Rising tensions and Priština's plans

Rising tensions and Pristina's plans The ban puts the European Union’s law-enforcement mission to Kosovo, EULEX, in a difficult position, as EULEX is officially “status neutral” on the issue of Kosovar independence yet has been asked to enforce the prohibition. Pristina could use this as an argument against EULEX’s presence. Furthermore, tensions between Pristina and Belgrade will rise — something which could work in Pristina’s favor as it seeks broader recognition of Kosovar independence. Analysis Kosovar government spokesman Memli Krasniqi said Aug. 18 that Serbian government officials are prohibited from entering the former Serbian province because they had “misused” earlier visits. Serbian officials would still be allowed to come and go on private business but would not be allowed to make political statements during their visits. Krasniqi said that anyone entering Kosovo in an official capacity, regardless of rank, “will be arrested and expelled if caught by police.” The ban will increase tensions between Belgrade and Pristina and could provoke an incident between visiting Serbian officials and Kosovar law enforcement in the short term — possibly within days. It also puts the EU law enforcement mission to Kosovo, EULEX, in a difficult situation, as it has been asked to enforce the ban despite being “status neutral” on Kosovo’s independence from Serbia. Kosovo became independent Feb. 17, 2008, with a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) after nine years of de facto independence from Serbia following the 1999 NATO war against Belgrade which forced Serbia to give up control of the majority Albanian province. The declaration was the subject of an International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion July 22 that affirmed that the UDI did not contravene international law. As STRATFOR wrote following the ICJ decision, the advisory opinion was likely to embolden Pristina to begin enforcing its sovereignty over all of Kosovo. Particularly important to Pristina is the Serbian enclave north of the river Ibar — especially the northern portion of the town Mitrovica — where about 70,000 Serbs still form the majority. To Pristina’s chagrin, Belgrade has set up parallel institutions in the enclave and the Serbian residents generally ignore Pristina’s authority. There are also several minor Serb communities south of the Ibar that Serbian politicians have in the past made a point of visiting as a way of reaffirming Belgrade’s refusal to recognize Pristina’s sovereignty. The ban on Serbian officials is Kosovo’s first post-ICJ opinion challenge to Belgrade. Kosovo Police (KP) have in the past arrested Serbian officials who allegedly used private visits to give political statements — the latest case being that of Deputy Minister for Kosovo-Metohija Branislav Ristic, who was arrested Jan. 27 in the village of Drsnik, south of the Ibar. He was escorted to the administration line between Serbia and Kosovo and expelled. Similar action was taken against Serbian Minister for Kosovo-Metohija Goran Bogdanovic when the KP interrupted his visit to the town of Strpce, south of the Ibar. The Kosovar government justified both of these cases as enforcement of a rule that required permission from Pristina for visits for political purposes rather than a blanket ban on Serbian politicians. Furthermore, both happened south of the Ibar River where the KP has free hand in enforcing Pristina’s sovereignty. North of the Ibar, however, the ban will be practically impossible to enforce. As EULEX sources told STRATFOR, the border posts in the Serbian enclave north of the Ibar are manned by EULEX and KP, but KP units at the crossing are made up of ethnic Serbs — not Kosovar Albanians — since technically Kosovo is a multiethnic political entity. Thus, Pristina does not have the means to prevent Serbian government officials from making their way to the northern enclave, unless EULEX goes against its neutral stance or Kosovo’s own ethnic Albanian forces make the arrests, which would almost certainly lead to a violent confrontation with the local Serb population. While it would seem that Kosovar officials have declared a ban they can not enforce, the ban does promote Pristina’s interests on several points. First, EULEX is put in a difficult position. The mission will have to choose between Pristina’s ban and Serbian officials’ freedom of movement in the enclave north of the Ibar. EULEX is officially “status neutral” regarding Kosovar independence, but it is expected to help Pristina with law enforcement and building up sovereignty. If it refuses to enforce the ban, it will be seen as taking Serbia’s side. As STRATFOR has noted in the past, relations between EULEX and Pristina are deteriorating because Pristina sees the mission as hindering it in its attempts to exert sovereignty over the entire province — and Pristina does not appreciate EULEX investigating corruption and smuggling in Kosovo. EULEX has already said it is “not involved in the process” of administrating the ban, giving Pristina more fuel for the argument that the mission is an obstacle to full Kosovar sovereignty. Second, increasing tensions with Serbia could boost recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Pristina is not fully satisfied with the result of the ICJ opinion; it had hoped that a favorable opinion would lead to more recognition of Kosovo as an independent state. None has come yet. Pristina therefore wants to force the international community’s hand — especially in the West, which supports Kosovar independence. If tensions increase, Pristina hopes the West — reluctant to face further Balkan security issues in light of the current U.S. military commitments and Europe’s ongoing economic crisis — will make a renewed effort to lobby for Kosovar independence during the U.N. General Assembly session in September. The question now is whether Serbian officials will respect the ban. If they do, they put the current pro-EU government in Belgrade in a difficult position, as the nationalists will see any acquiescence as a sign that Serbia is giving up on Kosovo. There are therefore already indications that Belgrade’s officials do not intend to curtail their visits. Bogdanovic immediately declared that he will go to Kosovo and “if any incident should take place, the responsibility will be EULEX’s.” He had planned to visit Aug. 19 — though it is not clear that his statements refer to that particular visit — as did State Secretary in the Ministry for Kosovo-Metohija Oliver Ivanovic who also stated that he intends to go. The issue could therefore come to a head rather quickly, with EULEX forced to choose between enforcing Pristina’s ban on the behalf of the Kosovars or protecting Serbian officials essentially breaking Kosovo’s law. The certainty is that tensions in Kosovo are set to increase, which may not be altogether a bad thing from Pristina’s perspective as it looks to enforce its sovereignty over the entire province. This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR EULEX police in Kosovska Mitrovica (Tanjug, file) The Kosovar government announced a ban on Serbian government officials traveling to Kosovo on official business. STRATFOR "The certainty is that tensions in Kosovo are set to increase, which may not be altogether a bad thing from Pristina’s perspective as it looks to enforce its sovereignty over the entire province."

Rising tensions and Priština's plans

The ban puts the European Union’s law-enforcement mission to Kosovo, EULEX, in a difficult position, as EULEX is officially “status neutral” on the issue of Kosovar independence yet has been asked to enforce the prohibition.

Pristina could use this as an argument against EULEX’s presence. Furthermore, tensions between Pristina and Belgrade will rise — something which could work in Pristina’s favor as it seeks broader recognition of Kosovar independence.
Analysis

Kosovar government spokesman Memli Krasniqi said Aug. 18 that Serbian government officials are prohibited from entering the former Serbian province because they had “misused” earlier visits. Serbian officials would still be allowed to come and go on private business but would not be allowed to make political statements during their visits. Krasniqi said that anyone entering Kosovo in an official capacity, regardless of rank, “will be arrested and expelled if caught by police.”

The ban will increase tensions between Belgrade and Pristina and could provoke an incident between visiting Serbian officials and Kosovar law enforcement in the short term — possibly within days. It also puts the EU law enforcement mission to Kosovo, EULEX, in a difficult situation, as it has been asked to enforce the ban despite being “status neutral” on Kosovo’s independence from Serbia.

Kosovo became independent Feb. 17, 2008, with a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) after nine years of de facto independence from Serbia following the 1999 NATO war against Belgrade which forced Serbia to give up control of the majority Albanian province. The declaration was the subject of an International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion July 22 that affirmed that the UDI did not contravene international law.

As STRATFOR wrote following the ICJ decision, the advisory opinion was likely to embolden Pristina to begin enforcing its sovereignty over all of Kosovo. Particularly important to Pristina is the Serbian enclave north of the river Ibar — especially the northern portion of the town Mitrovica — where about 70,000 Serbs still form the majority.

To Pristina’s chagrin, Belgrade has set up parallel institutions in the enclave and the Serbian residents generally ignore Pristina’s authority. There are also several minor Serb communities south of the Ibar that Serbian politicians have in the past made a point of visiting as a way of reaffirming Belgrade’s refusal to recognize Pristina’s sovereignty.

The ban on Serbian officials is Kosovo’s first post-ICJ opinion challenge to Belgrade. Kosovo Police (KP) have in the past arrested Serbian officials who allegedly used private visits to give political statements — the latest case being that of Deputy Minister for Kosovo-Metohija Branislav Ristic, who was arrested Jan. 27 in the village of Drsnik, south of the Ibar. He was escorted to the administration line between Serbia and Kosovo and expelled.

Similar action was taken against Serbian Minister for Kosovo-Metohija Goran Bogdanovic when the KP interrupted his visit to the town of Strpce, south of the Ibar. The Kosovar government justified both of these cases as enforcement of a rule that required permission from Pristina for visits for political purposes rather than a blanket ban on Serbian politicians. Furthermore, both happened south of the Ibar River where the KP has free hand in enforcing Pristina’s sovereignty. North of the Ibar, however, the ban will be practically impossible to enforce.

As EULEX sources told STRATFOR, the border posts in the Serbian enclave north of the Ibar are manned by EULEX and KP, but KP units at the crossing are made up of ethnic Serbs — not Kosovar Albanians — since technically Kosovo is a multiethnic political entity. Thus, Pristina does not have the means to prevent Serbian government officials from making their way to the northern enclave, unless EULEX goes against its neutral stance or Kosovo’s own ethnic Albanian forces make the arrests, which would almost certainly lead to a violent confrontation with the local Serb population.

While it would seem that Kosovar officials have declared a ban they can not enforce, the ban does promote Pristina’s interests on several points. First, EULEX is put in a difficult position. The mission will have to choose between Pristina’s ban and Serbian officials’ freedom of movement in the enclave north of the Ibar. EULEX is officially “status neutral” regarding Kosovar independence, but it is expected to help Pristina with law enforcement and building up sovereignty. If it refuses to enforce the ban, it will be seen as taking Serbia’s side.

As STRATFOR has noted in the past, relations between EULEX and Pristina are deteriorating because Pristina sees the mission as hindering it in its attempts to exert sovereignty over the entire province — and Pristina does not appreciate EULEX investigating corruption and smuggling in Kosovo. EULEX has already said it is “not involved in the process” of administrating the ban, giving Pristina more fuel for the argument that the mission is an obstacle to full Kosovar sovereignty.

Second, increasing tensions with Serbia could boost recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Pristina is not fully satisfied with the result of the ICJ opinion; it had hoped that a favorable opinion would lead to more recognition of Kosovo as an independent state. None has come yet. Pristina therefore wants to force the international community’s hand — especially in the West, which supports Kosovar independence. If tensions increase, Pristina hopes the West — reluctant to face further Balkan security issues in light of the current U.S. military commitments and Europe’s ongoing economic crisis — will make a renewed effort to lobby for Kosovar independence during the U.N. General Assembly session in September.

The question now is whether Serbian officials will respect the ban. If they do, they put the current pro-EU government in Belgrade in a difficult position, as the nationalists will see any acquiescence as a sign that Serbia is giving up on Kosovo. There are therefore already indications that Belgrade’s officials do not intend to curtail their visits. Bogdanovic immediately declared that he will go to Kosovo and “if any incident should take place, the responsibility will be EULEX’s.”

He had planned to visit Aug. 19 — though it is not clear that his statements refer to that particular visit — as did State Secretary in the Ministry for Kosovo-Metohija Oliver Ivanovic who also stated that he intends to go. The issue could therefore come to a head rather quickly, with EULEX forced to choose between enforcing Pristina’s ban on the behalf of the Kosovars or protecting Serbian officials essentially breaking Kosovo’s law.

The certainty is that tensions in Kosovo are set to increase, which may not be altogether a bad thing from Pristina’s perspective as it looks to enforce its sovereignty over the entire province.

This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR