslavia together.

It was so very clear to me - from the ground level - that it was simply, for better or worse, too late to save Yugoslavia. While we should have been concentrating all of our efforts to ensure that the breakup took place non-violently, we instead were wasting our time in trying to keep it together.

These experiences came flooding back to me this week while watching the testimony about Iraq before Congress of two of our brightest career professionals, General David Patraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker.

The reality - which everybody reading this column instinctively knows - is that Iraq is now so divided into a witches brew of competing ethnic groups and splinter groups within each of them (all subject to influence by powerful outside forces such as Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Saudi Arabia) that there is absolutely no way, short of an absolutely brutal dictatorship, to put it all together again.

Virtually all the political benchmarks laid down months ago as concrete indicators of success have not been met and will not be met in the foreseeable future. Our current position is sort of like holding a tiger tightly by its tail. As bad as your situation is, letting go could instantly make it a lot worse. So President Bush is holding onto the tiger's tail as fiercely as he can.

I have very mixed emotions; therefore, about the testimony of these two consummate professionals. While believing in their integrity, I also believe their very strengths (including a fierce will to succeed, previous success in difficult postings, loyalty to their President, and strong patriotism) prevent them from admitting, perhaps even to themselves, that the United States cannot succeed in its latest goal of achieving some sort of workable government in place consisting of all ethnic groups.

Therefore, with all due respect, these two career officers have done a great disservice to the United States…and to Iraq. They are providing the Bush Administration with the excuse needed to continue its current policies and avoid coming to terms with reality.

The common thread running through all three of my examples is that failure to recognize the true situation and take the painful steps to deal with it has led to needless, continued violence, instability, and tragedy. Nothing is ultimately gained, but much is lost while fighting to realize an unachievable goal.

Patraeus and Crocker had a unique opportunity to change that dynamic and to force the debate in Iraq to where it should be: a realization that we have lost the capability to bring about any of the positive solutions we wanted for Iraq.

We need to set a deadline for our troop withdrawal, but at the same time, work to leave Iraq in the least-bad situation we can. That is precisely the nature of the debate we should now be having. All options should be on the table, including partition and autonomy for each of the three ethnic groups.

Instead, their testimony, which had months ago been advertised as a key turning point in the war, has been transformed into an excuse for continuing business as usual. It guarantees that the United States of America will have over one hundred thousand troops in Iraq as of Election Day, 2008 and that the hard decisions on what to do about Iraq will be handed over to the next President.

President Bush will embrace the report of these two officers, indicate a willingness to withdraw a certain number of troops (to around the pre-surge levels of 130,000) in the next several months, and announce a new round of consultations/evaluations in the early months of next year. He will try to sell it as the "way forward" when it actually is "running in place."

The real irony in this situation is that I can guarantee absolutely that around two or three years from now, President Bush and Vice President Cheney will be doing the rounds of television talk shows to criticize the actions (whatever they are) of their successors, claiming that they would have handled the situation differently and better.

My only question is whether the President cynically knows what he is doing and is deliberately stretching out the process to avoid having responsibility for the inevitable tough decisions to come or if he is really so far out of touch with reality that he actually believes his plan can succeed.

Either is possible. But in the meantime, we can expect a continuation of the suicide bombings, support for Islamic Jihadism, and ever-widening ethnic and sectarian divisions in Iraq for the foreseeable future. This isn't the worst aspect, however.

The worst is that by prolonging the agony for the United States and Iraq, it will make it impossible - or at least far harder - for the next President to tackle the scores of other important issues, which have been neglected for the past eight years.