NATO chief reiterates support for Ahtisaari

Pressure on Belgrade to extradite General Mladic comes from the ostensible belief that the Serbian government can (at least) put pressure on those who are protecting the indictee and (at most) itself apprehend General Mladic. Is it a bona-fide belief? We don't know. But suppose it were, and suppose further that Belgade could apply such pressure to achieve a significant result. (It's a stretch, but if we don't suppose these then the argument lies elsewhere - below.)

Well, then, in order for that scenario to play out, Belgrade would need to be able to claim that it took so long because the General was hiding in a physical location that was not under full control of the government. Influence yes, jurisdiction no. A couple of places come to mind. One is the border with BiH where, beleive it or not, there is a bit of territory that is officially under dispute. The second is Kosovo. Can I have my share of the 5 million now?

More likely, however, is that all players are tacitly in agreement that General Mladic should remain at large. After all, to ensure that Serbia remains at the negotiating table over other issues (Kosovo and yes, indeed, RS) one can't take away all of someone's bargaining chips. That would be like insisting that someone sit down at a poker table when it is clear he has nothing with which to ante up.

Several clocks are ticking here. Notably, ICTY trials of the "Kosovo Six" and of non-Serb indictees, the whole Kosovo status thing, (unfortunately, the Kosovo standards clock does not appear to be ticking), determination of the Dayton shelf-life, and the depth of K-albanian patience. It is unfortunate for the student of history that Izetbegovic, Tudman and especially Milosevic are all dead. They were not aged men, and I don't expect the clocks of Mr Karadzic and General Mladic to reveal very much to historians when all is said and done.

Pressure on Belgrade to extradite General Mladic comes from the ostensible belief that the Serbian government can (at least) put pressure on those who are protecting the indictee and (at most) itself apprehend General Mladic. Is it a bona-fide belief? We don't know. But suppose it were, and suppose further that Belgade could apply such pressure to achieve a significant result. (It's a stretch, but if we don't suppose these then the argument lies elsewhere - below.)

Well, then, in order for that scenario to play out, Belgrade would need to be able to claim that it took so long because the General was hiding in a physical location that was not under full control of the government. Influence yes, jurisdiction no. A couple of places come to mind. One is the border with BiH where, beleive it or not, there is a bit of territory that is officially under dispute. The second is Kosovo. Can I have my share of the 5 million now?

More likely, however, is that all players are tacitly in agreement that General Mladic should remain at large. After all, to ensure that Serbia remains at the negotiating table over other issues (Kosovo and yes, indeed, RS) one can't take away all of someone's bargaining chips. That would be like insisting that someone sit down at a poker table when it is clear he has nothing with which to ante up.

Several clocks are ticking here. Notably, ICTY trials of the "Kosovo Six" and of non-Serb indictees, the whole Kosovo status thing, (unfortunately, the Kosovo standards clock does not appear to be ticking), determination of the Dayton shelf-life, and the depth of K-albanian patience. It is unfortunate for the student of history that Izetbegovic, Tudman and especially Milosevic are all dead. They were not aged men, and I don't expect the clocks of Mr Karadzic and General Mladic to reveal very much to historians when all is said and done.