The Anniversaries of Two Deaths

The Anniversaries of Two Deaths

The contrast between the two is striking. Slobodan Milosevic skillfully relied on ---and inflamed---the fears and prejudices lurking inside all of us. He rose to power - and stayed there for a decade - on the wave of Serbian nationalism, which he fostered.

Zoran Djindjic appealed to our "better angels." Slobodan Milosevic attempted to create a Greater Serbia standing alone, confronting the world and contemptuous of it.

Zoran Djindjic had a vision of Serbia as a normal country, fully integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions. One (Milosevic) cynically used nationalism to enhance his popularity, but walked away from the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia whom he had encouraged to revolt.

The other (Djindjic) knowingly took steps to move his country closer to Europe even though he knew full well that his popularity would suffer for it and that it was dangerous. His willingness to take these hard, unpopular decisions was remarkable for any elected politician anywhere in the world, much less in a Serbia recovering from years of strife and sanctions. 

Both paid a heavy price for their policies. Milosevic died in prison in The Hague during his trial for war crimes in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Croatia.  Zoran Djindjic was assassinated because he was seen as a threat to both murderous criminals and ultra-nationalists fiercely opposed to his policy of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

I am frequently asked how Serbia would be different if Djindjic had not been assassinated. It certainly would have been a better world with him in it. The pro-European, democratic forces would have the benefit of a strong, skilled, and articulate advocate. Given his skill at political infighting, it is possible that he still would be in power today. But unlikely.

The fact is that at the time of his assassination, his popularity rating and that of his Democratic Party had dropped significantly. This was primarily due to the consistent pressure on his government by the West to take steps unpopular with most Serbians (such as cooperation with the ICTY), as well as the slowness of the Serbian economy to respond to the essential corrective measures which he and his team introduced to make it competitive with other market economies.

His coalition was maintained only with great difficulty with almost daily crises. The opposition from the Radicals, from the party of DSS, and from several other members of the original DOS coalition was strong, constant, and growing. The issues of The Hague and Kosovo would have continued to bedevil him and his ability to govern.

A far more likely scenario, therefore, would be a situation similar to what we have now, with a number of parties other than the Radicals and Socialist Party negotiating to try to form a government, which almost by definition will be fraught with contradictions and conflicts from day one.

Zoran Djindjic shared a lot more with U.S. President John Kennedy than simply both being assassinated by a rifle while leading their country. Both managed to strike a chord of optimism in people all over the world and both were more loved in death than while alive. Both had fierce domestic opposition and both faced significant obstacles, which prevented them from carrying out all the reforms and initiatives, which they wished to take.

Both inspired talented outsiders to come into government in order to make a difference. Both had visions for the future, but also a highly pragmatic streak that led them to choose their issues carefully and a willingness, if necessary, to deal with the devil.

Milosevic and Djindjic also had a major impact on the life of the other. Zoran Djindjic spent the decade of the 1990s as a leader of the opposition to Milosevic and his policies. One of his greatest accomplishments was his willingness to put his political rivalry with Vojislav Kostunica aside and support him in the Presidential elections of September 2000. That decision and his subsequent work in keeping the DOS coalition on line and on message amazed an outside world all too familiar with years of Serbian opposition infighting and self-inflicted wounds.

I can confirm that when Slobodan Milosevic made the fateful decision to call early Presidential elections, virtually no one in the Western community initially believed that the opposition had any chance of coming to power. Djindjic deserves the most credit for Milosevic's political downfall, as well as his arrest, and transfer to The Hague.

But those actions of Djindjic also had a high cost. The maneuvering after the elections to ensure that Milosevic would in fact leave office and the army and police would not turn on the opposition brought Djindjic into fatal contact with the Red Beret leader Legija.

The "revolt" of the red berets following the arrest and extradition to the ICTY of two Serbian indictees exposed the weakness of the Djindjic government to armed attack in a potential coup and led him to make further concessions to a mixed coalition of nationalists such as Legija and his associates even in the Zemun gang. 

Those forces ultimately killed him, as he was getting ready to move decisively against them. His assassin gave his rationale, as "he (Djindjic) wanted to send all of us to The Hague." Thus, in a way, Milosevic got a measure of revenge.

Zoran Djindjic's legacy is mostly one of a message of hope, courage, and a vision of a better Serbia. He and his team built a solid foundation in re-establishing normal relationships with the International Community, including receiving billions of dollars in economic assistance and debt forgiveness. They put Serbia on a democratic track.

However, the feeling of excitement and positive movement that existed during most of his time as Premier is gone, replaced now by fear of the rise of the Radicals and other nationalist forces, voter apathy, and an uncertain future.

Slobodan Milosevic's legacy is more concrete and unfortunately, much longer lasting. He was extremely successful in instilling within a majority of the Serbian people an image of the events of the 1990s, which is dramatically at odds with the perceptions shared by most of the world. Through skillful use of the media, relying on the existing prejudices and fears of the Serbian people, and making full use of the political turmoil of the time, Milosevic created in Serbia a perception of a world where the Serbian people everywhere were victims of aggression, misunderstood by an international community duped by the Kosovo Albanians, by the perfidious Muslims in Bosnia, and by the Croatians.

Most Serbs have little knowledge in the extent of the destruction and violence carried out in their name and even less interest in taking active measures to find out. This is Milosevic's true legacy to the Serbian people. It remains the foremost obstacle to the possibility of Serbia assuming its rightful place in Europe. Seven years after his fall from power and a year after his death, he still casts a large shadow over a troubled land. While the same problem to some extent exists in other countries in the region as well, no one did it nearly as well as Slobodan Milosevic.