Kosovo became independent Feb. 17,
======================
According to whom?
Why is this presented as a fact when it is not?
If Kosovo became independent then why are we still discussing it?
This is a plan that may ultimately backfire for Pristina on several fronts.
First and most importantly is the issue of enforcing said ban. There is little to nothing Pristina can do to halt or even hinder the movement of Serbian officials north of the Ibar. Pristina likes the talk big about exerting law and order, but it has done absolutely nothing to make deeds out of words, and when anything is attempted, it's usually in the form of something provocative, forcing EULEX and KFOR to react and keep stability, which usually is pushing any Albanian momentum back south over the Ibar.
Second is the issue of results. The "incidents" today - if one can call them that - were not preventive. Only a delaying tactic. Ivanovic and Petkovic ultimately reached their intended targets. Petkovic was stopped because he crossed at the Merdare crossing, which takes him directly into Podujevo - an area controlled by the Albanians. Now whether he chose to cross there because he wanted to test his luck, make the news, or just because he we too lazy to drive all the way around and enter at Rudnica/Jarinja is unknown. But like Ivanovic, he reached his destination. He simply entered a private vehicle (probably brought along in case) and continued on his way. At the end of the day, the Serbs got to where they needed to go and an issue that might not have been political was made so by Pristina. Pristina showed it merely delayed, or inconvenienced, Serb officials. Banning them is something that has yet to be attempted and in the absence of cooperation from EULEX, they do not have the capability to enforce that.
Third is the issue of interpreting visits. Anything that doesn’t jive with Pristina’s official policies can be seen as “political” and “provocative”. This is a government run by some of the most paranoid and self-conscious people in the Balkans. Anything that is interpreted as statements of support by Belgrade for the K-Serb community is “provocative” by these people. But in the end, they are their own worst enemies. By making gestures of arresting Serb officials, they answer interpretive provocations with actual provocations, leading to a further deterioration of relations between Serbs and Albanians and in the end are the ones that look like the authoritarians. I can only imagine what will happen in Pristina when Patriarch Irinej is formally enthroned in Pec. The point here is that these interpretations directly lead to an increase of tensions because Pristina constantly needs to make some effort to prove its in charge. Yet in many respects, the visits by Serb officials are to events connected with already-established Serbian institutions. The visit by Ivanovic to what I can only imagine is a Belgrade-financed kindergarten shows that Belgrade can still exert authority in Kosovo. Inconveniencing the emcee is little more a delayed reaction to an already done deal. What’s the point of delaying Ivanovic if they can’t prevent the construction of a new school?
Additionally, the visit last week by Ivica Dacic raises a few eyebrows. If, as Pristina claims, all Serbian officials ultimately need their approval to come, how is it that Thaci allowed Dacic to travel to Gracanica? I mean, even EULEX says they only function as a middleman between Belgrade and Pristina. Now Dacic’s visit could not have been that clandestine. So either someone in Pristina was dumb enough to approve his visit, knowing full well his very presence as Serbia’s Interior Minister is a “provocative” move, or they were told by EULEX to approve the visit. In this regard, Thaci’s statement of “banning” any future visits must have come because members of his own party ridiculed him on being a pushover. Again. So Pristina is either impotent to do anything vis a vis EULEX, or just simply incompetent.
Fourth is Pristina’s relation with EULEX. As much as the K-Albanian government wants to emphasize its in charge, it isn’t. It remains and will remain heavily dependent on foreign assistance for the immediate future, and that means taking orders from Washington, Berlin, and Paris. If Pristina wants to alienate EULEX, its link to the rest of Europe, it risks deteriorating relations with those countries that have invested time, money, and diplomacy into this parastate. If the only thing they could threaten EULEX with to action is general violence, they have not progressed since 1999. If after 11 years they can only resort to mob violence instead of inter-ethnic outreach, there’s clearly a reason why Kosovo’s statehood is managed by outsiders.
So with all of this being said, most of the huffing and puffing from Pristina will be, as it has been in the past, lots of empty rhetoric. All they can do is inconvenience Belgrade and EULEX. They cannot take matters into their own hands because they lack the resources and the international support to make good on their threats. EULEX’s apparent statement to Pristina in regards to “banning” Belgrade officials is “you’re on your own”. I interpret this as they will neither support nor hinder. If they can actually pull this off, which I doubt, more power to them. If they can’t and they need the help of EULEX, it shows once again their reliance on another institution to enforce what they want.
Tell Thaci that Ahtissarri sold him "Supervised Independence", and not complete sovereignty. Maybe the Snake misunderstood that part of the Finn's plan?
"EULEX has already said it is “not involved in the process” of administrating the ban, giving Pristina more fuel for the argument that the mission is an obstacle to full Kosovar sovereignty."
What "full Kosovar sovereignty" does Pristina expect?
This is, after all, the reality of what is meant by "supervised independence" --> EU, through Eulex, will supervise and tell you what to do for as long as they like!
"EULEX has already said it is “not involved in the process” of administrating the ban, giving Pristina more fuel for the argument that the mission is an obstacle to full Kosovar sovereignty."
What "full Kosovar sovereignty" does Pristina expect?
This is, after all, the reality of what is meant by "supervised independence" --> EU, through Eulex, will supervise and tell you what to do for as long as they like!
Tell Thaci that Ahtissarri sold him "Supervised Independence", and not complete sovereignty. Maybe the Snake misunderstood that part of the Finn's plan?
This is a plan that may ultimately backfire for Pristina on several fronts.
First and most importantly is the issue of enforcing said ban. There is little to nothing Pristina can do to halt or even hinder the movement of Serbian officials north of the Ibar. Pristina likes the talk big about exerting law and order, but it has done absolutely nothing to make deeds out of words, and when anything is attempted, it's usually in the form of something provocative, forcing EULEX and KFOR to react and keep stability, which usually is pushing any Albanian momentum back south over the Ibar.
Second is the issue of results. The "incidents" today - if one can call them that - were not preventive. Only a delaying tactic. Ivanovic and Petkovic ultimately reached their intended targets. Petkovic was stopped because he crossed at the Merdare crossing, which takes him directly into Podujevo - an area controlled by the Albanians. Now whether he chose to cross there because he wanted to test his luck, make the news, or just because he we too lazy to drive all the way around and enter at Rudnica/Jarinja is unknown. But like Ivanovic, he reached his destination. He simply entered a private vehicle (probably brought along in case) and continued on his way. At the end of the day, the Serbs got to where they needed to go and an issue that might not have been political was made so by Pristina. Pristina showed it merely delayed, or inconvenienced, Serb officials. Banning them is something that has yet to be attempted and in the absence of cooperation from EULEX, they do not have the capability to enforce that.
Third is the issue of interpreting visits. Anything that doesn’t jive with Pristina’s official policies can be seen as “political” and “provocative”. This is a government run by some of the most paranoid and self-conscious people in the Balkans. Anything that is interpreted as statements of support by Belgrade for the K-Serb community is “provocative” by these people. But in the end, they are their own worst enemies. By making gestures of arresting Serb officials, they answer interpretive provocations with actual provocations, leading to a further deterioration of relations between Serbs and Albanians and in the end are the ones that look like the authoritarians. I can only imagine what will happen in Pristina when Patriarch Irinej is formally enthroned in Pec. The point here is that these interpretations directly lead to an increase of tensions because Pristina constantly needs to make some effort to prove its in charge. Yet in many respects, the visits by Serb officials are to events connected with already-established Serbian institutions. The visit by Ivanovic to what I can only imagine is a Belgrade-financed kindergarten shows that Belgrade can still exert authority in Kosovo. Inconveniencing the emcee is little more a delayed reaction to an already done deal. What’s the point of delaying Ivanovic if they can’t prevent the construction of a new school?
Additionally, the visit last week by Ivica Dacic raises a few eyebrows. If, as Pristina claims, all Serbian officials ultimately need their approval to come, how is it that Thaci allowed Dacic to travel to Gracanica? I mean, even EULEX says they only function as a middleman between Belgrade and Pristina. Now Dacic’s visit could not have been that clandestine. So either someone in Pristina was dumb enough to approve his visit, knowing full well his very presence as Serbia’s Interior Minister is a “provocative” move, or they were told by EULEX to approve the visit. In this regard, Thaci’s statement of “banning” any future visits must have come because members of his own party ridiculed him on being a pushover. Again. So Pristina is either impotent to do anything vis a vis EULEX, or just simply incompetent.
Fourth is Pristina’s relation with EULEX. As much as the K-Albanian government wants to emphasize its in charge, it isn’t. It remains and will remain heavily dependent on foreign assistance for the immediate future, and that means taking orders from Washington, Berlin, and Paris. If Pristina wants to alienate EULEX, its link to the rest of Europe, it risks deteriorating relations with those countries that have invested time, money, and diplomacy into this parastate. If the only thing they could threaten EULEX with to action is general violence, they have not progressed since 1999. If after 11 years they can only resort to mob violence instead of inter-ethnic outreach, there’s clearly a reason why Kosovo’s statehood is managed by outsiders.
So with all of this being said, most of the huffing and puffing from Pristina will be, as it has been in the past, lots of empty rhetoric. All they can do is inconvenience Belgrade and EULEX. They cannot take matters into their own hands because they lack the resources and the international support to make good on their threats. EULEX’s apparent statement to Pristina in regards to “banning” Belgrade officials is “you’re on your own”. I interpret this as they will neither support nor hinder. If they can actually pull this off, which I doubt, more power to them. If they can’t and they need the help of EULEX, it shows once again their reliance on another institution to enforce what they want.
Kosovo became independent Feb. 17,
======================
According to whom?
Why is this presented as a fact when it is not?
If Kosovo became independent then why are we still discussing it?
Tell Thaci that Ahtissarri sold him "Supervised Independence", and not complete sovereignty. Maybe the Snake misunderstood that part of the Finn's plan?
"EULEX has already said it is “not involved in the process” of administrating the ban, giving Pristina more fuel for the argument that the mission is an obstacle to full Kosovar sovereignty."
What "full Kosovar sovereignty" does Pristina expect?
This is, after all, the reality of what is meant by "supervised independence" --> EU, through Eulex, will supervise and tell you what to do for as long as they like!
This is a plan that may ultimately backfire for Pristina on several fronts.
First and most importantly is the issue of enforcing said ban. There is little to nothing Pristina can do to halt or even hinder the movement of Serbian officials north of the Ibar. Pristina likes the talk big about exerting law and order, but it has done absolutely nothing to make deeds out of words, and when anything is attempted, it's usually in the form of something provocative, forcing EULEX and KFOR to react and keep stability, which usually is pushing any Albanian momentum back south over the Ibar.
Second is the issue of results. The "incidents" today - if one can call them that - were not preventive. Only a delaying tactic. Ivanovic and Petkovic ultimately reached their intended targets. Petkovic was stopped because he crossed at the Merdare crossing, which takes him directly into Podujevo - an area controlled by the Albanians. Now whether he chose to cross there because he wanted to test his luck, make the news, or just because he we too lazy to drive all the way around and enter at Rudnica/Jarinja is unknown. But like Ivanovic, he reached his destination. He simply entered a private vehicle (probably brought along in case) and continued on his way. At the end of the day, the Serbs got to where they needed to go and an issue that might not have been political was made so by Pristina. Pristina showed it merely delayed, or inconvenienced, Serb officials. Banning them is something that has yet to be attempted and in the absence of cooperation from EULEX, they do not have the capability to enforce that.
Third is the issue of interpreting visits. Anything that doesn’t jive with Pristina’s official policies can be seen as “political” and “provocative”. This is a government run by some of the most paranoid and self-conscious people in the Balkans. Anything that is interpreted as statements of support by Belgrade for the K-Serb community is “provocative” by these people. But in the end, they are their own worst enemies. By making gestures of arresting Serb officials, they answer interpretive provocations with actual provocations, leading to a further deterioration of relations between Serbs and Albanians and in the end are the ones that look like the authoritarians. I can only imagine what will happen in Pristina when Patriarch Irinej is formally enthroned in Pec. The point here is that these interpretations directly lead to an increase of tensions because Pristina constantly needs to make some effort to prove its in charge. Yet in many respects, the visits by Serb officials are to events connected with already-established Serbian institutions. The visit by Ivanovic to what I can only imagine is a Belgrade-financed kindergarten shows that Belgrade can still exert authority in Kosovo. Inconveniencing the emcee is little more a delayed reaction to an already done deal. What’s the point of delaying Ivanovic if they can’t prevent the construction of a new school?
Additionally, the visit last week by Ivica Dacic raises a few eyebrows. If, as Pristina claims, all Serbian officials ultimately need their approval to come, how is it that Thaci allowed Dacic to travel to Gracanica? I mean, even EULEX says they only function as a middleman between Belgrade and Pristina. Now Dacic’s visit could not have been that clandestine. So either someone in Pristina was dumb enough to approve his visit, knowing full well his very presence as Serbia’s Interior Minister is a “provocative” move, or they were told by EULEX to approve the visit. In this regard, Thaci’s statement of “banning” any future visits must have come because members of his own party ridiculed him on being a pushover. Again. So Pristina is either impotent to do anything vis a vis EULEX, or just simply incompetent.
Fourth is Pristina’s relation with EULEX. As much as the K-Albanian government wants to emphasize its in charge, it isn’t. It remains and will remain heavily dependent on foreign assistance for the immediate future, and that means taking orders from Washington, Berlin, and Paris. If Pristina wants to alienate EULEX, its link to the rest of Europe, it risks deteriorating relations with those countries that have invested time, money, and diplomacy into this parastate. If the only thing they could threaten EULEX with to action is general violence, they have not progressed since 1999. If after 11 years they can only resort to mob violence instead of inter-ethnic outreach, there’s clearly a reason why Kosovo’s statehood is managed by outsiders.
So with all of this being said, most of the huffing and puffing from Pristina will be, as it has been in the past, lots of empty rhetoric. All they can do is inconvenience Belgrade and EULEX. They cannot take matters into their own hands because they lack the resources and the international support to make good on their threats. EULEX’s apparent statement to Pristina in regards to “banning” Belgrade officials is “you’re on your own”. I interpret this as they will neither support nor hinder. If they can actually pull this off, which I doubt, more power to them. If they can’t and they need the help of EULEX, it shows once again their reliance on another institution to enforce what they want.
Kosovo became independent Feb. 17,
======================
According to whom?
Why is this presented as a fact when it is not?
If Kosovo became independent then why are we still discussing it?
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