Confusion over Kosovo

Confusion over Kosovo The elections truly will point Serbia in one of two very different directions. What needs to be appreciated, however, is that despite these differences, the governing coalition has crafted and carried out a Kosovo policy, which has achieved certain successes: -The Serbian public is united and energized in a common view of how Kosovo was illegally and unjustly taken from it. Five hundred years from now, this will still be the Serbian view. -A vigorous diplomatic campaign has slowed and in some cases stopped the recognition of Kosovo by many countries. -In concert with Russia, strong diplomatic pressure at the UN has made the UN Secretary General and his staff more cautious in his approach to Kosovo. This is most notable in the increasing uncertainty over the termination of UNMIK and its replacement by the EU Mission known as EULEX. -The process of linking the northern part of Kosovo to Serbia in far more visible ways, creating a de facto partition, is well underway. Kosovo Serbs (at least in the northern areas) are solidly behind Belgrade's actions. -Due at least in part to Serbia's actions, few Kosovo Serbs have left despite the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Regardless of who wins the May 11 elections, these points will not fundamentally change. The strength of this Serbian response has in turn brought out divisions and uncertainty within the US/EU on the way ahead. This is not too surprising as there was and is no agreed game plan on how to respond to the Serbian challenge to create a de facto partition in northern Kosovo and its refusal to deal with the EULEX Mission. Those who were pushing hardest for Kosovo independence in the US and EU saw it as the "end of the story, the goal." In fact, getting to this point has been the easy part compared to what now follows. There are three very different views among the Western International Community in how to handle the Kosovo Serb question now. The first is to take a hard line that Kosovo is an independent country within its current boundaries and that any efforts to undercut that independence via parallel structures, etc need to be firmly resisted. Based on their public statements, this seems to be the view of both Pieter Feith, who has the titles of the Special Representative of the EU (and Head of the EULEX Mission) and the International Civilian Representative, and Joachim Rucker, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General. At the other end of the spectrum are those anonymous European diplomats who publicly and privately speculate about the value of a formal partition. In the middle are those who advocate a soft "frozen conflict," gambling that over time, emotions would cool; practical realities of everyday life would lead to increased links within Kosovo; and the problem would ultimately go away with eventual EU membership. The problem is that these radically different viewpoints lead to mixed messages as well as unevenness in handling of day-to-day relations with the Kosovo Serb community. Deciding how to react to a provocation, such as the occupation of the courthouse in Northern Mitrovica seems to depend not on a clearly defined policy, but on the ad hoc views of individuals on the ground (and perhaps some level of support from the countries they represent). It was always a given that in the pre-election period, the Kosovo Serbs would stage provocations, challenging UNMIK/EULEX/Kosovo Government authority. The courthouse protest by judicial personnel was an excellent gambit, because at its core, it was based on a legitimate grievance of the Kosovo Serb community: so many of them have been prevented from returning to their pre-war jobs. The bottom line on the incident is that regardless of rights and wrongs and what actually happened on the ground, the combined UNMIK/KFOR reaction played exactly into the hands of Serbian nationalists. A quick review of Serbian media coverage of the incident says it all. Anyone familiar with events in Kosovo over the past several years should have been well aware of what the consequences would be. Another good example of the lack of preparation for post-independence Kosovo is the status of UNMIK. During its nine years of operations, Serbia consistently was one of its severest critics, followed closely by Russia in the regular reviews on Kosovo at the UN Security Council. As much as two years ago, the Western nations informally planned for a phase-out of UNMIK and its replacement by a EU Mission. This was common knowledge in UN circles and as a result, many of the best personnel in UNMIK moved on to other jobs. Those plans all fell apart when Serbia and Russia fiercely resisted the EULEX Mission and simultaneously began to "appreciate" UNMIK. In fact, it became impossible to get rid of UNMIK, as a UN Security Council Resolution doing so was impossible to pass due to a certain Russian veto. So we now have the bridgehead of the EULEX Mission in place in Kosovo "co-existing" with the remnants of UNMIK. The Serbs refuse to deal with EULEX at all and insist on working only with UNMIK. This leaves EULEX making statements that they "plan" to have staff all over Kosovo, while in fact they now have none in Serb-controlled areas. The EU is scratching its collective head, trying to figure out how to weave through the legalities of operating in Kosovo and what the EULEX Mission will actually be able to do. In any case, full deployment of EULEX personnel will not even be attempted until well after the May 11 Serbian elections. Even then, any attempt to insert members into Serb-controlled areas will automatically bring about a confrontation. The other significant factor in the whole equation is the reaction of the Kosovo Albanians. Until now, they have wisely stayed on the sidelines and apart from issuing statements of reconciliation, have allowed the international community to take the lead in dealing with the Kosovo Serbs. But they have done so, based in very large part on the assurances from people such as Rucker and Feith that the International Community would use its full force to enforce the sovereignty of the new State of Kosovo throughout its territory; would stop the operations of parallel institutions; and would prevent any sort of partition. So the UNMIK/KFOR/EULEX Missions are squeezed between two determined ethnic groups, both passionate in their beliefs and willing to go to extremes to defend what they feel are their rights. All that we can be sure of is that regardless of who wins the May 11 elections in Serbia, the conflict in Kosovo will be played out over years and that for all of this time, the region will not be fully stabile and the fires of nationalism will consistently be given more fuel. The courthouse in Kosovska Mitrovica (Beta) The dramatic collapse of the ruling coalition and the resulting call for Parliamentary Elections on May 11 has highlighted the fact that there are major conflicts in Serbia on the broad range of issues, which flow from the Kosovo problem. William Montgomery "The UNMIK/KFOR/EULEX Missions are squeezed between two determined ethnic groups, both passionate in their beliefs and willing to go to extremes to defend what they feel are their rights."

Confusion over Kosovo

The elections truly will point Serbia in one of two very different directions. What needs to be appreciated, however, is that despite these differences, the governing coalition has crafted and carried out a Kosovo policy, which has achieved certain successes:

-The Serbian public is united and energized in a common view of how Kosovo was illegally and unjustly taken from it. Five hundred years from now, this will still be the Serbian view.

-A vigorous diplomatic campaign has slowed and in some cases stopped the recognition of Kosovo by many countries.

-In concert with Russia, strong diplomatic pressure at the UN has made the UN Secretary General and his staff more cautious in his approach to Kosovo. This is most notable in the increasing uncertainty over the termination of UNMIK and its replacement by the EU Mission known as EULEX.

-The process of linking the northern part of Kosovo to Serbia in far more visible ways, creating a de facto partition, is well underway. Kosovo Serbs (at least in the northern areas) are solidly behind Belgrade's actions.

-Due at least in part to Serbia's actions, few Kosovo Serbs have left despite the Unilateral Declaration of Independence.

Regardless of who wins the May 11 elections, these points will not fundamentally change. The strength of this Serbian response has in turn brought out divisions and uncertainty within the US/EU on the way ahead. This is not too surprising as there was and is no agreed game plan on how to respond to the Serbian challenge to create a de facto partition in northern Kosovo and its refusal to deal with the EULEX Mission. Those who were pushing hardest for Kosovo independence in the US and EU saw it as the "end of the story, the goal." In fact, getting to this point has been the easy part compared to what now follows.

There are three very different views among the Western International Community in how to handle the Kosovo Serb question now. The first is to take a hard line that Kosovo is an independent country within its current boundaries and that any efforts to undercut that independence via parallel structures, etc need to be firmly resisted. Based on their public statements, this seems to be the view of both Pieter Feith, who has the titles of the Special Representative of the EU (and Head of the EULEX Mission) and the International Civilian Representative, and Joachim Rucker, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General.

At the other end of the spectrum are those anonymous European diplomats who publicly and privately speculate about the value of a formal partition. In the middle are those who advocate a soft "frozen conflict," gambling that over time, emotions would cool; practical realities of everyday life would lead to increased links within Kosovo; and the problem would ultimately go away with eventual EU membership.

The problem is that these radically different viewpoints lead to mixed messages as well as unevenness in handling of day-to-day relations with the Kosovo Serb community. Deciding how to react to a provocation, such as the occupation of the courthouse in Northern Mitrovica seems to depend not on a clearly defined policy, but on the ad hoc views of individuals on the ground (and perhaps some level of support from the countries they represent).

It was always a given that in the pre-election period, the Kosovo Serbs would stage provocations, challenging UNMIK/EULEX/Kosovo Government authority. The courthouse protest by judicial personnel was an excellent gambit, because at its core, it was based on a legitimate grievance of the Kosovo Serb community: so many of them have been prevented from returning to their pre-war jobs.

The bottom line on the incident is that regardless of rights and wrongs and what actually happened on the ground, the combined UNMIK/KFOR reaction played exactly into the hands of Serbian nationalists. A quick review of Serbian media coverage of the incident says it all. Anyone familiar with events in Kosovo over the past several years should have been well aware of what the consequences would be.

Another good example of the lack of preparation for post-independence Kosovo is the status of UNMIK. During its nine years of operations, Serbia consistently was one of its severest critics, followed closely by Russia in the regular reviews on Kosovo at the UN Security Council. As much as two years ago, the Western nations informally planned for a phase-out of UNMIK and its replacement by a EU Mission. This was common knowledge in UN circles and as a result, many of the best personnel in UNMIK moved on to other jobs.

Those plans all fell apart when Serbia and Russia fiercely resisted the EULEX Mission and simultaneously began to "appreciate" UNMIK. In fact, it became impossible to get rid of UNMIK, as a UN Security Council Resolution doing so was impossible to pass due to a certain Russian veto. So we now have the bridgehead of the EULEX Mission in place in Kosovo "co-existing" with the remnants of UNMIK. The Serbs refuse to deal with EULEX at all and insist on working only with UNMIK. This leaves EULEX making statements that they "plan" to have staff all over Kosovo, while in fact they now have none in Serb-controlled areas.

The EU is scratching its collective head, trying to figure out how to weave through the legalities of operating in Kosovo and what the EULEX Mission will actually be able to do. In any case, full deployment of EULEX personnel will not even be attempted until well after the May 11 Serbian elections. Even then, any attempt to insert members into Serb-controlled areas will automatically bring about a confrontation.

The other significant factor in the whole equation is the reaction of the Kosovo Albanians. Until now, they have wisely stayed on the sidelines and apart from issuing statements of reconciliation, have allowed the international community to take the lead in dealing with the Kosovo Serbs. But they have done so, based in very large part on the assurances from people such as Rucker and Feith that the International Community would use its full force to enforce the sovereignty of the new State of Kosovo throughout its territory; would stop the operations of parallel institutions; and would prevent any sort of partition.

So the UNMIK/KFOR/EULEX Missions are squeezed between two determined ethnic groups, both passionate in their beliefs and willing to go to extremes to defend what they feel are their rights. All that we can be sure of is that regardless of who wins the May 11 elections in Serbia, the conflict in Kosovo will be played out over years and that for all of this time, the region will not be fully stabile and the fires of nationalism will consistently be given more fuel.