Pragmatism carries the day in Serbia

Pragmatism carries the day in Serbia Above all else, this entire process was a triumph of pragmatism over ideology, historical animosities, and long-standing policies and practices by many individuals, parties, and international players. First and foremost, a significant percentage of the Serbian people decided to resist the siren song of nationalism and “inat” and voted with their heads to maintain a basic policy of further integration into the European Union, despite their deep anger over the Kosovo process. For over seven years after the fall of Slobodan Milosevic, the European Union and the United States resisted the pleas of the late Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic and many other pro-European Serbian politicians to take quicker and more substantive steps to bring Serbia into Europe. One has to wonder how different the region would look today if in fact the West had responded far more positively in those early days. In fact, quite the opposite occurred. No effort was made to ease visa restrictions and as the EU expanded to neighboring countries, Serbs found themselves more isolated than in the Milosevic years. Conditionality, principally over cooperation with The Hague and general lethargy on the part of an EU more focused on itself than anything else prevented Serbia from coming closer to the EU. Discussions over a Stabilization and Association Agreement (the SAA), a key step in the process, went on endlessly with no concrete result. That all changed virtually overnight, thanks in large part to the Serbian reaction to events in Kosovo and the very real possibility that the Radical Party could come to power in Serbia with adverse consequences to the stability of the entire region. This was the vital “tipping point” which convinced European statesmen to drastically “change course” with startling speed and efficiency. The end result was to soften long-standing conditionality and speed up the SAA process dramatically, along with concrete steps on easing visa regimes for the Serbs just in time for the Serbian Presidential and then Parliamentary elections. The result of this step by the EU was as good as or better than most of the EU members could have anticipated. It helped to define the elections as a black-and-white choice between two very different paths for Serbia’s future. Even with a convincing success in the Parliamentary elections (winning by far the largest number of seats), the Democratic Party/G17 Plus coalition - like their Radical Party and DSS (Kostunica) opponents - were stymied in their efforts to form a new government and both ended up dependent on a small coalition of three parties headed by the Socialist Party having only 20 deputies out of 250 in Parliament to reach the critical majority needed to rule. Swallowing years of antagonism and bitter opposition, the Democratic Party pragmatically reached out to the Socialists. Once they got over election night euphoria and realized that the resulting government was far from certain, so did the Western governments. In fact, given the history of the Socialist Party, founded and then ruled by Milosevic for ten years and until this day not renouncing him or his policies of the time, the abrupt turnaround to welcome the Socialists was just a little too quick and unconditional for many. The Socialist Party leadership had its own problems. Its party base consists almost entirely of hard-line nationalist supporters of Milosevic and his policies. In any referendum of those who actually voted for the Socialist Party, there is no question but that the overwhelming choice for coalition partners would have been the Radicals and the DSS. On the other hand, being part of the DS/G17 Plus coalition will give the party legitimacy and respectability in Europe and the United States. Already, it has been invited to take initial steps in joining the Socialist International. Moreover, as part of the coalition government, the Party will have the Speaker of the Parliament; the senior Deputy Prime Minister position; the Minister of the Interior; several other Ministries; as well as control over several State enterprises. So once again, pragmatism ruled the day. In so doing, however, the Socialist Party leadership is taking a huge gamble. Their “treachery” and “betrayal” will no doubt cost them heavily among the party supporters and if new elections are held anytime soon, they would have no chance whatsoever of passing the threshold. They hope that with the success of this government; moving closer to Europe; and the visible role which they play in it, they will develop a new base of supporters. Time will tell if they are proved correct. But one fact is for sure: the last thing on earth which the Socialists will want at any time in the foreseeable future is new elections. The big loser in the whole process has been Vojislav Kostunica and his DSS. Since the assassination of Zoran Djindjic, he has been the cleverest politician in Serbia. He has consistently managed to take more power and have more influence than the strength of his party would suggest. Time and again he has managed to set the agenda and get other parties, particularly the DS, to play to his tune and react to his initiatives. This all makes his extreme, emotional opposition to the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) offered by the European Union somewhat puzzling. It wasn’t necessary to have been so extreme in order to ultimately derail it. Perhaps it was a simple miscalculation of the public mood, but more likely a reflection of the rage he feels over Western recognition of Kosovo’s independence. In any case it was the catalyst for him to break up the previous government in which he was Prime Minister; his reaction was the primary reason for his party’s poor showing in the Parliamentary elections; and finally (after a totally unnecessary “analysis” by DSS legal experts of the illegitimacy of the SAA), the excuse or reason upon which the Socialist Party could hang their “defection.” In other words, his refusal to take a more pragmatic course played into his opponents’ hands and proved – at least in the short term – to be his undoing. As the new government takes shape and begins to define itself, it will be interesting to keep an eye on the following: -The EU and the United States took those significant pre-election measures with the expectation that a new “pro-European” government would take a more moderate approach to Kosovo and would also bring about the arrests of Mladic and Karadzic. It’s questionable whether the new government will be able or willing to do either. -The Radical Party has serious internal conflicts between its real leader, Vojislav Seselj, and his surrogate, Toma Nikolic. They also have to wonder if they have reached the high-water mark of their power and influence. Meanwhile, speculation continues over the prospects of an early return from The Hague by Seselj following completion of his trial. That would certainly liven up Serbian political life. -The Democratic Party, for all its recent success, has some severe internal conflicts. They aren’t going to go away, particularly if the Party’s popularity begins to decline. -Since the fall of Milosevic, the most powerful politician has been the Prime Minister. It will now be Serbian President Boris Tadic. He will essentially have the majority in Parliament to pass legislation; control over the government via his Party members, and of course, his own office. The experience in other countries in similar positions is that the group of advisors in the President’s office becomes an important unofficial power center often eclipsing the Ministers formally running the Government. -Given the number of parties in the ruling coalition and wildly disparate views, it may be difficult to keep them all singing from the same sheet of music. The chance of Ministries remaining individual fiefdoms fully subservient to whichever political party controls them is very high. Winners and losers gather in parliament (FoNet) After almost two months of delay, uncertainty, rumors and false starts, it now seems certain that Serbia will soon have a new government. Defying the wishes and beliefs of most of its base of supporters, the Socialist Party leadership along with its two coalition partners has opted to join a broad coalition of parties led by the Democratic Party of Boris Tadic in its formation. William Montgomery "Given the number of parties in the ruling coalition and wildly disparate views, it may be difficult to keep them all singing from the same sheet of music. The chance of ministries remaining individual fiefdoms fully subservient to whichever political party controls them is very high."

Pragmatism carries the day in Serbia

Above all else, this entire process was a triumph of pragmatism over ideology, historical animosities, and long-standing policies and practices by many individuals, parties, and international players.

First and foremost, a significant percentage of the Serbian people decided to resist the siren song of nationalism and “inat” and voted with their heads to maintain a basic policy of further integration into the European Union, despite their deep anger over the Kosovo process.

For over seven years after the fall of Slobodan Milošević, the European Union and the United States resisted the pleas of the late Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić and many other pro-European Serbian politicians to take quicker and more substantive steps to bring Serbia into Europe. One has to wonder how different the region would look today if in fact the West had responded far more positively in those early days. In fact, quite the opposite occurred.

No effort was made to ease visa restrictions and as the EU expanded to neighboring countries, Serbs found themselves more isolated than in the Milošević years. Conditionality, principally over cooperation with The Hague and general lethargy on the part of an EU more focused on itself than anything else prevented Serbia from coming closer to the EU. Discussions over a Stabilization and Association Agreement (the SAA), a key step in the process, went on endlessly with no concrete result.

That all changed virtually overnight, thanks in large part to the Serbian reaction to events in Kosovo and the very real possibility that the Radical Party could come to power in Serbia with adverse consequences to the stability of the entire region. This was the vital “tipping point” which convinced European statesmen to drastically “change course” with startling speed and efficiency. The end result was to soften long-standing conditionality and speed up the SAA process dramatically, along with concrete steps on easing visa regimes for the Serbs just in time for the Serbian Presidential and then Parliamentary elections.

The result of this step by the EU was as good as or better than most of the EU members could have anticipated. It helped to define the elections as a black-and-white choice between two very different paths for Serbia’s future.

Even with a convincing success in the Parliamentary elections (winning by far the largest number of seats), the Democratic Party/G17 Plus coalition - like their Radical Party and DSS (Koštunica) opponents - were stymied in their efforts to form a new government and both ended up dependent on a small coalition of three parties headed by the Socialist Party having only 20 deputies out of 250 in Parliament to reach the critical majority needed to rule.

Swallowing years of antagonism and bitter opposition, the Democratic Party pragmatically reached out to the Socialists. Once they got over election night euphoria and realized that the resulting government was far from certain, so did the Western governments. In fact, given the history of the Socialist Party, founded and then ruled by Milošević for ten years and until this day not renouncing him or his policies of the time, the abrupt turnaround to welcome the Socialists was just a little too quick and unconditional for many.

The Socialist Party leadership had its own problems. Its party base consists almost entirely of hard-line nationalist supporters of Milošević and his policies. In any referendum of those who actually voted for the Socialist Party, there is no question but that the overwhelming choice for coalition partners would have been the Radicals and the DSS.

On the other hand, being part of the DS/G17 Plus coalition will give the party legitimacy and respectability in Europe and the United States. Already, it has been invited to take initial steps in joining the Socialist International. Moreover, as part of the coalition government, the Party will have the Speaker of the Parliament; the senior Deputy Prime Minister position; the Minister of the Interior; several other Ministries; as well as control over several State enterprises.

So once again, pragmatism ruled the day. In so doing, however, the Socialist Party leadership is taking a huge gamble. Their “treachery” and “betrayal” will no doubt cost them heavily among the party supporters and if new elections are held anytime soon, they would have no chance whatsoever of passing the threshold. They hope that with the success of this government; moving closer to Europe; and the visible role which they play in it, they will develop a new base of supporters. Time will tell if they are proved correct. But one fact is for sure: the last thing on earth which the Socialists will want at any time in the foreseeable future is new elections.

The big loser in the whole process has been Vojislav Koštunica and his DSS. Since the assassination of Zoran Đinđić, he has been the cleverest politician in Serbia. He has consistently managed to take more power and have more influence than the strength of his party would suggest. Time and again he has managed to set the agenda and get other parties, particularly the DS, to play to his tune and react to his initiatives.

This all makes his extreme, emotional opposition to the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) offered by the European Union somewhat puzzling. It wasn’t necessary to have been so extreme in order to ultimately derail it. Perhaps it was a simple miscalculation of the public mood, but more likely a reflection of the rage he feels over Western recognition of Kosovo’s independence.

In any case it was the catalyst for him to break up the previous government in which he was Prime Minister; his reaction was the primary reason for his party’s poor showing in the Parliamentary elections; and finally (after a totally unnecessary “analysis” by DSS legal experts of the illegitimacy of the SAA), the excuse or reason upon which the Socialist Party could hang their “defection.” In other words, his refusal to take a more pragmatic course played into his opponents’ hands and proved – at least in the short term – to be his undoing.

As the new government takes shape and begins to define itself, it will be interesting to keep an eye on the following:

-The EU and the United States took those significant pre-election measures with the expectation that a new “pro-European” government would take a more moderate approach to Kosovo and would also bring about the arrests of Mladic and Karadzic. It’s questionable whether the new government will be able or willing to do either.

-The Radical Party has serious internal conflicts between its real leader, Vojislav Šešelj, and his surrogate, Toma Nikolić. They also have to wonder if they have reached the high-water mark of their power and influence. Meanwhile, speculation continues over the prospects of an early return from The Hague by Seselj following completion of his trial. That would certainly liven up Serbian political life.

-The Democratic Party, for all its recent success, has some severe internal conflicts. They aren’t going to go away, particularly if the Party’s popularity begins to decline.

-Since the fall of Milošević, the most powerful politician has been the Prime Minister. It will now be Serbian President Boris Tadić. He will essentially have the majority in Parliament to pass legislation; control over the government via his Party members, and of course, his own office. The experience in other countries in similar positions is that the group of advisors in the President’s office becomes an important unofficial power center often eclipsing the Ministers formally running the Government.

-Given the number of parties in the ruling coalition and wildly disparate views, it may be difficult to keep them all singing from the same sheet of music. The chance of Ministries remaining individual fiefdoms fully subservient to whichever political party controls them is very high.