NATO prepares to expand

NATO prepares to expand The only glitch at this point seems to be the unyielding Greek demand that the Macedonians change the name of their country to make clear that they have no ambitions towards the Northern Greek province of the same name. This will be the sixth round of expansion since NATO’s founding in 1949 and will increase total membership from the current 26 to 29. This upcoming event highlights the radically different directions, which countries in this region are taking. In contrast to the above three countries, neither public opinion nor the majority of Parliamentarians in Serbia are in favor of NATO membership. Quite the contrary. Prime Minister Kostunica and others have bitterly attacked NATO for its actions in Kosovo. This includes the 1999 bombing campaign, but also its role now. In rhetoric reminiscent of the Cold War era, he has rather bizarrely called Kosovo a “NATO State” governed from Camp Bondsteel, the base for the U.S. contingent to KFOR. Newly-independent Montenegro is pressing hard to be a full NATO member as soon as possible. Bosnia remains harder to judge, as the full support of all three ethnic groups will be required, including far more work to unify its armed forces. For a lot of reasons, including Bosnian Serb reactions to Kosovo and their own desires for independence, this may be difficult. When NATO was founded and for several decades afterwards, the overriding goal of the members was simply national survival. The threat from the Warsaw Pact was real and significant. The members of the NATO Pact were concerned enough to swallow needed compromises for the common good. That era – and the cooperation that went with it – is long gone. The significance of the three newest members is not measured purely in terms of additional military assets for NATO (although all three have been helpful in NATO operations). Rather, their membership will strengthen regional stability and provide all three with an increased sense of their own security. Croatia, for example, looks at the growing strength of the Radicals in Serbia and listens to their rhetoric extolling the virtues of a “Greater Serbia,” and sees NATO as providing an additional level of comfort. Macedonia, remembering the ethnic violence of 2001 and fearing its return, considers NATO to be a stabilizing element which if necessary, will move rapidly to help quell any return of violence. All view inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic institutions as an important vehicle for both dialogue and tangible ways to further regional cooperation. On the surface, NATO appears to be a major success story. Its Cold War enemy, the Warsaw Pact has disintegrated. Eight of its current members were formerly part of that Alliance. Several other countries rising from the dissolution of the Soviet Union are members of the Partnership for Peace and have expressed interest in NATO membership. However, all is not sweetness and light. Its very success in attracting new members from the former Warsaw Pact and particularly from parts of the former Soviet Union has angered and embittered the Russians. This particularly includes former KGB agent and “Cold Warrior” Vladimir Putin. Plans by the United States to build bases in the Czech Republic and Poland to support its missile defense program have caused an extremely negative reaction from Russia. It has as a direct result, abrogated the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, which place limits on forces and weapons that countries could employ in designated areas. Any additional steps by NATO to include countries such as Ukraine would further strain – perhaps beyond the boiling point – the already difficult relationship between the US/NATO and Russia. Having lost its powerful and dangerous enemy (the Warsaw Pact), the members of NATO no longer feel as compelled to support it unreservedly. Despite pledges and promises, NATO countries have failed to contribute the promised quota of troops to Afghanistan and many have placed extreme limitations on how their troops could be used there. Countries are also loath to spend sufficient funds on the military and consequently are contributing less and less to the collective military strength of the Alliance. Some EU members are more interested in building an internal EU military response force than working with NATO. The traditional lead role played by the United States is increasingly resented by many. As the Alliance has enlarged and the major threat has disappeared, political differences among member countries are harder to resolve. This makes taking any sort of action far more difficult and time-consuming. In short, NATO has become less cohesive, less able to focus its forces and utilize them, and consequently may well have seen its high point in terms of effectiveness and ability to respond as an organization in crisis situations. Viewed in purely military terms, it is also dangerously overextended, particularly in the Baltic countries. It is becoming more a vehicle, like the EU, to encourage internal change in candidate countries and once in, to encourage stability in them rather than preparing for its traditional goal of mutual self defense in times of major conflict. By contrast, Russia has rebounded from the disastrous collapse of the Soviet Union and its own economy. It has shed the unreliable support of former Warsaw Pact “allies” and also the burden of a discredited Communist ideology in favor of a more nationalistic one. As a result, it now has internal cohesion and enthusiastic public support. Decisions can be taken instantaneously at the top with no fear of political backlash. Thanks to radically increased prices for natural resources (particularly oil and gas), its economy has turned around. Whereas then years ago, it could not even afford to fly its planes or send its fleet on cruises, it is now “back” in a military sense. Moreover, it is “back” with an attitude. It is angry at the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact; angry at NATO’s incursions into its “near abroad,” and particularly outraged by what it perceives as a consistent pattern of insulting, patronizing treatment by NATO countries led by the United States. The West thinks the Cold War is something belonging to the history books. Vladimir Putin and the Russian people have a slightly different view. For them the hegemony which the West was able to impose following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact has ended. Russia fully intends to regain its status and prestige in the world and has no compunctions about challenging the West to do so. In fact, in order to demonstrate its renewed power, it needs to find reasons and issues on which to confront the West. Kosovo should certainly be viewed in that context. This combination of a resurgent, aggressive Russia and an over-confident, complacent, and over-extended NATO is a potentially dangerous combination. This is particularly true in the countries of the former Soviet Union with significant, vocal Russian minorities. The potential for serious conflict in one of these areas is real. It could easily be triggered by an incident (staged or spontaneous) involving those minorities. NATO could suddenly and with little preparation be confronted with the very type of situation for which it was founded far from its Western base of support. Choosing an adequate response would not be easy. But that is the price of extending alliances based far more on political criteria than practical military considerations. Let’s hope that this new reality is fully understood by the leaders gathering for the upcoming Summit, as well as the governments they represent. Over-confident, complacent, over-extended? (Tanjug) If everything goes as planned at the NATO Summit Conference in Bucharest on April 2-4, formal invitations to join will be issued to Croatia, Macedonia, and Albania. William Montgomery "The combination of a resurgent, aggressive Russia and an over-confident, complacent, and over-extended NATO is a potentially dangerous combination. This is particularly true in the countries of the former Soviet Union with significant, vocal Russian minorities. The potential for serious conflict in one of these areas is real."

NATO prepares to expand

The only glitch at this point seems to be the unyielding Greek demand that the Macedonians change the name of their country to make clear that they have no ambitions towards the Northern Greek province of the same name. This will be the sixth round of expansion since NATO’s founding in 1949 and will increase total membership from the current 26 to 29.

This upcoming event highlights the radically different directions, which countries in this region are taking. In contrast to the above three countries, neither public opinion nor the majority of Parliamentarians in Serbia are in favor of NATO membership. Quite the contrary. Prime Minister Koštunica and others have bitterly attacked NATO for its actions in Kosovo. This includes the 1999 bombing campaign, but also its role now.

In rhetoric reminiscent of the Cold War era, he has rather bizarrely called Kosovo a “NATO State” governed from Camp Bondsteel, the base for the U.S. contingent to KFOR. Newly-independent Montenegro is pressing hard to be a full NATO member as soon as possible. Bosnia remains harder to judge, as the full support of all three ethnic groups will be required, including far more work to unify its armed forces. For a lot of reasons, including Bosnian Serb reactions to Kosovo and their own desires for independence, this may be difficult.

When NATO was founded and for several decades afterwards, the overriding goal of the members was simply national survival. The threat from the Warsaw Pact was real and significant. The members of the NATO Pact were concerned enough to swallow needed compromises for the common good. That era – and the cooperation that went with it – is long gone.

The significance of the three newest members is not measured purely in terms of additional military assets for NATO (although all three have been helpful in NATO operations). Rather, their membership will strengthen regional stability and provide all three with an increased sense of their own security. Croatia, for example, looks at the growing strength of the Radicals in Serbia and listens to their rhetoric extolling the virtues of a “Greater Serbia,” and sees NATO as providing an additional level of comfort.

Macedonia, remembering the ethnic violence of 2001 and fearing its return, considers NATO to be a stabilizing element which if necessary, will move rapidly to help quell any return of violence. All view inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic institutions as an important vehicle for both dialogue and tangible ways to further regional cooperation.

On the surface, NATO appears to be a major success story. Its Cold War enemy, the Warsaw Pact has disintegrated. Eight of its current members were formerly part of that Alliance. Several other countries rising from the dissolution of the Soviet Union are members of the Partnership for Peace and have expressed interest in NATO membership. However, all is not sweetness and light.

Its very success in attracting new members from the former Warsaw Pact and particularly from parts of the former Soviet Union has angered and embittered the Russians. This particularly includes former KGB agent and “Cold Warrior” Vladimir Putin. Plans by the United States to build bases in the Czech Republic and Poland to support its missile defense program have caused an extremely negative reaction from Russia.

It has as a direct result, abrogated the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, which place limits on forces and weapons that countries could employ in designated areas. Any additional steps by NATO to include countries such as Ukraine would further strain – perhaps beyond the boiling point – the already difficult relationship between the US/NATO and Russia.

Having lost its powerful and dangerous enemy (the Warsaw Pact), the members of NATO no longer feel as compelled to support it unreservedly. Despite pledges and promises, NATO countries have failed to contribute the promised quota of troops to Afghanistan and many have placed extreme limitations on how their troops could be used there. Countries are also loath to spend sufficient funds on the military and consequently are contributing less and less to the collective military strength of the Alliance.

Some EU members are more interested in building an internal EU military response force than working with NATO. The traditional lead role played by the United States is increasingly resented by many. As the Alliance has enlarged and the major threat has disappeared, political differences among member countries are harder to resolve. This makes taking any sort of action far more difficult and time-consuming.

In short, NATO has become less cohesive, less able to focus its forces and utilize them, and consequently may well have seen its high point in terms of effectiveness and ability to respond as an organization in crisis situations. Viewed in purely military terms, it is also dangerously overextended, particularly in the Baltic countries. It is becoming more a vehicle, like the EU, to encourage internal change in candidate countries and once in, to encourage stability in them rather than preparing for its traditional goal of mutual self defense in times of major conflict.

By contrast, Russia has rebounded from the disastrous collapse of the Soviet Union and its own economy. It has shed the unreliable support of former Warsaw Pact “allies” and also the burden of a discredited Communist ideology in favor of a more nationalistic one. As a result, it now has internal cohesion and enthusiastic public support. Decisions can be taken instantaneously at the top with no fear of political backlash. Thanks to radically increased prices for natural resources (particularly oil and gas), its economy has turned around.

Whereas then years ago, it could not even afford to fly its planes or send its fleet on cruises, it is now “back” in a military sense. Moreover, it is “back” with an attitude. It is angry at the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact; angry at NATO’s incursions into its “near abroad,” and particularly outraged by what it perceives as a consistent pattern of insulting, patronizing treatment by NATO countries led by the United States. The West thinks the Cold War is something belonging to the history books. Vladimir Putin and the Russian people have a slightly different view.

For them the hegemony which the West was able to impose following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact has ended. Russia fully intends to regain its status and prestige in the world and has no compunctions about challenging the West to do so. In fact, in order to demonstrate its renewed power, it needs to find reasons and issues on which to confront the West. Kosovo should certainly be viewed in that context.

This combination of a resurgent, aggressive Russia and an over-confident, complacent, and over-extended NATO is a potentially dangerous combination. This is particularly true in the countries of the former Soviet Union with significant, vocal Russian minorities. The potential for serious conflict in one of these areas is real. It could easily be triggered by an incident (staged or spontaneous) involving those minorities.

NATO could suddenly and with little preparation be confronted with the very type of situation for which it was founded far from its Western base of support. Choosing an adequate response would not be easy. But that is the price of extending alliances based far more on political criteria than practical military considerations. Let’s hope that this new reality is fully understood by the leaders gathering for the upcoming Summit, as well as the governments they represent.