Egypt: Using NGO case to discourage U.S. efforts

Egypt: Using NGO case to discourage U.S. efforts Egyptian Judge Sameh Abu Zaid, who is helping lead the investigation into the activities of foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in Egypt, held a rare news conference Feb. 8 to address an issue that has turned into a crisis in Egyptian-U.S. relations. The overall tone of the judge's statements indicated that Cairo remains intent on trying the 43 aid workers indicted Feb. 5, 16 of whom are Americans. A U.S. State Department spokesman said Feb. 7 that less than half of the charged Americans are actually in Egypt, but some still in the country have been barred from traveling. One such aid worker is the son of U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood, a fact which has added considerable media attention to an already highly politicized issue. The potential for U.S. aid workers to be imprisoned in Egypt has jeopardized the more than $1.5 billion in U.S. aid Egypt receives each year as well as the two countries' strategic relationship. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is sending Washington a strong message: it will not allow the United States to dictate how Egypt manages its democratic transition. However, given what is at stake, the SCAF is handling the situation in a way that will allow both sides to back down. A scene from Cairo (Beta/AP) Egypt's perspective Egypt's official charge against the NGOs is that they were not registered to operate in the country (which violates taxation laws) and were using large sums of foreign money to train Egyptian political parties how to participate in the electoral process. The unspoken charge, however, is that Washington is using these NGOs to try to destabilize the Egyptian regime. This is why the SCAF is working to set boundaries in its relationship with the United States. The council feels it has already completed sufficient measures to promote democracy by holding parliamentary elections, accelerating the timeframe for a transition to civilian rule and laying the groundwork for the drafting of a new constitution and for a presidential election. The U.S. Congress' decision to make U.S. aid to Egypt conditional upon the SCAF's engaging in a full transition to democracy is a prime example of what the council sees as U.S. meddling. Indeed, Abu Zaid said during his press conference that the NGOs' political activities had intensified after the start of the Jan. 25 uprising. The SCAF could also point to several other instances in the past 13 months as evidence that the United States (and the West in general) has encouraged liberal forces to rise up against the regime despite Washington's interest in maintaining its strategic relationship with Cairo. The fundamental issue for the Egyptian leadership is whether it wants to bear the costs of an alliance with Washington. The primary benefits of such an alliance are the more than $1.5 billion in total aid Egypt receives each year ($1.3 billion of which goes directly to the military) and the United States' service as mediator between Egypt and Israel. The perceived costs of such an relationship for Egypt is being labeled as a U.S. lackey and having to cope with U.S.-funded NGOs supporting political forces aiming to overthrow the SCAF through democratic means. Though many members of these NGOs -- and of the U.S. government -- consider the organizations harmless and merely in the business of promoting democracy and human rights, the Egyptian regime has a different view. Other U.S. allies in the region such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have echoed Egypt's complaints about the perceived role of U.S.-backed NGOs and their respective bouts of internal unrest in the past year. The vast majority of the Egyptian public opposes Cairo's relationship with Washington anyway, so the SCAF would not be bucking popular opinion at home if it created a crisis in relations with the United States. The U.S.-Egyptian relationship The U.S.-Egyptian alliance primarily dates back to the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979, when U.S. military aid to Egypt began. That agreement allowed Washington to secure a valuable peace treaty between Egypt and Israel to maintain a crucial balance of power in the region, secure the safety of ships transiting the Suez Canal, build leverage with a key Arab state in the region and access intelligence provided by the Egyptians, upon whom Washington relies to act as its eyes and ears across much of the Middle East. The Egyptians were able to access a significant stream of revenue that primarily enriched members of the military regime while eliminating the need for constant preparations for war with Israel, against which it fought in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973. Cairo also obtained a valuable mediator in its relations with Israel. Since the start of the Egyptian uprising, most people who have predicted the end of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship -- or the death of the Camp David Accords -- have done so under assumption that the Muslim Brotherhood will come to power in Egypt. The SCAF's refusal to back down on the NGO investigation has highlighted the possibility that the military could also be the factor jeopardizing the status quo. By threatening to try in court -- and imprison, if convicted -- U.S. citizens for working with these organizations, the SCAF is telling Washington to stay out of its business. The underlying implication is that the SCAF does not need the alliance as much as the United States thinks it does. The SCAF's limits Egypt is not likely to push the NGO issue to the point of severing ties with the United States. With parliamentary elections ongoing, a constitution that has yet to be written and presidential elections to be held by the end of June, the SCAF is trying to make sure Washington understands that the Egyptian military wants to handle the democratic transition as it sees fit. The military regime does not want to deal with frequent outside interference along the way, as it does not intend to fully give up power by mid-summer. Stratfor therefore thinks it is unlikely that the SCAF will cross any red lines with the United States that could trigger a backlash -- particularly from the U.S. Congress, where many members have clearly expressed their anger with the current situation. U.S. President Barack Obama has indicated that he opposes making U.S. aid to Egypt conditional upon the country's transition to democracy, as maintaining its strategic relationship with Egypt is in the United States' national interest. However, if enough members of Congress want to cut off aid to Egypt, they can do so, and Obama would not have the ability to stop them. A two-thirds majority in Congress can override a presidential veto. In the United States, Congress can dictate certain elements of policy regardless of what the president wants, but the SCAF is Egypt's ultimate authority. It has the ability to stop the NGO investigation if its members want to. Right now, the military regime is strategically distancing itself from the investigation by having members of the judiciary handle it. Some members of the U.S. State Department have supported the notion that the military might not be in control of the issue by telling media outlets that, due to the "vacuum of authority" in Egypt, the SCAF "may not be the driving force behind this." This will give the SCAF the ability to move Egypt back from the brink if the standoff continues much longer. published with permission of Stratfor An Egyptian judge involved in the investigation of foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in Egypt indicated Feb. 8 that Cairo intends to try the 43 NGO workers indicted Feb. 5, many of whom are Americans. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is using the NGO investigation to signal to Washington that the council wants to manage Egypt's transition to democracy without foreign interference. Stratfor An Egyptian judge involved in the investigation of foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in Egypt indicated Feb. 8 that Cairo intends to try the 43 NGO workers indicted Feb. 5, many of whom are Americans.

Egypt: Using NGO case to discourage U.S. efforts

Egyptian Judge Sameh Abu Zaid, who is helping lead the investigation into the activities of foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in Egypt, held a rare news conference Feb. 8 to address an issue that has turned into a crisis in Egyptian-U.S. relations. The overall tone of the judge's statements indicated that Cairo remains intent on trying the 43 aid workers indicted Feb. 5, 16 of whom are Americans. A U.S. State Department spokesman said Feb. 7 that less than half of the charged Americans are actually in Egypt, but some still in the country have been barred from traveling. One such aid worker is the son of U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood, a fact which has added considerable media attention to an already highly politicized issue.

The potential for U.S. aid workers to be imprisoned in Egypt has jeopardized the more than $1.5 billion in U.S. aid Egypt receives each year as well as the two countries' strategic relationship. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is sending Washington a strong message: it will not allow the United States to dictate how Egypt manages its democratic transition. However, given what is at stake, the SCAF is handling the situation in a way that will allow both sides to back down.

Egypt's perspective

Egypt's official charge against the NGOs is that they were not registered to operate in the country (which violates taxation laws) and were using large sums of foreign money to train Egyptian political parties how to participate in the electoral process. The unspoken charge, however, is that Washington is using these NGOs to try to destabilize the Egyptian regime.

This is why the SCAF is working to set boundaries in its relationship with the United States. The council feels it has already completed sufficient measures to promote democracy by holding parliamentary elections, accelerating the timeframe for a transition to civilian rule and laying the groundwork for the drafting of a new constitution and for a presidential election. The U.S. Congress' decision to make U.S. aid to Egypt conditional upon the SCAF's engaging in a full transition to democracy is a prime example of what the council sees as U.S. meddling. Indeed, Abu Zaid said during his press conference that the NGOs' political activities had intensified after the start of the Jan. 25 uprising. The SCAF could also point to several other instances in the past 13 months as evidence that the United States (and the West in general) has encouraged liberal forces to rise up against the regime despite Washington's interest in maintaining its strategic relationship with Cairo.

The fundamental issue for the Egyptian leadership is whether it wants to bear the costs of an alliance with Washington. The primary benefits of such an alliance are the more than $1.5 billion in total aid Egypt receives each year ($1.3 billion of which goes directly to the military) and the United States' service as mediator between Egypt and Israel. The perceived costs of such an relationship for Egypt is being labeled as a U.S. lackey and having to cope with U.S.-funded NGOs supporting political forces aiming to overthrow the SCAF through democratic means.

Though many members of these NGOs -- and of the U.S. government -- consider the organizations harmless and merely in the business of promoting democracy and human rights, the Egyptian regime has a different view. Other U.S. allies in the region such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have echoed Egypt's complaints about the perceived role of U.S.-backed NGOs and their respective bouts of internal unrest in the past year. The vast majority of the Egyptian public opposes Cairo's relationship with Washington anyway, so the SCAF would not be bucking popular opinion at home if it created a crisis in relations with the United States.

The U.S.-Egyptian relationship

The U.S.-Egyptian alliance primarily dates back to the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979, when U.S. military aid to Egypt began. That agreement allowed Washington to secure a valuable peace treaty between Egypt and Israel to maintain a crucial balance of power in the region, secure the safety of ships transiting the Suez Canal, build leverage with a key Arab state in the region and access intelligence provided by the Egyptians, upon whom Washington relies to act as its eyes and ears across much of the Middle East. The Egyptians were able to access a significant stream of revenue that primarily enriched members of the military regime while eliminating the need for constant preparations for war with Israel, against which it fought in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973. Cairo also obtained a valuable mediator in its relations with Israel.

Since the start of the Egyptian uprising, most people who have predicted the end of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship -- or the death of the Camp David Accords -- have done so under assumption that the Muslim Brotherhood will come to power in Egypt. The SCAF's refusal to back down on the NGO investigation has highlighted the possibility that the military could also be the factor jeopardizing the status quo. By threatening to try in court -- and imprison, if convicted -- U.S. citizens for working with these organizations, the SCAF is telling Washington to stay out of its business. The underlying implication is that the SCAF does not need the alliance as much as the United States thinks it does.

The SCAF's limits

Egypt is not likely to push the NGO issue to the point of severing ties with the United States. With parliamentary elections ongoing, a constitution that has yet to be written and presidential elections to be held by the end of June, the SCAF is trying to make sure Washington understands that the Egyptian military wants to handle the democratic transition as it sees fit. The military regime does not want to deal with frequent outside interference along the way, as it does not intend to fully give up power by mid-summer.

Stratfor therefore thinks it is unlikely that the SCAF will cross any red lines with the United States that could trigger a backlash -- particularly from the U.S. Congress, where many members have clearly expressed their anger with the current situation. U.S. President Barack Obama has indicated that he opposes making U.S. aid to Egypt conditional upon the country's transition to democracy, as maintaining its strategic relationship with Egypt is in the United States' national interest. However, if enough members of Congress want to cut off aid to Egypt, they can do so, and Obama would not have the ability to stop them. A two-thirds majority in Congress can override a presidential veto.

In the United States, Congress can dictate certain elements of policy regardless of what the president wants, but the SCAF is Egypt's ultimate authority. It has the ability to stop the NGO investigation if its members want to. Right now, the military regime is strategically distancing itself from the investigation by having members of the judiciary handle it. Some members of the U.S. State Department have supported the notion that the military might not be in control of the issue by telling media outlets that, due to the "vacuum of authority" in Egypt, the SCAF "may not be the driving force behind this." This will give the SCAF the ability to move Egypt back from the brink if the standoff continues much longer.

published with permission of Stratfor