Kosovo scenarios and election boycotts

Kosovo scenarios and election boycotts The recent decision by the Serbian government that they would recommend that Kosovo Serbs not participate in the coming November elections there for the National Assembly and local government is the latest such example. It was accompanied by a statement that in areas of Kosovo where Serbs are in a majority, the Serbian government would carry out elections there in conjunction with the coming Serbian local and Presidential elections. This is putting Serbia in direct confrontation with UNMIK and thus, with the International Community. Before going into the reasons why this is a mistake, it is important to acknowledge that the Serbian experience in the Kosovo Assembly has been an extremely negative one. Despite having a healthy number of deputies, they have no power whatsoever; the Albanian majority routinely ignores them; no Albanian Party has ever once been willing on any issue to join with the Serbs in any vote against other Albanian parties; and their very participation in the process has been ill used by the International Community to demonstrate that "progress" has been made. It has been a fagade and nothing more. This is another case of "chickens coming home to roost." The Serbs see very clearly what the experience has been in the Kosovo Assembly. UNMIK routinely ignored Kosovo Albanian actions in Parliament, which harmed inter-ethnic relations and at times even violated Parliamentary procedures. This helped to convince the Serbs that they could not trust the word of the International Community in Kosovo and if they needed it, yet more confirmation of the adversarial nature of their relationship with Kosovo Albanians. Far more vigorous action by UNMIK and the rest of the International Community over the past eight years in this regard may have made a difference. Every time Kosovo has faced elections, the International Community in Belgrade has gone through the same process of attempting (successfully) to persuade Belgrade to encourage Serbs in Kosovo to vote. It has gotten progressively harder, in large part for the reason I stated above. So the decision this time to boycott should not come as a surprise to anyone. Particularly given the unfortunate timing - right when the status of Kosovo is being debated so vigorously with the chance of decisive action taking place in the near future. It is also a fact that the use of the boycott is standard practice in Serbian politics. The most important reason why the total boycott is a mistake is that it exposes the bankruptcy of the overall Serbian government policy towards Kosovo. It is abundantly clear what the Kosovo Albanians want: full independence (with many hoping that it will encourage massive Serbian flight from Kosovo). What Belgrade actually is prepared to do in Kosovo, however, is far less clear. Belgrade's supporters and sympathizers in the European Union - and there are many - desperately need some positive actions by Serbia to give them ammunition to fight against the proposed unilateral recognition of Kosovo Independence in December. Instead, the Serbs are doing everything possible to demonstrate that they cannot coexist with the Kosovo Albanians and will not work with them. What could strong "autonomy" possibly mean when the Belgrade government recommends even at local levels that Kosovo Serbs do not participate in running their affairs and competing in elections? If Belgrade had been clever, it would have put forward a comprehensive, moderate alternative for the International Community to consider. It, for example, should have fully embraced the specific points of the Ahtisaari Plan dealing with decentralization in particular. It could have had a firm policy of rejecting any decision on future status for a two-year period during which the European Union would replace UNMIK and beneficial points of the Ahtisaari Plan implemented. The new International Administrator appointed by the EU would then have the mandate to recommend after two years to the UN Security Council future status. This would have put the onus on the Kosovo Albanians to wait for two years for any possible action on status and would also have required them to demonstrate a willingness to cooperate on refugee return, decentralization, and freedom of movement. This is the sort of specific plan that supporters in the EU could have endorsed. Instead, the Kosovo Albanians can now sit back, take the high road, and watch the Serbs get into confrontation with the International Community once again. The Kosovo Albanians have been spared from implementing the recommendations of the Ahtisaari Plan, which would have been extremely painful for them. The Belgrade decision to discourage Kosovo Serbs from voting in even local elections also shows very clearly that there is a distinct difference between the interests of Belgrade and those of the Kosovo Serbs. The end result of the boycott will be that at local levels, particularly in mixed communities, the Serbs will cede local control to Albanians. Those elected officials will have the full support of UNMIK. This is sort of a self-fulfilling prophecy: the lack of Serb participation at the local level will ultimately provide proof via Albanian officials that there is no future for them in Kosovo. Any Serbian "officials" elected in ad hoc Serbian-sponsored elections later on will have no legitimacy whatsoever and will only be destined to increase the level of confrontation at the local level. Virtually every ethnic group in the Balkan conflicts has their own agenda and own national interests. What differentiates them most is in how they present those interests to the International Community. Both the Bosniaks in Bosnia and the Kosovo Albanians have consistently shown an awareness and respect for the goals and positions of the international community, even if they planned quietly and deliberately to circumvent them. The Serbs, in contrast, seem to take delight in openly challenging the International Community and have paid a heavy price as a result. They are about to do so again. By boycotting the elections in Kosovo, which the International Community has legitimized, and attempting to hold separate, unilateral elections (thereby setting up competing local governments in some municipalities), they are directly challenging the International Community and setting the stage for confrontation. Of course, this decision is also about Serbian domestic politics. Once again the DSS Party is using initiatives on nationalist issues such as Kosovo to force the DS and President Tadic to either follow its lead or appear to be caving into the international community. Once again, Tadic has chosen to accept the harder position of the DSS - and thereby showing where the real power lies in the government. With every step down this road: bashing NATO, boycotting Kosovo elections, delaying Presidential elections and local elections in Serbia solely due to the Kosovo question, Serbia continues to distance itself from the West. One wonders just how far this will go. It is fair to say that I hear more and more nightmare scenarios expressed by ordinary citizens in Belgrade these days. One may argue that the DSS strategy is to make the situation so god-awful and the accession to power of the Radicals so likely, that the forces supporting a "frozen conflict" in Kosovo will carry the day in order to avoid this catastrophe. It is a risky strategy, however, and one that could well backfire. Those who pursue it may be more confident than is justified that the EU will save Serbia from itself. Moreover, even if this strategy does work, the end result is a Kosovo where fewer and fewer Serbs will want to live. So it will be very much, a Pyrrhic victory. Is Sebia justified, or merely confident that EU will save it from itself? (Tanjug) A well-known comic strip in the United States shows a bank robber holding a pistol pointed at his own head and saying "Give me all the money or I will shoot!" Serbian behavior towards Kosovo reminds me very much of this cartoon. Belgrade's supporters and sympathizers in the European Union - and there are many - desperately need some positive actions by Serbia to give them ammunition to fight against the proposed unilateral recognition of Kosovo Independence in December.

Kosovo scenarios and election boycotts

The recent decision by the Serbian government that they would recommend that Kosovo Serbs not participate in the coming November elections there for the National Assembly and local government is the latest such example.

It was accompanied by a statement that in areas of Kosovo where Serbs are in a majority, the Serbian government would carry out elections there in conjunction with the coming Serbian local and Presidential elections. This is putting Serbia in direct confrontation with UNMIK and thus, with the International Community.

Before going into the reasons why this is a mistake, it is important to acknowledge that the Serbian experience in the Kosovo Assembly has been an extremely negative one.

Despite having a healthy number of deputies, they have no power whatsoever; the Albanian majority routinely ignores them; no Albanian Party has ever once been willing on any issue to join with the Serbs in any vote against other Albanian parties; and their very participation in the process has been ill used by the International Community to demonstrate that "progress" has been made. It has been a façade and nothing more.

This is another case of "chickens coming home to roost." The Serbs see very clearly what the experience has been in the Kosovo Assembly. UNMIK routinely ignored Kosovo Albanian actions in Parliament, which harmed inter-ethnic relations and at times even violated Parliamentary procedures.

This helped to convince the Serbs that they could not trust the word of the International Community in Kosovo and if they needed it, yet more confirmation of the adversarial nature of their relationship with Kosovo Albanians. Far more vigorous action by UNMIK and the rest of the International Community over the past eight years in this regard may have made a difference.

Every time Kosovo has faced elections, the International Community in Belgrade has gone through the same process of attempting (successfully) to persuade Belgrade to encourage Serbs in Kosovo to vote. It has gotten progressively harder, in large part for the reason I stated above. So the decision this time to boycott should not come as a surprise to anyone.

Particularly given the unfortunate timing - right when the status of Kosovo is being debated so vigorously with the chance of decisive action taking place in the near future. It is also a fact that the use of the boycott is standard practice in Serbian politics.

The most important reason why the total boycott is a mistake is that it exposes the bankruptcy of the overall Serbian government policy towards Kosovo.

It is abundantly clear what the Kosovo Albanians want: full independence (with many hoping that it will encourage massive Serbian flight from Kosovo). What Belgrade actually is prepared to do in Kosovo, however, is far less clear.

Belgrade's supporters and sympathizers in the European Union - and there are many - desperately need some positive actions by Serbia to give them ammunition to fight against the proposed unilateral recognition of Kosovo Independence in December.

Instead, the Serbs are doing everything possible to demonstrate that they cannot coexist with the Kosovo Albanians and will not work with them.

What could strong "autonomy" possibly mean when the Belgrade government recommends even at local levels that Kosovo Serbs do not participate in running their affairs and competing in elections?

If Belgrade had been clever, it would have put forward a comprehensive, moderate alternative for the International Community to consider. It, for example, should have fully embraced the specific points of the Ahtisaari Plan dealing with decentralization in particular.

It could have had a firm policy of rejecting any decision on future status for a two-year period during which the European Union would replace UNMIK and beneficial points of the Ahtisaari Plan implemented.

The new International Administrator appointed by the EU would then have the mandate to recommend after two years to the UN Security Council future status.

This would have put the onus on the Kosovo Albanians to wait for two years for any possible action on status and would also have required them to demonstrate a willingness to cooperate on refugee return, decentralization, and freedom of movement. This is the sort of specific plan that supporters in the EU could have endorsed.

Instead, the Kosovo Albanians can now sit back, take the high road, and watch the Serbs get into confrontation with the International Community once again. The Kosovo Albanians have been spared from implementing the recommendations of the Ahtisaari Plan, which would have been extremely painful for them.

The Belgrade decision to discourage Kosovo Serbs from voting in even local elections also shows very clearly that there is a distinct difference between the interests of Belgrade and those of the Kosovo Serbs.

The end result of the boycott will be that at local levels, particularly in mixed communities, the Serbs will cede local control to Albanians. Those elected officials will have the full support of UNMIK.

This is sort of a self-fulfilling prophecy: the lack of Serb participation at the local level will ultimately provide proof via Albanian officials that there is no future for them in Kosovo. Any Serbian "officials" elected in ad hoc Serbian-sponsored elections later on will have no legitimacy whatsoever and will only be destined to increase the level of confrontation at the local level.

Virtually every ethnic group in the Balkan conflicts has their own agenda and own national interests. What differentiates them most is in how they present those interests to the International Community.

Both the Bosniaks in Bosnia and the Kosovo Albanians have consistently shown an awareness and respect for the goals and positions of the international community, even if they planned quietly and deliberately to circumvent them.

The Serbs, in contrast, seem to take delight in openly challenging the International Community and have paid a heavy price as a result. They are about to do so again. By boycotting the elections in Kosovo, which the International Community has legitimized, and attempting to hold separate, unilateral elections (thereby setting up competing local governments in some municipalities), they are directly challenging the International Community and setting the stage for confrontation.

Of course, this decision is also about Serbian domestic politics. Once again the DSS Party is using initiatives on nationalist issues such as Kosovo to force the DS and President Tadić to either follow its lead or appear to be caving into the international community. Once again, Tadić has chosen to accept the harder position of the DSS - and thereby showing where the real power lies in the government.

With every step down this road: bashing NATO, boycotting Kosovo elections, delaying Presidential elections and local elections in Serbia solely due to the Kosovo question, Serbia continues to distance itself from the West. One wonders just how far this will go. It is fair to say that I hear more and more nightmare scenarios expressed by ordinary citizens in Belgrade these days.

One may argue that the DSS strategy is to make the situation so god-awful and the accession to power of the Radicals so likely, that the forces supporting a "frozen conflict" in Kosovo will carry the day in order to avoid this catastrophe. It is a risky strategy, however, and one that could well backfire.

Those who pursue it may be more confident than is justified that the EU will save Serbia from itself. Moreover, even if this strategy does work, the end result is a Kosovo where fewer and fewer Serbs will want to live. So it will be very much, a Pyrrhic victory.