Next Serbian steps on Kosovo

Next Serbian steps on Kosovo It will have the support of the United States and over 20 member-countries of the European Union. Despite their best efforts and the full support of Russia, they have not succeeded in preventing it. They have, however, by blocking action in the UN Security Council, reduced the legitimacy of the independence claim, opened the door for some sort of de facto partition, and also ensured that an adversarial relationship will exist between Kosovo and Serbia for the foreseeable future. Within certain boundaries, it is pretty easy to predict the actions of the Kosovo Albanians and the International Community as this process unfolds over the coming months. What is very much unknown is the reaction of the Serbian political leadership. It is fair to say that Serbia now stands at a crucial point in its history and the next six months will determine its short and medium term future. The potential scenarios are radically different. What makes it hard to predict what will happen is that while Kosovo has brought on the crisis, it also involves the long-standing battle between the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) of Vojislav Kostunica and the Democratic Party (DS) of Boris Tadic. This will come to a head in the coming weeks on the question of the upcoming Serbian Presidential elections, but will continue to play out even after that as the Kosovo process unfolds. These two issues (Kosovo and domestic politics) are intertwined and inseparable. Each in fact makes dealing with the other much more difficult. Breaking it down even further, the strategy and tactics of DS and President Tadic are also fairly clear. They have insisted on a definitive date in January for Presidential elections with the expectation that this optimizes President Tadic's chances for re-election. The party will continue to fully support a strong stance on Kosovo, including taking various measures to make it crystal clear that Serbia does not in any way accept a UDI. But at the same time, they have publicly stated time and again that the second pillar of their policy is ensuring and furthering Serbia's European future within the EU. It is this commitment, which probably makes a confrontation with the DSS inevitable. The key questions for Serbia and therefore its future are in the hands of Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica. They include: a) Will he provoke a crisis in the coalition by trying to remove the Speaker of the Parliament; postpone or significantly change the date of the elections; or introduce a resolution conditioning signature of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union upon actions taken by the EU and member countries in Kosovo? Any of the three would almost certainly bring down the current coalition government if G17+ and the DS stand up for their publicly stated goals and principles. b) Is his goal to have Boris Tadic defeated in the Presidential elections and therefore weakening him and the DS? Certainly his actions thus far in postponing the Presidential elections and tying them to events in Kosovo make it appear to be the case. This may mean an outright boycott of the elections by DSS or simply a quiet directive via party channels to do so. c) As a slight variation, does he want a Radical elected as President more or less to show to the West what it has done by supporting UDI? d) Is it his intention after the UDI is a reality and countries begin to recognize Kosovo to turn his back on the EU and the United States and definitively re-orientate Serbia towards Russia? Will he consider that their action in recognizing Kosovo is so contrary to Serbia's vital national interests that there is no way to cooperate with them in the future? How far will he go in demonstrating this downgrading of relations and related to that, the upgrading of relations with Russia? d) Is his plan in the light of a UDI to call for a "government of national unity" including all parties in Parliament (something which DS and G17+ could not accept) and therefore accepting a coalition with the Radicals and Socialists? e) Or in a variant of that theme, will he force new elections once UDI has been declared, believing that the DS would be weakened by it and that due to strong actions he will take, his party will benefit? f) The European Union has sent strong signals that it expects and will tolerate a "soft" partition of Kosovo on a "temporary" basis. Will the Prime Minister deliberately force a crisis by making the partition too "hard," including either permitting or encouraging the Kosovo Serbs and "volunteers" from Serbia itself to visibly establish an armed alternative security force? The future of Serbia depends very much on the answers to the above questions. Part of the Prime Minister's considerable skill as a politician is precisely that it is impossible to be sure of his real intentions. He is a "good poker player," keeping "his cards close to his chest," as we say in the United States. I assume that the United States and the EU have thought out all of the above questions. My fear, however, is that they are answering them from their own perspective on the whole Kosovo question and not at all from the Serbian standpoint. Moreover, they probably are not factoring in the domestic political dynamics. I think that they believe that at the end of day, the Prime Minister and most Serbs are sufficiently determined to move towards their European future that they will not cross "redlines" in protesting the UDI. They believe that offering the SAA now helps to ensure that is the case. At the same time - and this is well worth noting - they are losing patience with what they see as Russian and Serbian obstructionism. They do not see Serbia as a threat to the region, but only to itself. So, if at the end of day, the worst-case scenario happens, the main losers will (in the U.S. and EU view) be the Serbs themselves. In contrast to this optimistic scenario, I believe that the Prime Minister and his supporters will be sufficiently angered about the UDI and sufficiently dislike the DS so that the answers to many of the above questions will lead to a greater confrontation than any of us would want. But it will happen and take on a momentum of its own. Perhaps in anticipation of that, Russia on one side and the United States and the EU on the other are already pointing figures for who is responsible for whatever happens post UDI. Finally, this once again brings home just how unable the UN is to handle almost any crisis one can name. The primary reason is that the Security Council was set up to satisfy the victorious World War II powers and none of them (Russia, China, the U.S., the UK, and France) are about to give up their veto power. Until they do, and until the Security Council becomes flexible enough to reflect the world today and not the world in 1945, there is no hope for it. This is unfortunate, as we are entering a new era in the world where more and more regional powers will be struggling for resources and power. The potential for conflict is increasing daily and we have no good mechanism in place to deal with it. Long-standing battle? Kostunica, Tadic (FoNet) Although Serbian political leaders will never acknowledge it, they all realize that sometime in February, the process of a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) will be initiated by the Kosovo Albanian government. William Montgomery I believe that the Prime Minister and his supporters will be sufficiently angered about the UDI and sufficiently dislike the DS so that the answers to many questions will lead to a greater confrontation than any of us would want.

Next Serbian steps on Kosovo

It will have the support of the United States and over 20 member-countries of the European Union. Despite their best efforts and the full support of Russia, they have not succeeded in preventing it.

They have, however, by blocking action in the UN Security Council, reduced the legitimacy of the independence claim, opened the door for some sort of de facto partition, and also ensured that an adversarial relationship will exist between Kosovo and Serbia for the foreseeable future.

Within certain boundaries, it is pretty easy to predict the actions of the Kosovo Albanians and the International Community as this process unfolds over the coming months. What is very much unknown is the reaction of the Serbian political leadership.

It is fair to say that Serbia now stands at a crucial point in its history and the next six months will determine its short and medium term future. The potential scenarios are radically different.

What makes it hard to predict what will happen is that while Kosovo has brought on the crisis, it also involves the long-standing battle between the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) of Vojislav Koštunica and the Democratic Party (DS) of Boris Tadić.

This will come to a head in the coming weeks on the question of the upcoming Serbian Presidential elections, but will continue to play out even after that as the Kosovo process unfolds. These two issues (Kosovo and domestic politics) are intertwined and inseparable. Each in fact makes dealing with the other much more difficult.

Breaking it down even further, the strategy and tactics of DS and President Tadić are also fairly clear. They have insisted on a definitive date in January for Presidential elections with the expectation that this optimizes President Tadić's chances for re-election.

The party will continue to fully support a strong stance on Kosovo, including taking various measures to make it crystal clear that Serbia does not in any way accept a UDI. But at the same time, they have publicly stated time and again that the second pillar of their policy is ensuring and furthering Serbia's European future within the EU. It is this commitment, which probably makes a confrontation with the DSS inevitable.

The key questions for Serbia and therefore its future are in the hands of Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica. They include:

a) Will he provoke a crisis in the coalition by trying to remove the Speaker of the Parliament; postpone or significantly change the date of the elections; or introduce a resolution conditioning signature of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union upon actions taken by the EU and member countries in Kosovo? Any of the three would almost certainly bring down the current coalition government if G17+ and the DS stand up for their publicly stated goals and principles.

b) Is his goal to have Boris Tadić defeated in the Presidential elections and therefore weakening him and the DS? Certainly his actions thus far in postponing the Presidential elections and tying them to events in Kosovo make it appear to be the case. This may mean an outright boycott of the elections by DSS or simply a quiet directive via party channels to do so.

c) As a slight variation, does he want a Radical elected as President more or less to show to the West what it has done by supporting UDI?

d) Is it his intention after the UDI is a reality and countries begin to recognize Kosovo to turn his back on the EU and the United States and definitively re-orientate Serbia towards Russia? Will he consider that their action in recognizing Kosovo is so contrary to Serbia's vital national interests that there is no way to cooperate with them in the future? How far will he go in demonstrating this downgrading of relations and related to that, the upgrading of relations with Russia?

d) Is his plan in the light of a UDI to call for a "government of national unity" including all parties in Parliament (something which DS and G17+ could not accept) and therefore accepting a coalition with the Radicals and Socialists?

e) Or in a variant of that theme, will he force new elections once UDI has been declared, believing that the DS would be weakened by it and that due to strong actions he will take, his party will benefit?

f) The European Union has sent strong signals that it expects and will tolerate a "soft" partition of Kosovo on a "temporary" basis. Will the Prime Minister deliberately force a crisis by making the partition too "hard," including either permitting or encouraging the Kosovo Serbs and "volunteers" from Serbia itself to visibly establish an armed alternative security force?

The future of Serbia depends very much on the answers to the above questions. Part of the Prime Minister's considerable skill as a politician is precisely that it is impossible to be sure of his real intentions. He is a "good poker player," keeping "his cards close to his chest," as we say in the United States.

I assume that the United States and the EU have thought out all of the above questions. My fear, however, is that they are answering them from their own perspective on the whole Kosovo question and not at all from the Serbian standpoint. Moreover, they probably are not factoring in the domestic political dynamics.

I think that they believe that at the end of day, the Prime Minister and most Serbs are sufficiently determined to move towards their European future that they will not cross "redlines" in protesting the UDI. They believe that offering the SAA now helps to ensure that is the case. At the same time - and this is well worth noting - they are losing patience with what they see as Russian and Serbian obstructionism.

They do not see Serbia as a threat to the region, but only to itself. So, if at the end of day, the worst-case scenario happens, the main losers will (in the U.S. and EU view) be the Serbs themselves.

In contrast to this optimistic scenario, I believe that the Prime Minister and his supporters will be sufficiently angered about the UDI and sufficiently dislike the DS so that the answers to many of the above questions will lead to a greater confrontation than any of us would want.

But it will happen and take on a momentum of its own. Perhaps in anticipation of that, Russia on one side and the United States and the EU on the other are already pointing figures for who is responsible for whatever happens post UDI.

Finally, this once again brings home just how unable the UN is to handle almost any crisis one can name. The primary reason is that the Security Council was set up to satisfy the victorious World War II powers and none of them (Russia, China, the U.S., the UK, and France) are about to give up their veto power.

Until they do, and until the Security Council becomes flexible enough to reflect the world today and not the world in 1945, there is no hope for it. This is unfortunate, as we are entering a new era in the world where more and more regional powers will be struggling for resources and power. The potential for conflict is increasing daily and we have no good mechanism in place to deal with it.