Serbia: Harking back to cold war policy

Serbia: Harking back to cold war policy But Serbia’s foreign policy is intended to maintain domestic social stability as much as be an effective foreign policy, with the current and the geopolitical reality preventing Belgrade from returning to its favored foreign policy strategy. Tadic concluded his weeklong trip to China on Aug. 24 with a visit to Shanghai, where he spoke with Chinese businesspeople about the investment climate in Serbia. During his much publicized visit (both in Serbia and China), Tadic met with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, President Hu Jintao and National People’s Congress Standing Committee Chairman Wu Bangguo. Serbia and China signed an agreement on strategic partnership that enhances bilateral diplomatic and economic relations. Specifically, Beijing has tentatively agreed to invest approximately 200 million euro ($286 million) for the construction of a six-lane highway bridge across the Danube River between two of Belgrade’s suburbs. Tadic’s visit to China came approximately a month and a half after the Serbian president offered to host the 2011 50th anniversary Non-Aligned Movement (a Cold War-era organization of countries aligned with neither the Soviet nor Western blocs) summit in Belgrade. According to the latest news from Serbia, Belgrade is hoping to host the summit with its fellow former Yugoslav republics, with which relations have been strained since a series of civil wars broke apart the country in the 1990s. The two diplomatic efforts best represent and encapsulate Belgrade’s conscious strategy to reinvigorate its Cold War-era political orientation as a key bridge between the Western and Eastern blocs. This strategy, however, is an effort to play to a domestic audience, rather than establish a realistic foreign policy strategy, and harkens to a time when the political geography of Belgrade was much different. Belgrade enjoyed a golden age in the 1960s and 1970s of economic and political relevance. Led by its charismatic leader Marshall Josip Broz “Tito”, Yugoslavia parlayed its position as a firmly communist country that was open to the West for economic purposes. Yugoslav businesses profited greatly as a transshipment point for Western goods to the Soviet bloc, while its stated policy of neutrality allowed Belgrade to present itself as the only European country interested in the problems of the third world. As such, Tito steered Yugoslavia to its position as the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, which led to political prestige as well as economic benefits, especially by bartering for commodities and energy with engineering and technical know-how. The reality today is that Belgrade does not command the same geopolitical relevance as it did as when it was the capital of Yugoslavia. With a population of roughly 8 million people, Serbia is not much larger than Switzerland, has no sea access and is confined to a north-south axis of territory on the Balkans that makes it crucial only as a link to Greece. In 1989, Belgrade was the capital of a country of 23 million people, had a large Adriatic coastline, possessed the fourth largest military in Europe (and probably the third most effective after the Soviet Union and Turkey) and had an economy three times the size of Serbia’s present economy. Yugoslavia was not just politically important because it was a Communist country with good relations with the West, but because it possessed considerable geographic and demographic advantages. But since Yugoslavia’s collapse in 1991, Belgrade has struggled to strike a balance between its alliance with Russia and its desire to integrate in the European Union. Under the rule of Slobodan Milosevic, Belgrade maintained its pariah status in the West. Moscow offered only tenuous support, as it was undergoing economic and political upheaval of its own. This allowed the West to have its way with Belgrade, hack its territory to a size palatable to Western interests (splitting Montenegro and Kosovo), and reduce its military to a size in which it no longer threatened Western-defined stability in the Balkans. With the fall of Milosevic in 2000 and the arrival of an avowedly pro-EU government, Belgrade’s relations with the West improved markedly. However, the European Union’s resistance to offer Belgrade a clear path toward membership ¬ due to Serbia’s delayed political orientation toward the West (including sending war criminals to the international tribunal at The Hague) and the EU’s institutional, political and public fatigue towards enlargement ¬ has kept relations with the West strained. Western support for Kosovo’s independence in 2008 – a political vestige of NATO’s air war against Serbia in 1999 – cemented Belgrade’s caution toward integration with the West, and made it unpalatable to a large segment of the population. This has led to an often schizophrenic foreign policy, oscillating between fulfilling European demands for membership while moving closer to Russia through sale of key energy infrastructure and political concessions to Moscow (such as Belgrade’s refusal to start NATO membership talks despite a clear offer from the United States). At the heart of this oscillation is a political climate in Belgrade that views an ambiguous foreign policy as advantageous. Avid pro-EU liberals who see an answer to all domestic problems in Brussels face off against pro-Russian nationalists who mistrust the EU’s foot dragging and deplore NATO’s support for an independent Kosovo. The first group believes that EU membership is a panacea while the latter ignores Serbia’s geography, surrounded as it is by EU- and NATO-member states. The two sides often oppose one another in the government, but they often share seats in the same governing coalition. The current government, as a continuation of this foreign policy, is in favor of EU membership but opposes the NATO alliance. Belgrade believes that it can profit economically as it has in the past by being a bridge for investments and trade between the European Union and Russia. However, the European Union has no need for such a bridge, especially not with Germany’s excellent political and economic relationship with Russia. Tadic’s visit to China is therefore part of an attempt to rebrand Serbia’s foreign policy as one that goes back to the Cold War days when Belgrade was a key geopolitical player. The idea that Serbia can profit from being a bridge between the East and the West is based on a mistaken understanding of the geopolitical landscape of 2009; it is in fact similar to France continuing to pursue an independent foreign policy of de Gaulle despite the end of the Cold War. Unlike Paris, which discarded de Gaullism with the election of Nicholas Sarkozy, Belgrade seems to continue to base its geopolitical strategy on a political geography that no longer exists. Belgrade foreign policy of reinvigorating its Cold War links has admittedly had some successes. Serbia’s ability to pass a U.N. resolution in October 2008 that asked the International Court of Justice to offer a legal opinion on Kosovo’s independence – despite staunch U.S. and Western resistance – illustrated that Belgrade can still mobilize its links with the Third World at the United Nations. There is also evidence that Belgrade is again becoming a palatable arms exporter to its former Non-Aligned Movement allies, with Iraq recently signing a deal for Serbian arms. But a foreign policy strategy designed primarily to avoid domestic political upheaval is not viable in the long term. Belgrade will therefore have to wait for a firm political hand at home before it can calibrate a clear policy abroad. This report originally appeared on the Strategic Forecasting website Presidents Tadic, Jintao in Beijing (FoNet) Serbian President Boris Tadic finished his trip to China on Aug. 24. Tadic’s highly publicized visit demonstrates that Belgrade is attempting to revitalize its golden age, when it served as an important link between the East and the West. Stratfor "A foreign policy strategy designed primarily to avoid domestic political upheaval is not viable in the long term. Belgrade will have to wait for a firm political hand at home before it can calibrate a clear policy abroad."

Serbia: Harking back to cold war policy

But Serbia’s foreign policy is intended to maintain domestic social stability as much as be an effective foreign policy, with the current and the geopolitical reality preventing Belgrade from returning to its favored foreign policy strategy.

Tadić concluded his weeklong trip to China on Aug. 24 with a visit to Shanghai, where he spoke with Chinese businesspeople about the investment climate in Serbia. During his much publicized visit (both in Serbia and China), Tadić met with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, President Hu Jintao and National People’s Congress Standing Committee Chairman Wu Bangguo.

Serbia and China signed an agreement on strategic partnership that enhances bilateral diplomatic and economic relations. Specifically, Beijing has tentatively agreed to invest approximately 200 million euro ($286 million) for the construction of a six-lane highway bridge across the Danube River between two of Belgrade’s suburbs.

Tadić’s visit to China came approximately a month and a half after the Serbian president offered to host the 2011 50th anniversary Non-Aligned Movement (a Cold War-era organization of countries aligned with neither the Soviet nor Western blocs) summit in Belgrade. According to the latest news from Serbia, Belgrade is hoping to host the summit with its fellow former Yugoslav republics, with which relations have been strained since a series of civil wars broke apart the country in the 1990s.

The two diplomatic efforts best represent and encapsulate Belgrade’s conscious strategy to reinvigorate its Cold War-era political orientation as a key bridge between the Western and Eastern blocs.

This strategy, however, is an effort to play to a domestic audience, rather than establish a realistic foreign policy strategy, and harkens to a time when the political geography of Belgrade was much different.

Belgrade enjoyed a golden age in the 1960s and 1970s of economic and political relevance. Led by its charismatic leader Marshall Josip Broz “Tito”, Yugoslavia parlayed its position as a firmly communist country that was open to the West for economic purposes. Yugoslav businesses profited greatly as a transshipment point for Western goods to the Soviet bloc, while its stated policy of neutrality allowed Belgrade to present itself as the only European country interested in the problems of the third world.

As such, Tito steered Yugoslavia to its position as the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, which led to political prestige as well as economic benefits, especially by bartering for commodities and energy with engineering and technical know-how.

The reality today is that Belgrade does not command the same geopolitical relevance as it did as when it was the capital of Yugoslavia. With a population of roughly 8 million people, Serbia is not much larger than Switzerland, has no sea access and is confined to a north-south axis of territory on the Balkans that makes it crucial only as a link to Greece.

In 1989, Belgrade was the capital of a country of 23 million people, had a large Adriatic coastline, possessed the fourth largest military in Europe (and probably the third most effective after the Soviet Union and Turkey) and had an economy three times the size of Serbia’s present economy. Yugoslavia was not just politically important because it was a Communist country with good relations with the West, but because it possessed considerable geographic and demographic advantages.

But since Yugoslavia’s collapse in 1991, Belgrade has struggled to strike a balance between its alliance with Russia and its desire to integrate in the European Union. Under the rule of Slobodan Milošević, Belgrade maintained its pariah status in the West. Moscow offered only tenuous support, as it was undergoing economic and political upheaval of its own. This allowed the West to have its way with Belgrade, hack its territory to a size palatable to Western interests (splitting Montenegro and Kosovo), and reduce its military to a size in which it no longer threatened Western-defined stability in the Balkans.

With the fall of Milošević in 2000 and the arrival of an avowedly pro-EU government, Belgrade’s relations with the West improved markedly. However, the European Union’s resistance to offer Belgrade a clear path toward membership ¬ due to Serbia’s delayed political orientation toward the West (including sending war criminals to the international tribunal at The Hague) and the EU’s institutional, political and public fatigue towards enlargement ¬ has kept relations with the West strained.

Western support for Kosovo’s independence in 2008 – a political vestige of NATO’s air war against Serbia in 1999 – cemented Belgrade’s caution toward integration with the West, and made it unpalatable to a large segment of the population. This has led to an often schizophrenic foreign policy, oscillating between fulfilling European demands for membership while moving closer to Russia through sale of key energy infrastructure and political concessions to Moscow (such as Belgrade’s refusal to start NATO membership talks despite a clear offer from the United States).

At the heart of this oscillation is a political climate in Belgrade that views an ambiguous foreign policy as advantageous. Avid pro-EU liberals who see an answer to all domestic problems in Brussels face off against pro-Russian nationalists who mistrust the EU’s foot dragging and deplore NATO’s support for an independent Kosovo. The first group believes that EU membership is a panacea while the latter ignores Serbia’s geography, surrounded as it is by EU- and NATO-member states.

The two sides often oppose one another in the government, but they often share seats in the same governing coalition. The current government, as a continuation of this foreign policy, is in favor of EU membership but opposes the NATO alliance. Belgrade believes that it can profit economically as it has in the past by being a bridge for investments and trade between the European Union and Russia. However, the European Union has no need for such a bridge, especially not with Germany’s excellent political and economic relationship with Russia.

Tadić’s visit to China is therefore part of an attempt to rebrand Serbia’s foreign policy as one that goes back to the Cold War days when Belgrade was a key geopolitical player. The idea that Serbia can profit from being a bridge between the East and the West is based on a mistaken understanding of the geopolitical landscape of 2009; it is in fact similar to France continuing to pursue an independent foreign policy of de Gaulle despite the end of the Cold War. Unlike Paris, which discarded de Gaullism with the election of Nicholas Sarkozy, Belgrade seems to continue to base its geopolitical strategy on a political geography that no longer exists.

Belgrade foreign policy of reinvigorating its Cold War links has admittedly had some successes. Serbia’s ability to pass a U.N. resolution in October 2008 that asked the International Court of Justice to offer a legal opinion on Kosovo’s independence – despite staunch U.S. and Western resistance – illustrated that Belgrade can still mobilize its links with the Third World at the United Nations.

There is also evidence that Belgrade is again becoming a palatable arms exporter to its former Non-Aligned Movement allies, with Iraq recently signing a deal for Serbian arms. But a foreign policy strategy designed primarily to avoid domestic political upheaval is not viable in the long term. Belgrade will therefore have to wait for a firm political hand at home before it can calibrate a clear policy abroad.

This report originally appeared on the Strategic Forecasting website