31.07.2026.
13:33
Putin is opening a new nightmare; Half a million Russians are on the move?
In recent months, Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly stated that Kremlin plans to announce a new wave of mobilization in Russia this autumn, after the State Duma elections, and send another half a million people to the front. But what if it actually happens?
Officially, Moscow regularly denies such plans, claiming that even under the current system of recruiting soldiers through contracts, the military is being replenished at the required rate.
Mobilization is indeed unpopular in Russian society, and it would also put pressure on the economy, as it would “pull out” several hundred thousand more people from an already shrinking workforce.
For these reasons, the Kremlin has not announced any new waves of mobilization since autumn 2022, limiting itself to recruiting contract soldiers. Whether it will announce one this time depends directly on the actual ratio between casualties and the influx of new contract soldiers. These figures remain unknown.
But what happens if Russia announces mobilization and it does not lead to serious internal unrest, as many in Kyiv hope, and hundreds of thousands of additional Russian soldiers end up on the front lines? How would that change the military situation?
There is a widespread belief that recruiting even half a million or even one million soldiers would not fundamentally change the situation, because the drones Ukraine is currently producing in huge numbers could destroy incoming reinforcements, and the pace of Russia’s advance would not increase significantly, according to the Ukrainian outlet Strana.
This argument can be partially accepted: under current conditions, the dominance of unmanned aerial vehicles in the air makes offensive operations difficult regardless of the number of troops involved. However, mobilization in Russia could still have a significant impact on the war, but in a different way.
In those sections of the front where fighting is already active, the impact of mobilization is unlikely to be immediately noticeable due to the “drone wall” factor and the dead zones that have formed.
A new front
However, a major reinforcement of the army would allow Russia to open a new front in areas where the line of contact is currently relatively calm. Above all, this concerns the Ukrainian-Russian border regions around Bryansk, Sumy, and Chernihiv.
Zelensky recently stated that such a threat exists.
In this case, the Ukrainian Armed Forces would have to redeploy large reserves there, even though they are already facing a shortage of manpower. This would stretch Ukrainian forces thin, potentially leading to a significant weakening of the front in other areas.
Mobilization would allow Russia to quickly expand and replenish its drone units, further complicating the situation for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Mobilization would also allow more air defense crews to protect logistics networks in nearby and mid-range rear areas, as well as key facilities deep behind the front lines, thereby reducing the damage caused by Ukrainian strikes.
Mobilization would enable Russia to create a deeply layered defensive system along the entire front line and establish substantial reserves.
This, together with the strengthening of Russia’s drone forces, would make any plans the Ukrainian Armed Forces may have had for a large-scale offensive, if they had any at all, practically impossible to carry out.
This means that Russia would have enough manpower to continue a war of attrition over the next year or two, or even longer (depending on the number of people mobilized).
Zelensky has already stated that, given the possibility of mobilization in Russia, the main task facing the Ukrainian command is also to intensify its own mobilization efforts.
Some commentators have previously suggested that, in the event of Russian mobilization, Ukraine would lower the conscription age, something Kyiv’s Western partners have been urging for some time.
Some have mentioned lowering it from 25 to 23, while others have suggested going as low as 18. Whether these predictions will come true, or whether the authorities will find another way to speed up troop replenishment (for example, by reducing the size of reserve forces), remains to be seen. However, it is more than likely that one of Kyiv’s responses to a potential Russian mobilization, if it begins, would be a further tightening of mobilization measures in Ukraine.

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