ANEM Report on the Media Repression in Serbia over 1999

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IV THE WAR PERIOD

A) Introduction

The launch of the armed conflict between Yugoslavia and the multinational NATO forces signalled the beginning of the most difficult period in the history of the independent media in Serbia. By going to war with NATO, Slobodan Milosevic’s regime was finally able to repress all areas of public life without the need to show any consideration for the international community or organisations devoted to defending freedom of expression. On the other side, all opposition voices were successfully silenced by the fact that the international community was bombing Yugoslavia, as well as by the successful propaganda which the regime initially used to focus all public attention exclusively on the war and later to identify itself with a certain degree of success with the state. Thanks to these circumstances, the independent media lost its main support, that of the international community, which would have been counterproductive in such conditions, as well as the support of the public at home whose only thought was for the bombing. Left to themselves, the independent media were in the unenviable position of being forced to choose different strategies in an attempt to survive. Apart from having a "free hand" which enabled the regime to act according to its own needs, under the Constitution the state of war also provided them with the opportunity to use executive authority and pass laws and regulations which are normally under parliamentary jurisdiction, including regulations which allow the restriction or temporary abolition of human rights guaranteed by the Constitution, among which is the freedom of the media. Thus this section of the report will begin with an analysis of some of what were described as "war regulations" in order to later present an arsenal of repressive methods and cases.

B) Legal repression

The instructions published by the Serbian Ministry of Information on March 24, 1999, when the NATO attack on Yugoslavia was launched, consisted of, among others, severe restrictions on the work of journalists. According to these instructions, in a state of war, news agencies and media houses were obliged to carry out the following duties:

It is important to mention here that these restrictions were introduced on the basis of a constitutional provision according to which freedom of expression may be restricted in a state of war and under threat of war. However, the method used to restrict the aforementioned rights, namely, issuing internal instructions and holding subsequent internal briefings with the editors-in-chief of the media on a daily basis fails to comply with constitutional provisions, according to which a decree should be put into force which would specifically authorise the Ministry of Information to censor the media, and afterwards the Ministry should declare its own legal document determining ways of controlling the media.

One part of these instructions refers to the obligation of the media concerning the maintenance of constant contact with state bodies, which is the reason 24-hour duty was introduced in the media. Such instructions are understandable given the state of war, and the failure to comply with them, although there is no explicitly prescribed punitive measure contained within the instructions, entailed the closing down of the media in question, as in the case of ANEM stations which, according to the Ministry of Information, failed to comply with the instructions.

That part of the instructions which introduces censorship refers to the strictest ban on the reporting of any losses incurred by the army and the police, as well as additional instructions regarding the terminology to be used in reports (the army and the police must be referred to as defenders and freedom fighters, NATO as the aggressor, the KLA as a gang and terrorists, etc.). The responsibility of the editor-in-chief is also particularly emphasised with respect to any information which could have had an impact on the spread of defeatism and panic. The Ministry made all decisions regarding this issue, since, although there is no mention of any kind of punitive measure for publishing such information, the fact that Slavko Curuvija, the editor-in-chief of an influential daily newspaper and magazine was murdered, and Veran Matic, the editor-in-chief of Radio B92, as well as Stevan Niksic, the editor-in-chief of the weekly magazine "NIN" (one issue of "NIN" was actually banned), were arrested after the conflict had begun, proves the readiness of the authorities to apply the most brutal forms of repression against any journalist failing to comply with the instructions as well as with the everyday instructions of the authorities regarding reporting.

Particular importance should be given to article 6 of the Serbian Ministry of Information's instructions which obliges every journalist to serve the "current interests of the country" and to report anything of importance to the state as part of their military duties. This regulation also clearly demonstrates that journalists were unable to pursue their work with any sort of professionalism because if the authorities judged their activities to be against the "current interests of the country", which was up to the Ministry, i.e. the authorities, to decide, their lives would be placed in danger, criminal charges could be brought against them or they risked being exposed to other forms of police repression.

Finally, that article of the instructions in which Serbian media were ordered to constantly monitor reports from foreign media, especially from those radio stations whose signal could be received via short and medium waves in Yugoslavia, is of particular significance. The monitoring of foreign programs broadcast in the Serbian language such as The Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Deutsche Welle and France International is at issue here. Although this was not explicitly stated, it is obvious that these media were considered the major propaganda outlets of the enemy and, because the citizens could not be prevented from listening to these programs, nor could the signal of these foreign media be jammed, it was essential to monitor their reports in order to undertake "propaganda countermeasures".

To conclude this short analysis, we should emphasise the fact that the instructions issued by the Ministry of Information were extremely vague, i.e. extremely general in their nature and thus did not provide a clear picture for the editors regarding which information they were allowed to publish and which information they were banned from publishing. This lack of clarity in the instructions was compensated for by daily briefings with the editors-in-chief of the media in the Ministry of Information, during which the way the media reported on recent developments was discussed and decisions were then taken regarding the information received on a daily basis from the field.

With respect to the possibility of journalists being in a position to carry out their work without obstruction and with any degree of freedom in such a state of war, it must be stressed that such activities were, not only literally but also in a legal sense, so dangerous that they could have cost a journalist or an editor his or her life. Above all, the disruption of communication lines by the NATO bombing, combined with the disruption of the electric power system, prevented all media-related-work relying on electrical equipment and made it virtually impossible for any journalistic activities and the dissemination of news both in the country itself and abroad. Given the fact that foreign programs were being monitored, it was not even advisable to send reports by phone to these foreign media since the journalist providing the information was situated in Serbia, i.e. within the reach of repression by the local authorities. The increase in the legal risk was a direct result of the Decree on Criminal Proceedings during the State of War and the Decree on the Application of the Law on Internal Affairs during the State of War, both of which are analysed below. These two decrees increased the authority of the police and public prosecutors to such an extent that there was no guarantee whatsoever of the legality of the procedure. Any privacy of correspondence, of apartments, of individuals, any form of communication in fact, was virtually suspended by these decrees. Any policeman on duty was authorised to arrest any journalist and hold them in custody for a period of up to thirty days without explanation on the slightest suspicion of their being "engaged in activities against the current interests of the country". Criminal procedure was stripped of all legal procedural guarantees to such an extent that the individual could be sentenced without actually exercising his right to defend himself. We should, of course, bear in mind that repression in Serbia also exists outside the legal system (this often took place during the war) which means that any reputable journalist, whose trial may draw too much public attention, could lose their life under suspicious circumstances, as was the case with Slavko Curuvija. What was temporarily lost during the NATO intervention was the independent media. However, apart from the tragic murder of Slavko Curuvija, independent journalists have managed to survive.

* Decree on Internal Affairs during the state of war

This Decree provided the Ministry of Internal Affairs with increased authority during the state of war.

This authority was given to all employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs designated by the Minister of Internal Affairs or to any individual designated by him. These people were obliged to carry out all orders issued by their superiors in the line of duty, unless the enforcement of these orders would have constituted a criminal act.

If the interests of the services required it, the Minister of Internal Affairs or the person designated by him was able to relocate any employee of the Ministry or send them to some other Ministry department for as long a period as the interests of the service required.

As a counterbalance to the increased authority given to the Ministry’s officers, the Decree imposed stricter disciplinary responsibilities on them. As well as those included in the Internal Affairs Act, the Decree also cites other new activities considered to be serious violations of the officers’ professional duties and obligations. In addition to the disciplinary measures and sanctions in the Internal Affairs Act, the Decree also introduced new measures for serious violations of officers’ professional duties and obligations which included detention for up to 60 days or demotion to a lower rank which could last for one to two years. Disciplinary measures for minor violations of officers' professional duties and obligations were also introduced such as a ban on leaving the barracks for a period of up to four days and a detention which could last for up to 30-days. The immediate superior officer was authorised to pass such disciplinary measures for minor violations of officers’ professional duties and obligations. The Decree finally stated that students of the Internal Affairs School may be recruited into police units provided they were more than 16 years old.

The Federal Government's decree was in accordance with article 99, paragraph 11 of the Constitution of Yugoslavia under which the Federal Government is authorised to pass decrees regarding issues under the jurisdiction of the Federal Assembly should the Federal Assembly itself be unable to convene during a state of war.

The changes in the Criminal Proceedings Act as determined by this decree are as follows:

Article 2 of the decree authorises the court, when the accused was arrested or turned himself in voluntarily, to conduct criminal proceedings against an accused who has absconded or is beyond the jurisdiction of the local court which would otherwise be authorised to act as determined by the Criminal Proceedings Act.

This represents an extension of the jurisdiction of a local court where the accused has been arrested or turned himself in voluntarily as compared to its jurisdiction under article 29, paragraph 3 of the Criminal Proceedings Act, according to which the court has jurisdiction if neither the scene of the crime nor the residence of the accused is known, or if these are both located beyond the borders of Yugoslavia.

1. Changes regarding the obligation to obtain authorisation to conduct criminal proceedings as well as to search an apartment, other premises and individuals.

Article 3 of this decree determines that the regulations contained within the Criminal Proceedings Act regarding the obligation to obtain authorisation to conduct criminal proceedings shall not be applied to those who have committed crimes:

as well as in cases where the crime committed by the accused entails a minimum a 5-year prison sentence.

This effectively revokes, in this case, the regulation contained in article 139 of the Criminal Proceedings Act, under which the public prosecutor can neither demand an investigation nor press charges i.e. submit a proposal to bring charges unless presenting evidence beforehand that authorisation has been obtained from the competent state bodies (e.g. authorisation from the Federal Assembly to initiate criminal court action against MPs from the assembly itself as perpetrators of a criminal offence... ).

Article 7 of the decree also authorises law enforcement officers to search an apartment, other premises or individuals without a written court order and without the individual’s consent in cases where there is a reasonable doubt that the person has committed one of the criminal offences mentioned above.

Thus, in this case, the regulation contained within article 207, paragraph 1 of Criminal Proceedings Act, according to which the court orders a search by means of a search warrant, as well as the regulations contained in article 207, paragraph 2 of the Criminal Proceedings Act according to which the court order to make a search is to be delivered to the person to be searched or whose premises are to be searched before the search itself commences, are effectively revoked. This also includes the regulation according to which the person to whom such a court order refers is summonsed before the search is carried out and asked to voluntarily give information about the person in question or more specifically the objects which are being sought.

3. Changes to the regulations regarding the disqualification of judges

Article 4 of the Decree determines that the regulation contained in article 39, paragraph 6 of the Criminal Proceedings Act, according to which a judge or members of the jury may be disqualified if the circumstances indicate their possible prejudice, is no longer to be applied.

4. Changes to the jurisdiction and structure of the court

Article 5 of the Decree determines that a judge acting alone in the court of first instance is to conduct the proceedings for criminal offences for which fines or sentences of up to 5 years in prison are prescribed (thus changing the regulations according to which a council consisting of a judge and two jurors are required to conduct such proceedings, article 23, Criminal Proceedings Act).

5. Changes connected to the increase in the authority of certain state bodies

According to article 6 of the Decree, increased authority is given to:

The investigative judge and law enforcement officers were obliged to immediately notify the public prosecutor i.e. the state prosecutor after taking such measures.

6. Changes connected to those bodies which may impose temporary arrest and determine the duration of the confinement.

Article 8 of the Decree changes the regulations contained within the Criminal Proceedings Act regarding the authority of the relevant bodies to impose temporary confinement (which according to the Criminal Proceedings Act, only the investigative judge of the competent court was previously authorised to do - article 192, paragraph 1, Criminal Proceedings Act - in certain cases the investigative judge of the lower court – article 194, paragraph 1, Criminal Proceedings Act - and in special cases, this could be done by Internal Affairs officers before the investigation was initiated under conditions as determined by article 196, paragraphs 1 and 2 and article 191, paragraphs 1 and 2, items 1 and 3, of the Criminal Proceedings Act (imposing temporary confinement on individuals suspected of having committed a criminal offence punishable, according to the law, by capital punishment..).

The following organs may now impose temporary arrest:

- the investigative judge

- the public prosecutor i.e. state prosecutor and

The regulations of the Criminal Law concerning the duration of temporary arrest were also changed so that:

Article 9 of the Decree provided for extending the authority of the public prosecutor i.e. the state prosecutor to bring charges without prior investigation and consent of the investigative judge if the evidence gathered provided sufficient grounds to bring charges in the case of a criminal offence which entails a prison sentence of up to 10 years.

Article 160, paragraph 6, provided for the authority of the public prosecutor to bring charges without prior investigation, if the evidence gathered concerning both the criminal offence and the offender was not sufficient grounds for prosecution, but this relates to criminal offences for which sentences of up to 5 years in prison are prescribed. Regarding the disagreement of the investigative judge with the indictment without prior investigation, article 160, paragraph 5, determined that the course of action must incorporate an investigation before the indictment was delivered.

7. The introduction of the shortest possible time limit for determining the date of the main hearing from the date of delivering the indictment

Article 10 of the Decree provided for a 48 hour time limit from the moment the indictment was delivered to the accused until the main hearing.

Article 279, paragraph 2, Criminal Proceedings Act, determined that the president of the judicial council must schedule the main hearing within a 2-month time limit from the date of receipt of the indictment in court. Consequently, article 10 of the Decree determined the shortest possible time limit for scheduling the main hearing in order to expedite criminal proceedings.

8. Changes in the time limits within which the accused has the right to appeal against the indictment

Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Decree determined that the accused had the right to appeal against the indictment within 24 hours of the delivery of the indictment. Thus, the time limit under article 267, paragraph 1, of the Criminal Proceedings Act was changed to 8 days from the moment of the receipt of the indictment.

The same article, paragraph 2, of the Decree determined that the appeal did not affect the scheduling of the main hearing which would take place regardless within 48 hours according to paragraph 10, which practically meant that any appeal by the accused did not affect the indictment being put into effect in legal terms. Consequently, the indictment could come into effect despite an appeal being made against the indictment itself on the part of the accused, i.e. there was no major violation of the criminal proceedings' provisions in the case where the main hearing was scheduled and sentence brought according to an indictment which was never actually put into effect since the appeal made by the accused was submitted previously.

Article 271, paragraph 1, of the Criminal Proceedings Act provided for the possibility of presenting an appeal against the indictment by the public prosecutor, together with article 277, paragraph 1, determine that, if the appeal against the indictment was never submitted or was rejected, then, the council of the court of first instance (article 23, paragraph 6), at the request of the president of the council before which the main hearing is to take place, may reach a decision on any issue which is to be resolved on the basis of this law and with respect to this objection. However, since article 11, paragraph 1 of the Decree does not explicitly state that these objections do not affect the scheduled main hearing within the time limit as determined in article 10 of the Decree, one could presume that the provision from the article 11, paragraph 2 of the Decree does not refer to the cases from the articles 271, paragraph 1 and the article 277 of the Criminal Proceedings Act.

X Changes regarding the delivery of the appeal against the reply

Article 12 of the Decree effectively revokes the regulations of the Criminal Proceedings Act which refer to the delivery of the appeal against the reply of the court. This means that a major violation of the regulations of the criminal proceedings does not exist anymore when the court of second instance reaches a decision, thus accepting the appeal of the public prosecutor and altering the sentence of the court of first instance so as to pass a more severe punishment, even though the copy of the prosecutor's appeal has not been previously delivered by the court of first instance to the accused as determined by the article 369 of the Criminal Proceedings Act.

XI Changes regarding the adjournment of the main hearing and/or changes of the judicial council i.e. an individual judge

Article 13 of the Decree provides for the possibility that the Council, i.e. the judge, as an individual MAY DECIDE NOT TO INITIATE THE PROCESS OF HEARING AGAIN if the following conditions are met:

- if the main hearing was adjourned, and the adjournment lasted for more than a month, or

- if the adjourned main hearing takes place before the altered council or another judge.

If that were the case, the court would proceed with the hearing and the president of the judicial council, i.e. the judge, as an individual gives the account of the first part of the hearing. This represents an alteration of the article 305, paragraph 3 of the Criminal Proceedings Act, according to which the main hearing has to be initiated and all the evidence presented once again if the adjournment of the main hearing has lasted for more than a month or if the main hearing is taking place before another president of the judicial council.

XII Changes regarding the delivery of the written copy of the verdict

Article 14 of the Decree determines that a written copy of the verdict is to be delivered ONLY AT THE EXPLICIT REQUEST OF AN INTERESTED PARTY. Thus, article 356, paragraph 3 and article 123 of the Criminal Proceedings Act concerning the delivery of the verdict which is in the authority of the judge as an individual have been altered so that the obligation to deliver copies of the verdict to both the defendant and his or her lawyer does not exist.

XIII Changes of time limits for appealing against the verdict

Article 15 of the Decree determines that the regulations of the Criminal Proceedings Act concerning the PRESENCE OF THE PARTIES during the process of the appeal are to be applied only when the president of the judicial council or the council itself rules that the presence of the parties, or one of the parties, or of the defendant's lawyer, WOULD BE USEFUL TO EXPLAIN THE MATTER. Consequently, the regulations from article 373, paragraph 2 and 3 of the Criminal Proceedings Act, in their part which determines the obligation to summon the defendant and his or her lawyer for the hearing before the court of second instance, shall not be applied if the court rules that their presence has no bearing on further clarifying the matter.

XIV Extending the application of the regulations of the Criminal Proceedings Act regarding the summary proceedings and temporary confinement in summary proceedings

Article 17, paragraph 1, of the Decree determines the application of the regulations of the Criminal Proceedings Act regarding SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS before the court of first instance for all criminal offences for which the major punishment that may be imposed is either a fine or a sentence of UP TO FIVE YEARS in prison, thus extending the number of criminal offences for which three-year prison sentences are prescribed according to the article 430 of the Criminal Law. Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Decree determines that temporary confinement in summary proceedings may LAST FOR ONLY THE PERIOD NEEDED TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATION, BUT NOT MORE THAN THIRTY DAYS. Thus, the regulations under article 433, paragraph 2, of the Criminal Proceedings Act are effectively revoked, and they determine that the temporary confinement in summary proceedings before indictment may last as long as needed to conduct the investigation, but not more than eight days, Also, article 433, paragraph 3 and article 199 concerning the imposition of temporary confinement in summary proceedings from the moment of submitting the indictment to the conclusion of the main hearing are no longer in force as one single regulation has been put into effect for the both phases of summary proceedings.

* Decree on Internal Affairs during the state of war

This Decree provided the Ministry of Internal Affairs with increased authority during the state of war.

Such authority was given to all employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs designated by the Minister of Internal Affairs or to any individual designated by him. These persons were obliged to carry out all orders issued by their superiors in the line of duty, unless the enforcement of these orders should constitute a criminal act.

If the interests of the services required it, the Minister of Internal Affairs or the person designated by him was able to relocate any employee of the Ministry or send him to some other Ministry department for as long a period as the interests of the service required.

As a counterbalance to the increased authority given to the Ministry’s officers, the Decree imposed stricter disciplinary responsibilities on them. As well as those included in the Internal Affairs Act, the Decree also cited other new activities considered to be serious violations of officers’ professional duties and obligations. In addition to the disciplinary measures and sanctions in the Internal Affairs Act, the Decree also introduced new measures for serious violations of officers’ professional duties and obligations which included detention for up to 60 days or demotion to a lower rank which could last for one to two years. Disciplinary measures for minor violations of officers' professional duties and obligations were also introduced such as a ban on leaving the barracks for a period of up to four days and a detention which could last for up to 30-days. The immediate superior officer was authorised to pass such disciplinary measures for minor violations of officers’ professional duties and obligations. The Decree finally stated that students of the Internal Affairs School could be recruited into police units provided they were more than 16 years old.

The Federal Government's decree was in accordance with article 99, paragraph 11 of the Constitution of Yugoslavia according to which the Federal Government is authorised to pass decrees regarding those issues under the jurisdiction of the Federal Assembly should the Federal Assembly itself be unable to convene during a state of war.

The changes in the Criminal Proceedings Act as determined by this decree were as follows:

Article 2 of the decree authorised the court where the accused was arrested or turned himself in voluntarily to conduct criminal proceedings against an accused who had absconded or was beyond the jurisdiction of the local court which would otherwise be authorised to act as determined by the Criminal Proceedings Act.

This represented an extension of the jurisdiction of a local court where the accused had been arrested or turned himself in voluntarily as compared to its jurisdiction under article 29, paragraph 3 of the Criminal Proceedings Act according to which the court has jurisdiction if neither the scene of the crime nor the residence of the accused is known, or if these are both located beyond the borders of Yugoslavia.

1. Changes regarding the obligation to obtain authorisation to conduct criminal proceedings as well as to search apartments, other premises and individuals.

Article 3 of this decree determined that the regulations contained within the Criminal Proceedings Act regarding the obligation to obtain authorisation to conduct criminal proceedings would not be applied to those who had committed the following crimes:

as well as in cases when the crime perpetrated by the accused was punishable by a minimum 5-year prison sentence.

Thus, in this case, the regulation contained in article 139 of the Criminal Proceedings Act was effectively revoked. According to this regulation the public prosecutor could neither demand an investigation nor press charges i.e. submit a proposal to bring charges unless presenting evidence beforehand that authorisation had been obtained from the competent state bodies (e.g. authorisation from the Federal Assembly to initiate criminal court action against MPs from the assembly itself as perpetrators of a criminal offence...).

Article 7 of the decree also authorised law enforcement officers to search apartments, other premises and individuals without a written court order and without the individual’s consent in cases where there was a reasonable doubt that the person had committed one of the above-mentioned criminal offences.

Thus, in this case, the regulation contained within article 207, paragraph 1 of the Criminal Proceedings Act, according to which the court orders a search by means of a search warrant, as well as the regulations contained in article 207, paragraph 2 of the Criminal Proceedings Act, according to which the court order to make a search was to be delivered to the person to be searched or whose premises were to be searched before the search itself commenced, were effectively revoked. This also included the regulation according to which the person to whom this court order refers is summoned before the search was carried out and asked to voluntarily give information about the person in question or more specifically the objects which were being sought.

3. Changes to the regulations regarding the disqualification of judges

Article 4 of the Decree determined that the regulation contained in article 39, paragraph 6 of the Criminal Proceedings Act, according to which a judge or members of the jury could be disqualified if the circumstances indicated his or her possible prejudice, was no longer to be applied.

4. Changes to the jurisdiction and structure of the court

Article 5 of the Decree determined that a judge acting alone in the court of original jurisdiction was to conduct proceedings for criminal offences for which fines or sentences of up to 5 years in prison were prescribed (thus changing the regulations according to which a council consisting of a judge and two jurors were intended to conduct such proceedings, article 23, Criminal Proceedings Act).

5. Changes regarding the increase in the authority of certain state bodies

According to article 6 of the Decree, increased authority was given to:

The investigative judge and law enforcement officers were obliged to immediately notify the public prosecutor, i.e. the state prosecutor, after taking such measures.

6. Changes regarding those bodies which may impose temporary detention and determine the duration of the confinement.

Article 8 of the Decree changed the regulations contained within the Criminal Proceedings Act regarding the authority of the relevant bodies to impose temporary confinement (which according to the Criminal Proceedings Act, only the investigative judge of the competent court was previously authorised to do - article 192, paragraph 1, Criminal Proceedings Act - in certain cases the investigative judge of the lower court – article 194, paragraph 1, Criminal Proceedings Act - and in special cases, this could be done by Internal Affairs officers before the investigation was initiated under conditions as determined by article 196, paragraphs 1 and 2 and article 191, paragraphs 1 and 2, items 1 and 3, of the Criminal Proceedings Act (imposing temporary confinement on individuals suspected of having committed a criminal offence punishable, according to the law, by capital punishment).

The following organs may now impose temporary arrest:

- the investigative judge

The regulations of the Criminal Law concerning the duration of temporary arrest were also changed so that:

Article 9 of the Decree provided for extending the authority of the public prosecutor i.e. the state prosecutor to bring charges without prior investigation and the consent of the investigative judge if the evidence gathered provided sufficient grounds to bring charges in the case of a criminal offence punishable by a prison sentence of up to 10 years.

Article 160, paragraph 6, provided for the authority of the public prosecutor to bring charges without prior investigation, if the evidence gathered concerning both the criminal offence and the offender did not constitute sufficient grounds for prosecution, but this related to criminal offences for which sentences of up to 5 years in prison are prescribed. Regarding the disagreement of the investigative judge with the indictment without prior investigation, article 160, paragraph 5 determines that the course of action must incorporate an investigation prior to delivery of the indictment.

7. The introduction of the shortest possible time limit for determining the date of the main hearing from the date of delivering the indictment

Article 10 of the Decree provided for a 48-hour time limit from the moment the indictment was delivered to the accused until the main hearing.

Article 279, paragraph 2, Criminal Proceedings Act determined that the president of the judicial council must schedule the main hearing within the 2-month time limit from the date of receipt of the indictment in court. Consequently, article 10 of the Decree determined the shortest possible time limit for scheduling the main hearing so as to expedite the criminal proceedings.

8. Changes in the time limits within which the accused has the right to appeal against the indictment

Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Decree determined that the accused had the right to appeal against the indictment within 24 hours of the delivery of the indictment. Thus, the time limit under article 267, paragraph 1, of the Criminal Proceedings Act was changed to 8 days from the moment of the receipt of the indictment.

The same article, paragraph 2, of the Decree determined that the appeal did not affect the scheduling of the main hearing which would take place regardless within 48 hours according to paragraph 10, which meant in practical terms that any appeal by the accused did not affect the indictment being put into effect in legal terms. Consequently, the indictment could come into effect despite an appeal being made against the indictment itself on the part of the accused, i.e. there was no major violation of the criminal proceedings provisions in a case where the main hearing was scheduled and sentence brought according to an indictment which was never actually put into effect as the appeal made by the accused had been submitted previously.

Article 271, paragraph 1, of the Criminal Proceedings Act provided for the possibility of presenting an appeal against the indictment issued by the public prosecutor, and article 277, paragraph 1 determined that if the appeal against the indictment was never submitted or was rejected, then, the council of the court of original jurisdiction (article 23, paragraph 6), at the request of the president of the council before which the main hearing was to take place, could reach a decision on any issue which was resolved on the basis of this law and with respect to this objection. However, since article 11, paragraph 1 of the Decree did not explicitly state that these objections did not affect the scheduled main hearing within the time limit as determined in article 10 of the Decree, one could presume that the provision from article 11, paragraph 2 of the Decree did not refer to the cases from articles 271, paragraph 1 and article 277 of the Criminal Proceedings Act.

9. Changes to appeals made against sentencing

Article 12 of the Decree effectively revoked the regulations of the Criminal Proceedings Act which referred to appeals made against sentencing. This meant that a major violation of the regulations of the criminal proceedings no longer existed in cases where the appellate court had reached a decision, thus accepting the appeal of the public prosecutor and had consequently altered the sentence passed by the court of original jurisdiction and passed a more severe sentence, even though the prosecutor's appeal had not been previously delivered by the court of original jurisdiction to the accused as determined by article 369 of the Criminal Proceedings Act.

10. Changes regarding the adjournment of the main hearing and/or changes to the judicial council i.e. an individual judge

Article 13 of the Decree provided for the possibility that the Council i.e. the judge working alone could decide not to reconvene the hearing if the following conditions were met:

If that were the case, the court would proceed with the hearing and the president of the judicial council i.e. the judge working alone would give an account of the first part of the hearing.

This represented an change to article 305, paragraph 3 of the Criminal Proceedings Act, according to which the main hearing had to be reinitiated and all the evidence presented again if the main hearing had been adjourned for more than a month or if the main hearing had taken place before another president of the judicial council.

Article 14 of the Decree determined that a written copy of the verdict was to be delivered only at the explicit request of the interested party.

Thus, article 356, paragraph 3 and article 123 of the Criminal Proceedings Act concerning the delivery of the verdict which is the authority of the judge working alone was altered so that the obligation to deliver copies of the verdict to both the defendant and his or her lawyer no longer existed.

7. Changes to time limits for appeals made against the verdict

Article 15 of the Decree determined that the new time limit for making an appeal against the verdict was three days instead of the previous time limit of fifteen days according to article 359, paragraph 1 of the Criminal Proceedings Act.

14. Changes to the regulations regarding the presence of the relevant parties during the appeal process

Article 16 of the Decree determined that the regulations regarding the presence of the relevant parties during the appeal process were to be applied only when the president of the judicial council or the council itself ruled that the presence of all parties, or of one of the parties, or of the defendant's lawyer would be useful to resolve the matter in question.

Consequently, the regulations determined in article 373, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Criminal Proceedings Act, in the part which determine the obligation to summon the defendant and his or her lawyer for the hearing before the court of appeal would not be applied if the court ruled that their presence had no bearing on a further clarification of the matter in question.

regarding summary proceedings and temporary confinement in summary proceedings

Article 17, paragraph 1, of the Decree determined the application of the regulations of the Criminal Law regarding summary proceedings before the court of original jurisdiction for all criminal offences for which the major punishment that could be imposed was either a fine or a sentence of up to five years imprisonment, thus extending the number of criminal offences for which three-year prison sentences were prescribed (as determined by article 430 of the Criminal Proceedings Act).

Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Decree determined that temporary confinement in a summary proceeding could last for only as long as was required to conduct an investigation, but not more that thirty days.. Thus, the regulations under article 433, paragraph 2, of the Criminal Proceedings Act were effectively revoked. Those regulations determined that temporary confinement in summary proceedings prior to indictment could last as long as was required to conduct an investigation, but not more than eight days. Article 433, paragraph 3 and article 199 concerning the imposing of temporary confinement in a summary proceeding from the moment of submitting the indictment to the conclusion of the main hearing were no longer in force as one single regulation had been put into effect for both phases of the summary proceeding.

C) Cases of repression

Through the adoption in 1998 of the Serbian Public Information Act, which had destroyed several independent media and attempted to discipline those remaining, an atmosphere of fear was created six months prior to the launch of the NATO attack. It should be emphasised that even as early as October 1998, the most fanatical nationalistic- chauvinistic leaders (as well as key government officials) such as Radical Party leader Vojislav Seselj and Yugoslav Left official Milovan Bojic, both deputy prime ministers in the Serbian government, issued threats not only to Kosovo Albanians, that they would be swept from Kosovo "in whatever way was needed" when the first bombs fell on Yugoslavia, but also to local non-governmental organisations and the independent media in particular, which they publicly referred to as the NATO Alliance in Yugoslavia. On one occasion in the Serbian Parliament, Seselj said that in the case of a NATO attack "we might not be able to shoot down any of their planes, but we will certainly be able to attack their domestic allies who are to be found in various opposition parties, so called non-governmental organisations and in the independent media in particular". In the same speech made by the Serbian Deputy Prime Minister, the editor-in-chief of B92, Veran Matic was referred to as "a NATO Lieutenant-General" and the local department of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights was declared to be "an organisation of traitors". By insisting on the danger imposed on everyone by war and bombing, the regime succeeded in curbing public opinion to such an extent that the public no longer reacted to any other subject than that of war and bombing. Public opinion, which had at one time protected the position of the independent media on several occasions, had, in the days before the bombing, lost all interest in anything but the bombing. The closing down of Radio B92, the most influential independent media outlet in Belgrade, along with the arrest of B92 head and ANEM chairman, Veran Matic, only a few hours after NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana’s announcement that he had given the order to launch the NATO air attack during the night between March 23 and 24, was used by the regime as a litmus test for public opinion. We believe that, by closing down B92 and arresting Veran Matic without any legal grounds, the regime wanted to send a clear message to the independent media and the electronic media in particular. By closing down the largest independent broadcaster and arresting "the NATO general", the regime wanted to let it be known that there was no hope of smaller independent media surviving unless they "cooperated". The only time the regime has been in a position to act in such a way was when NATO launched their attack on Yugoslavia.

Considering the atmosphere in Serbia at the end of March, 1999, and the means of repression in the hands of the regime at that time, repression which was imposed at all levels, it is not difficult to draw the conclusion that the independent media in Serbia had no chance of carrying out any professional reporting. Since it is impossible to provide details of all the cases of repression which took place during this time on the part of the regime, we will attempt to demonstrate the most significant methods of repression used against journalists and the independent media by illustrating them with certain specific cases. Without intending to rank these methods of repression, we will begin with those we consider to be the most brutal and go on to describe the most sophisticated ones.

The liquidation of "dangerous" independent journalists remains the most brutal method of repression used by the regime in their transition to open dictatorship.

Sadly, the owner and director of "Dnevni telegraf" and Evropljanin, Slavko Curuvija, was professionally murdered in front of the building where he lived, after his regular afternoon walk with his wife through the centre of Belgrade on April 11, 1999, at Orthodox Easter during the war. Two assassins dressed in black shot Curuvija in the back of the head as he was entering his home. His wife was knocked unconscious and the assassins made a quick getaway. A few days before his murder, Curuvija said that he had been warned by circles close to the ruling family to go somewhere "out of their reach" for a time because his life was in danger. Failing to take such threats seriously and believing this to be just another method of intimidation used by the regime, Curuvija decided to remain in Belgrade. He also failed to make use of the security at his disposal because, during the bombing, the possession of weapons was strictly forbidden and it was senseless to have unarmed security guards. The comments made in the regime-controlled daily "Ekspres Politika", which were also broadcast on the main news on state television, falsely accusing Curuvija of inviting the NATO attack on Yugoslavia, were in fact an open invitation to lynch him. State television never broadcast any information regarding the murder of Curuvija. The only Belgrade media to do so was Studio B Television which is controlled by Mr Draskovic and his party who openly condemned the murder. The independent media made hesitant reports about the murder using the official statement (only one headline described Curuvija as having been liquidated). Since this information was kept from the public, and in an attempt to bring an end to the widely held opinion that the regime had caused this murder, the regime initiated rumours to the effect that Curuvija was in considerable debt to certain unknown persons in Montenegro. The answer to the question of who killed Mr. Curuvija may be revealed when the Serbian police archives are one day opened to the public. Regardless of who ordered the murder of Mr Curuvija, this case is without precedent as an act against the freedom of expression in Serbia. Those who fight for the right to freedom of expression in Serbia must always be on their guard even when only verbal attacks on the independent media and professional journalists take place, because such verbal attacks could represent the go ahead for further liquidations.

On March 24, by means of the War Decree, the regime began imprisoning, some of whom are still in prison at the time of writing this report. The case of Nebojsa Ristic, the editor in chief of TV Soko from Sokobanja, a small town in eastern Serbia, clearly illustrates the regime’s new method of repression. The regime closed down TV Soko on March 27, their official explanation being non-possession of the relevant broadcasting license, but in reality this was done because of TV Soko’s criticism of Milosevic and his regime and the rebroadcasting of news programs from Montenegro and foreign countries. Employees of TV Soko expressed their anger at being closed down by putting a poster with the slogan "Free Press – Made in Serbia" on the window of their premises (this poster was a B92 and ANEM production made during the public campaign against the Public Information Act in October 1998). Shortly after this, Nebojsa Ristic was charged with the criminal act of "spreading libel" according to article 218 of the Serbian Criminal Code and was consequently sentenced to a year's imprisonment. He began to serve his sentence immediately, prior to the end of the appeal procedure as determined by the special War Decree. Putting a poster on a window, regardless of its content hardly constitutes "spreading libel" – this is nonsense and it does not take a lawyer to reach such a conclusion. Nevertheless, Milosevic’s court ruled that such an act did indeed constitute a criminal act because among other things it "caused public suspicion of the government’s activities" which is a criminal act as determined by article 218 of the Serbian Criminal Statute. Thus, the Sokobanja Municipal Court disgraced itself along with the entire judiciary especially given the fact that the explanation of how the verdict was reached cited article 218 of the Serbian Criminal Code, part of which had been revoked by the Serbian Constitutional Court in 1991 (the words "cause public suspicion of the government’s activities" had been ruled unconstitutional and deleted from article 218). All the circumstances in Ristic’s case prove that this trial bore no resemblance to a legal procedure, however, this did not stop the district court in Zajecar from confirming the verdict in June despite its obvious illegality. Nebojsa Ristsic is still serving his prison sentence in Zajecar prison. After the war, during the campaign for his release, a delegation from the Independent Association of Serbian Journalists (NUNS) visited Ristic in prison on December 17, after the head of VIN TV production company Gordana Susa was elected the new president of NUNS. On December 18, NUNS demanded that the Federal Minister of Information, Goran Matic, release Ristic in keeping with a promise he made at a press conference which took place after their prison visit.

Apart from this case, some journalists were sentenced to thirty days imprisonment on minor charges such as failing to report change of residence within a 24-hour time limit as determined in the War Decree. That happened to the Vranje correspondent of Belgrade daily "Danas", Vojkan Ristic, who was officially registered as living in Belgrade but often worked in Vranje, a town in southern Serbia. Vojkan Ristic is a severe critic of corruption and manipulation in southern Serbia, traditionally a stronghold of the regime in Serbia.

Finally, we should mention the prosecution of Zoran Milesevic the director of two ANEM stations, VK Radio from Kikinda and Radio Senta from Senta, two towns in Vojvodina, which were closed down during the war for non-possession of a broadcast license. Milesevic managed to survive two charges for the possession of a transmitter without a license and was not given a prison sentence (the main reason for that being that he was tried by a judge who had maintained both his personal and professional integrity).

The case of the editor in chief of weekly "NIN", Stevan Niksic, and a columnist from the same publication, Dragoslav Rancic, is yet another example of the atmosphere created by repression at the launch of the NATO attack which might serve to enable colleagues who have not experienced such events to come to a closer understanding of the mood of the day. When it became clear that armed conflict was inevitable, the editors-in-chief of all leading dailies and magazines were invited to attend a meeting at the Serbian Ministry of Information on March 24. It was explained at that meeting that "a state of war would be declared soon" and that in such circumstances some basic constitutional freedoms would be consequently restricted. It was in fact stated that censorship would be applied effective from that moment, that internal political life would be suspended and that the media were banned from reporting any issues relating to domestic politics. It was also ordered that all publications were to be brought to the Ministry for inspection and approval. The problem with "NIN" was that its latest issue, which was already ready for printing, contained numerous articles which were forbidden in the new circumstances. Consequently, Niksic, as editor-in-chief, was forced to make changes in a very short time by dropping some problematic articles from that particular issue. After handing over the issue (the March 23 issue) to the Ministry on March 24, when the bombing had already begun, the issue was approved – the Ministry censors were not very careful at the beginning and after a rather hasty inspection, the issue was approved for publication. The issue was thus printed and distributed, but on March 26, Niksic was summoned to the Ministry where he was informed that one article had annoyed "some very influential people".. This referred to an article written by Dragoslav Rancic and the controversial part was a quote from a statement made by Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic who said that Milosevic would start a war with NATO but, after a short period of bombing, would give in and accept all demands made by the international community (which did in fact happen 11 weeks later). Niksic explained that the article had been approved by the Ministry and that the issue was already in distribution, so that if the Ministry now wanted to ban the issue, they would have to confiscate the issue from all news-stands. Realising the danger he and the whole news staff were now in, Niksic suggested that the Ministry carry out an inspection of the "NIN" premises if they did not believe that the entire issue had been put into distribution. Niksic told us that given the circumstances, he would have stopped any further sales of the issue if he had been in a position to do so. The issue was not in fact banned and it seemed that this was the end of the matter. However, in the early hours of March 28, literally between two NATO strikes on Belgrade, at around 2.30 in the morning, five policemen (in plain clothes, looking like a typical death squad) came to Niksic’s flat without a search warrant, checked the identity documents of everyone in the flat and informed Mr. Niksic that he was under arrest and was to accompany then to the police station in 29^th November street (this is the same police station where ANEM President Veran Matic had been taken four days earlier). Mr. Niksic, who at the time had a foreign journalist staying in his flat and who was aware that nobody could help him, especially not international community representatives, got dressed and asked everyone in his flat not to report his arrest. He was put in a cell in solitary confinement for thirty hours, he was not questioned nor did he have any contact with anyone and was later released without any explanation. All he was told was to return to the police station at 10 o’clock that morning to report to a certain policeman (he was released at 6 o’clock in the morning on 29^th March), but since he was unable to reach the policeman in question by phone by 9.30, Niksic decided not to go. He later found out that one of his colleagues, Rancic, had been in the next cell at the same time and had been treated in exactly the same way. The case was thus closed. Neither Mr. Rancic, nor Mr. Niksic were ever formally arrested or charged, so their story and the fact that they disappeared was the only proof that they were ever actually taken into custody. Mr. Niksic later received an unofficial apology from Ministry of Information officials who explained that they had had nothing to do with this arrest and that they had attempted to find out the reasons for it while he was in custody but with no success. The last detail regarding this case was a statement made by Seselj when a "NIN" journalist met him on the street in the centre of Belgrade on March 28. When the journalist asked him why the "NIN" editor-in-chief had been arrested, Seselj replied, "we are at war, and during wars traitors are shot".

One of Radio B92's freelance journalists, A. O. (we have, at his request, only published his initials and not his full name) was arrested by the regime on 25^th April on charges of spying for the NATO Alliance. He was arrested publicly in the main square in the centre of Belgrade and taken to the police station. During the night, he was threatened with death and conscription into units responsible for clearing mine fields in Kosovo, as well as with reprisals against members of his family if he refused to cooperate. His arm was broken and he suffered about fifty injuries to his body and face.

He was released the following morning with the explanation that this had been a case of mistaken identity. He was warned not to inform anyone of what had happened, neither his family, colleagues, nor the public. He was transferred to Belgrade’s Emergency Centre in order to receive medical attention and also to keep the reason for his injuries from the duty officers. The doctors on duty at the Emergency Centre concluded that the injuries he had sustained constituted aggravated assault and battery and there is a medical report confirming this. After a full examination, Mr. A.O. was released, but he was also ordered to keep to the official version of this event, according to which, he had been robbed and beaten by unknown assailants.

On 30^th June, the day after his visit to the Finnish Embassy in connection with a documentary which was supposed to be financed by the Helsinki Government, Mr. A.O. was attacked again. Two unidentified young males followed him and assaulted him in front of his home. He was threatened with a gun, his mobile phone stolen and he was hit in the mouth. The assailants were not interested in his money and the telephone was second-hand and not of any real value. This Radio B92 freelance journalist was taken to the Emergency Centre where his wound was sutured and he underwent plastic surgery several days later. Mr. A.O. then left Yugoslavia.

The Federal Government Decree regarding the application of the law on criminal procedures during a state of war made it possible for those under suspicion to be kept in custody for 30 days instead of 72 hours. This was fully applied in the case of the magazine "Republika" journalist, Miroslav Hadzica who was held in custody from April 9 until May 7, 1999, without his family’s knowledge. "Republika" is the only magazine which was not censored during the bombing, which can be explained by the fact that it is a monthly magazine with a readership not considered to pose a serious threat to the regime. Nevertheless, this magazine deserves praise for the way it bravely continued its work ignoring the restrictions imposed by the regime.

The next method of repression was the drafting of independent journalists into the army. Since Yugoslavia does not have a professional army, all males can be conscripted if required by the military authorities. We cannot confirm that all independent media journalists were drafted simply because they were journalists, but in some cases there is no doubt that this was the case. The best proof of this was the fact that regime journalists were rarely drafted because they were, "serving their country through their profession".. This method of silencing the independent media was slightly more sophisticated than others, especially during a state of war, because it is very difficult to prove that any individual was drafted simply because he was working for the independent media and it was widely used in Montenegro due to the fact that other methods could not be applied there. Failure to respond when drafted in Serbia meant almost certain imprisonment (years, not months) if and when the conscript was arrested and only after serving in the military, i.e. the war. On the other hand, avoiding conscription would have provided the state with ammunition for propaganda, a powerful weapon used to slander independent media journalists. Consequently, many journalists accepted the draft which meant that some stations were left without staff. The number of those drafted varied from station to station, but an average of 30% of independent media journalists were drafted (some small stations have 10 full-time employees at the most). Thirty employees were drafted from TV Nis, 11 from RTV Kraljevo, 8 from Radio Uzice, 6 from TV5 from Uzice, 6 from RTV Pirot, including the editor-in-chief, Momcilo Djurdjic, 5 from RTV Cacak, including the General Director Stojan Markovic, 4 from RTV Trstenik, 3 from RTV Bajina Basta, 2 from RTV Pancevo and Radio Pozega, 1 from TV Zajecar F Kanal as well as the owner of Radio Globus from Kraljevo. The regime did not succeed in closing down any station in Serbia through conscription (as they did with some stations in Montenegro) since even those stations whose owners, directors and chief editors were drafted continued to broadcast. However, on the other hand, the regime did not have to rely on this method in Serbia as much as it did in Montenegro because other, more direct methods of repression were available in Serbia.

The most frequently used method to silence the independent electronic media was to close down stations on the orders of Federal Ministry of Telecommunications officers. This method originated in the period when the regime needed to present its repression as "purely technical", not in any way political, since it is not easy to prove that political motives are hidden behind technical ones. Reports from the international association for the protection of the freedom of the media in Yugoslavia, the Free2000 Committee, as well as reports and statements made by ANEM, prove that political reasons were and remain the only ones for decisions made by the regime to close down certain stations on the pretext of " telecommunications regulations". During the war, the regime felt strong enough to exert pressure on any media they considered to be dangerous and consequently did not need to hide behind such technical pretexts. Instead of using typical reasons for banning some stations from carrying out their work, such as the non-possession of a suitable transmission license, the Ministry of Telecommunications used article 9 of the Federal Telecommunications Act which determines that any station using a transmitter "against the interests of the country’s defence" will be immediately closed down. The Ministry’s legal department could not easily explain its politically motivated bans by any other means without risking appearing ridiculous (some decisions were in fact ridiculous especially when looked at in retrospect). Some stations were closed down for the non-possession of relevant licenses, others for non-payment of frequency charges (the fact that some stations did not hold frequency licenses, did not stop the Ministry from demanding payment for the use of those frequencies) and the rest for "the use of equipment against the interests of the country’s defence".. It goes without saying that the majority of those stations which were closed down were ANEM members and ANEM appealed against all cases but one during the war. Decisions made by the appeal courts show that the position of the Ministry of Telecommunications was that broadcasting without a relevant license was in effect broadcasting "against the interests of national security" (as though there is no legal difference between these two types of ban) and that the non-payment of frequency charges for a "pirate" station was also considered to be the same as broadcasting without a license. Even a superficial legal analysis of the bans imposed by the Ministry of Telecommunications clearly demonstrates that these decisions bore no relation to the Federal Telecommunications Act, but were forms of repression carried out by the regime under a transparent veil of telecommunication regulations. Despite the clumsiness of such methods of repression, the consequences were very serious: equipment was confiscated, staff lost their jobs or income in a very difficult period (also financial) and, after the NATO strike on the regime media, equipment belonging to the independent media was handed over to RTS. The regime closed down all those stations which refused to compromise and continued to produce independent reports, informing the public about the tragedy of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, rebroadcasting foreign programs and using news from foreign news agencies (Reuters, AP, France Press etc.). Such closures took place, with one or two exceptions, within the first days of the war.

Radio B92 is a special case here since it was closed (or more precisely, banned in Belgrade) even before the launch of the NATO attack and taken over one week later in an attempt to destroy the free soul of B92 and ANEM forever.

The following stations were closed down during the war: Radio 021 from Novi Sad, VKI and VKII Radio from Kikinda, Radio Senta from Senta, TV Soko from Sokobanja, (March 27), TV Cacak from Cacak (April 3), Radio Jasenica from Smederevska Palanka, RTV Devic from Smederevska Palanka, RTL from Lisovic and Radio B92 (March 24).

Some stations decided to stop broadcasting because there was no chance of independent reporting and experience had shown that equipment repossessed from banned media (illegally) was being handed over to RTS and used to spread state propaganda. Radio Ozon from Cacak (April 2), STV Negotin (April 18), TV Glas Obiliceva (March 22) were among those stations which decided to stop broadcasting in order to protect their equipment. The news agency Fonet also decided to stop working on June 2 because of "intolerable conditions under which no professional work is possible". Slavko Curuvija made the same decision on March 24.

The action taken by the regime which resulted in the take-over of Belgrade’s most well-known independent radio station, B92, started on 24^th March 1999 with the decision made by the Federal Ministry of Telecommunications ordering B92 to stop broadcasting immediately. The decision also ordered the removal and repossession of part of the radio's transmission equipment. The explanation given for the Ministry’s decision was that Radio B92 had exceeded its maximum permitted transmission power of 300 W. This explanation has no basis in truth since it had in fact been broadcasting at 190 W. It is obvious that such a decision was made with the aim of preventing B92 from broadcasting during the war and to prepare the ground for a take-over of the station.

B92 editor-in-chief, Veran Matic, arrived on the premises while the order from the Ministry of Telecommunications was being carried out and was arrested and taken to the police station in 29^th November Street. All demands made by Mr. Matic’s lawyers to see and talk to their client were refused. Officials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs refused to provide his lawyers with any explanation for his arrest. Some eight hours later, Mr. Matic was released without being questioned or given any explanation concerning his arrest.

On the same day, 24^th March 1999, Radio B92 legal representatives appealed against the Ministry of Telecommunication’s decision and at the same time the Radio B92 management decided to continue broadcasting via satellite and the internet. The following day, 25^th March, the police entered B92 premises on several occasions in an attempt to intimidate both the journalists and management.

On the morning of 2^nd April, Belgrade’s Commercial Court sheriff, accompanied by police officers and ten suspicious looking individuals in black leather jackets and short cropped hair, entered the premises of B92 and delivered the Commercial Court’s ruling to the radio’s director, Sasa Mirkovic. The decision reached by the president of Belgrade’s Commercial Court, Milena Arezina, determined that the new director – the person authorised to represent the Public Radio Diffusion Company "Radio B92" - was now Aleksandar Nikacevic. The court sheriff and his escorts occupied the studio and ordered the radio staff to leave the premises. The ANEM premises, which were at that time on the tenth and eleventh floors of the same building, were also occupied and staff were even forbidden to take their personal belongings away with them.

The Belgrade Commercial Court ruling to take over Radio B92 was totally illegal. It was made on the basis of the new Public Radio Diffusion Company Radio B92 Statute adopted by the Belgrade Youth Council, a phantom organisation controlled by the regime, which determined that they were the founders of Radio B92. Even if that had been true, and given that Radio B92 is a public company, the founder of this type of company is still not authorised by law to make such a statute, only the employees of that company have that exclusive right.

The implementation of the Commercial Court’s illegal ruling to appoint a new director resulted in more law violations. The premises of ANEM, an entirely separate company, were also seized and all staff told to leave, their personal belongings kept, even though the court ruling strictly related to B92 only and did not even mention ANEM.

The following day, 5^th April, the legal director of Radio B92, Sasa Mirkovic appealed against this unprecedented Commercial Court ruling. ANEM also appealed against the court’s ruling, demanding that the president of Belgrade’s Commercial Court, Milena Arezina, urgently return the use of their premises. ANEM also pressed charges for trespassing in Belgrade’s First Municipal Court.

The first hearing in the First Municipal Court and an on the spot search of the ANEM premises regarding the trespassing charges, took place as early as 7^th April. The accused, Aleksandar Nikacevic, and ANEM radio network coordinator Dusan Masic both attended the hearing.

The following day, the president of the Commercial Court, Milena Arezina, received Radio B92 legal representatives and requested that they give her a few extra days to familiarise herself more thoroughly with the case and their appeal. A new meeting took place on 12^th April when Mrs. Arezina informed Radio B92 legal representatives that she had decided not to proceed any further until the High Court ruling regarding their appeal had been made, mentioning that due to the current state of war in Yugoslavia, this procedure would take longer than usual. On the same day, in spite of the Federal Ministry of Telecommunications’ ruling from 24^th March ordering B92 to stop broadcasting, the new, usurping Radio B92 management started broadcasting without any reaction from the Ministry.

On 14^th April, Belgrade’s First Municipal Court rejected ANEM’s proposal for implementing temporary measures which would enable ANEM to use their premises, citing the untrue and unclear explanation that the premises had been seized on the basis of the Commercial Court ruling and that only the Commercial Court had the authority to deal with this case. On 20^th April ANEM appealed against this decision.

On 18^th April, ANEM suspended Radio B92 membership of their association until the end of the war and until all legal proceedings connected with the status of the company had been concluded.

On 10^th June, the Radio B92 Worker’s Assembly started legal proceedings to revoke the new Public Radio Diffusion Company Radio B92 Statute brought in by Belgrade’s Youth Council and all connected decisions. These legal proceedings were based on the fact that this controversial statute was brought in by an unauthorised body. In the meantime, several hearings regarding this case took place, but due to the failure of the accused's lawyer to follow the courts demands and the judge’s apathy in this matter, this case is no closer to being concluded at the beginning of 2000 than it was when it started.

In the middle of June, the staff of Radio B92 started receiving notices of dismissal, explained by their non-appearance at work for five consecutive days. The new usurping management had initially told staff not to come to work because of the state of war, informing them that they would be notified when to return to work. None of the staff received any notification that they should return to work, and those who had attempted to do so on their own initiative had not been allowed to enter the premises, having been turned away by the new usurping management’s security guards. Instead of receiving notification to return to work, the staff received their notice for "unexcused absence" from work. All 43 members of staff, from the director and editor-in-chief to the coffee lady, were dismissed.

Those dismissed were:

All members of staff took up joint legal action for unfair dismissal with Belgrade’s First Municipal Court.

Apart from those already mentioned, there is a further case currently before Belgrade’s Commercial Court whose aim is to revoke the appointment of the new Radio B92 director. This case began in August, since it was only then that the legal representatives of the illegally dismissed director Sasa Mirkovic finally managed to obtain access to the relevant case files and ascertain exactly how B92 was taken over. This case is still in process.

Another method of repression used by the regime during the war was the enforced renting of frequencies and equipment for the broadcasting of RTS programmes and the rebroadcasting of RTS news programmes by every electronic media in Serbia. Both of these restrictive measures were consequences of the NATO bombing of the State television transmitters and, sadly, the bombing of the RTS building in Aberdareva street in Belgrade when sixteen, mostly young, RTS members of staff tragically lost their lives. These measures were illegal and did not appear in the regulations cited in the War Decree (the order to rebroadcast came either from the Army or the Federal Government). Before the war, RTS was the only electronic media able to cover 100% of Serbian territory with its signal. As we have already established in previous reports, as the national electronic media, RTS was the key weapon for Milosevic’s propaganda, not only during the war, but in peacetime as well. Consequently, after NATO’s direct hit on RTS, which reduced the territory covered by their signal to Belgrade, that being restricted to certain times of the day only, the regime had to react quickly in order to re-establish its powerful "weapon". Since it was impossible to repair the destroyed aerials and transmitters during the bombing campaign (there was neither the money nor the equipment to do so, nor would there have been any sense in making such repairs since NATO could have destroyed them again), the regime turned to the independent media and their transmitters. The electronic media were forced to choose between closing their stations down and having their equipment seized, or handing over their frequencies and equipment to RTS. RTS key targets were AM transmitters, but some FM transmitters were also "rented".. Some stations decided to close down due to the unwillingness of their owners to broadcast RTS programmes using their equipment and frequencies, however, the majority compromised by handing over some of their frequencies and restricting their critical programming to their remaining frequencies. That was the case with RTV Pancevo which was forced to hand over its AM frequency to Radio Belgrade (a part of RTS) in order to keep its FM frequency which covers Belgrade and its local television channel. Radio Television Cacak, whose television department was banned, was forced to hand over its only FM frequency to RTS and later to rent another local FM frequency from a private station. For some independent electronic media this type of compromise with the regime was hard to bear, but this period was a difficult one and many independent electronic media were forced to make considerable compromises in order to survive and see better days.

Orders regarding the enforced rebroadcasting of RTS news programmes were given when the war was coming to an end. However, since the very beginning of the war, some powerful regime media personalities had proposed that all stations constantly rebroadcast all RTS programmes. Their proposal was rejected by the Ministry of Information, but according to the same rationale, at a meeting held in the Ministry at the end of April 1999 (after the bombing of RTS), the owners and editors in chief of all major Belgrade TV stations "agreed" (we have place inverted commas here because agreement means the free will of all those involved in making an agreement, and we believe this "agreement" to have been the result of threats and fear) to rebroadcast RTS news programmes "to demonstrate their solidarity with those who were shamelessly bombed in Aberdareva street".. At that time, the formal obligation to rebroadcast RTS news did not exist, so the majority of ANEM stations did not do so, choosing to demonstrate their solidarity with their murdered colleagues and their families in a different way. However, as the war was drawing to an end, and it became increasingly obvious that Milosevic would give in and allow NATO troops to enter Kosovo (something he could have done at the start without risking the destruction of the country), the regime became more afraid of public opinion, the very public opinion they had created through their war propaganda and the rhetoric of hatred. Such a sudden political turnaround, typical of Milosevic’s regime, could, considering the fact that a large part of the country was no longer covered by the RTS signal due to destroyed transmitters, have been fatal for the regime had they lost the RTS propaganda monopoly to back up such a move in public. As peace negotiations seemed inevitable, the independent media increased their criticism of Milosevic, fearing him less in the belief that he had again been beaten in the field of foreign politics. The only solution for the regime was, on the one hand, to somehow force the independent media to rebroadcast RTS news programmes thereby increasing the territory covered by the RTS signal, and on the other, to prevent the independent media from broadcasting their own news at the same time as RTS. Relying on the state of war which was not declared over until four weeks after NATO stopped its air campaign, the military authorities and the Federal Government began issuing orders to those stations which had failed to rebroadcast RTS news programmes, to start doing so or "certain measures would be taken".. At that moment, almost all independent media began broadcasting RTS news programmes on radio and television, but the majority broadcast statements to the effect that this had been ordered and was not carried out willingly just before broadcasting the RTS news (e.g. RTV Pancevo). Some stations, including RTV Studio B from Belgrade and RTV Trstenik, had stopped rebroadcasting RTS news programmes at the end of the bombing, but they received warnings soon after that the obligation to rebroadcast RTS news programmes remained in force until the state of war in the country was officially declared over. Studio B editor-in-chief Dragan Kojadinovic, told his television audience that he had received a warning to continue the rebroadcasting of RTS news (Studio B was also present at the meeting when the previously mentioned "agreement" was reached") from the Federal Ministry of Telecommunications. He also said that Studio B would not obey this order, but would, nevertheless, continue to rebroadcast RTS news programmes because "Studio B had been asked by RTS colleagues to do so to show professional solidarity". The enforced rebroadcasting of RTS programmes came to an end when the Federal Government revoked the state of war.

One of the atypical methods of repression used by the regime to violate freedom of expression and the independent media was an extremely strange form of censorship which, because of its peculiarity, deserves to be mentioned in this report. Apart from being ordered to rebroadcast RTS news programmes on all their cable television channels, cable television station TV Senta from the town of Senta in Vojvodina, was also ordered to "cover" foreign news programs. This order caused considerable problems for their TV operators who had to watch all foreign programs in order to turn off the sound every time the news was broadcast – this meant working around the clock and was an extremely unusual "turn on, turn off" type of censorship.