NATO prepares a massive military force: Will war break out in 2029?

The goal is to define the capabilities each member state must provide by 2029—a year that some European assessments identify as the point at which Russia could be ready to attack a NATO member. The negotiations are beginning at a sensitive time.

The Trump administration is considering a significant reduction in the U.S. military presence in Europe, which could leave the Alliance short of troops and key assets, including aerial refuelling tankers, long-range missiles, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. The discussions will reveal how willing individual countries are to invest, to what extent Europe can rely on its own forces, and whether robotics and artificial intelligence should be more extensively integrated into military planning.

One senior diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity, predicted a difficult process. “It will be difficult,” he said, citing burden-sharing, the role of the United States, and the need to reconcile ambitions with political priorities as the main challenges.

In the coming days, allies will begin reviewing new capability targets. This marks the first step in NATO’s Defence Planning Process (NDPP), which consists of five phases. Admiral Pierre Vandier, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, stressed that the aim is to make this a cycle of transformation rather than merely an administrative exercise.

Politico spoke to 15 current and former officials and diplomats, identifying five key areas for discussion.

How many troops should be provided?

The first question concerns the number of troops and the capabilities allies should provide. So far, in addition to the forces required for large-scale operations, allies have committed to maintaining 18 reserve brigades, each comprising approximately 5,000 troops, for smaller crisis-response missions outside Alliance territory, such as those in Afghanistan or Kosovo.

Pressure from the United States to shift a greater share of responsibility for security to Europe—an approach known as “NATO 3.0”—could lead to these requirements being reduced or scrapped. The discussions will also cover ways to accelerate the planning process in response to the rapid pace of battlefield innovation, from artificial intelligence to ground-based robotics, as well as conventional support for nuclear-armed allies such as the United Kingdom and the United States.

Nasima Barouz, NATO’s director for nuclear policy, stressed that this support is an integral part of the North Atlantic Alliance’s Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and a key message that allies want to emphasise.

Who will fill the gap left by the U.S.?

The Pentagon’s review of American forces in Europe looms over the negotiations. Earlier this year, Washington withdrew certain assets on which NATO had relied, including strategic bombers, fighter jets, drones, submarines and warships.

With the review’s findings expected in December, while negotiations are still underway, there are concerns that the process could delay the talks or that the United States could withdraw additional capabilities crucial to Europe, such as heavy transport aircraft.

This will also raise the question of who will replace American capabilities. Achieving a fair distribution of the burden will be difficult, as national budgets are already under considerable strain.

Camille Grand, head of a U.S. defence industry association and a former senior NATO official, noted that NATO had traditionally assessed its requirements while the United States filled the gaps.

“That is no longer the case,” she said.

One possible solution would be to move away from specific requirements for particular types of weapons towards broader objectives that countries must achieve—for example, destroying Russian command posts. This would give European allies greater flexibility, even without access to American weapons.

Fabrice Pothier, a former NATO director of policy planning and current head of Rasmussen Global, argues that Europe does not need “thousands of Tomahawk missiles” because the same effect can be achieved using significantly cheaper alternatives.

East, North or South?

Focusing on Russia could create friction with allies concerned about other threats. Officially, NATO advocates a “360-degree” approach to security. In practice, however, the focus has shifted eastward following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Last year, the Alliance also expanded its focus northward by launching an Arctic mission, largely in response to pressure from Donald Trump over Greenland.

Some allies are calling for greater attention to NATO’s southern and southeastern flanks, where challenges include the presence of Russian mercenaries in Libya, the potential use of migration as a weapon, increased submarine activity, and drone attacks on vessels in the Black Sea.

“Too much attention is being directed towards the north,” said another NATO diplomat, who believes the Alliance should reassess its priorities.

4. More drones or more tanks?

The drone warfare seen in Ukraine will fuel debate over the balance between unmanned systems and conventional equipment, such as tanks and artillery. Most allies plan to expand their use of drones. The United Kingdom announced a “hybrid fleet” this year that will rely on autonomous vessels, including Type 93 unmanned underwater vehicles.

France has allocated approximately €8.4 billion for drones and loitering munitions, while Germany plans to establish its first drone-specialised regiment next year.

Demographic challenges are also influencing these decisions. According to Grand, ageing populations and recruitment difficulties are increasingly pushing countries towards unmanned systems.

Vandier has warned that Russia produces nine million drones annually, requiring the Alliance to make a “fairly radical effort.” As a possible solution, he proposed a subscription-based model for hardware upgrades to prevent military equipment from becoming obsolete too quickly.

Lessons from Ukraine

Most allies believe that Ukraine contributes to their security through its large, battle-hardened military and rapid technological advances in aerial, naval and ground-based drones, air defence, missiles, and the Delta battlefield management system.

Consequently, some countries are seeking closer military and industrial cooperation with Ukraine, while others urge caution, pointing out that the war in Ukraine differs from NATO doctrine, which is based on rapid manoeuvres, air superiority and precision strikes from a distance.

NATO's senior military commander, U.S. General Alexus Grynkewich, told the European Parliament that important lessons must be learned from the conflict, adding: “We do not want to fight that kind of war.”