Our unique intelligence agencies

Our unique intelligence agencies The first is the release of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which concludes with “high confidence” that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003. It also states with “high confidence” that Iran will not be technically capable of producing and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015. Moreover, its assessment is that Iran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to develop a nuclear weapon regardless of the political, economic, and military costs. In other words, it is possible to prevent Iranian nuclear proliferation with the right combination of diplomatic actions and that in any case, the threat is not nearly as imminent as the Bush Administration has portrayed. While historians may contradict me, I personally know of no other occasion in history where the intelligence agencies of any country have combined to publicly release an assessment that totally undercuts one of the highest foreign policy objectives of its own government. The reaction of the President seemed to be astonishment, denial, and then almost ignoring it as if it came from some independent, unreliable agency with no relation to his Administration. Sort of “they” have their opinion and we have our own. But as the NIE states in its opening paragraphs, the “NIEs are the Intelligence Community’s most authoritative written judgments on national security issues.” Over the past several years the Bush Administration has been in the forefront of countries expressing concern about the Iranian program and the intentions of the Iranian government. Along with several key partners in the European Union, it has steadily built a case for more sanctions against Iran. There has been widespread speculation that even military action of some kind was seriously being considered. Enthusiasm around the world for all of the above is now disappearing like air in a balloon that has been punctured with a pin. The release of the NIE immediately ratified suspicions by many that the Bush Administration had been hyping the same “Weapons of Mass Destruction” scenario in Iran as worked so well in the build-up to the Iraqi invasion. It undercut the work of many allies who had been steadily trying to curtail the Iranian program as well. The United States once again looks like an unreliable partner. Iran viewed the report as a victory which ratified its own position. They also deliberately ignored many other parts of the NIE far less favorable to them. The fact is that the NIE seems to deliberate highlight certain aspects of the Iranian nuclear program, while ignoring or downplaying many other very serious questions. The overall result is a skewed document. What this highlights is the tremendous gap (and probably a lot of animosity) which now exists between the intelligence community as a whole and the leadership of the Bush Administration. It is as if the Intelligence Community felt it had been badly compromised by bowing to high level pressure in the case of Iraq and wanted “payback” or wanted to bend over backwards in the opposite direction to restore its credibility. Finally, I simply cannot comprehend how in the world any Administration could ever get itself in a position where such a devastating report was permitted to reach anywhere near final status. In any sort of normal situation, over a long period of time, the President and his key advisors should have been receiving classified information pointing in the direction of the NIE conclusions. This would have enabled the Administration to take a number of steps. It could have pointed out the real flaws in the way the report was written and suggested changes in factual content, emphasis, or other areas to be highlighted; it could have slowly and carefully changed its own public comments and positions with key allies to reflect the considered opinions of the intelligence community; and finally, they could have prepared a press strategy in advance of the publication so that it could smoothly evaluate the report. In short, one way or another, the report would not have been such a bombshell because it would not be such at odds with the Administration. Instead, the President and his policy towards Iran have been routed and are now in disarray. As I said in an earlier column, it truly is the “Gang who could not shoot straight.” This is an American expression for true ineptness. The other intelligence-related incident was the disclosure that the Central Intelligence Agency had in 2005 deliberately destroyed hundreds of hours of videotapes of the interrogation in 2002 of two Al-Qaeda operatives. While initial reports claim that it was basically a unilateral action by one part of the CIA, there are a plethora of hearings and inquiries underway trying to determine who knew what, when they knew it, and who was involved in the decision-making process both to tape the interrogations in the first place and three years later to destroy them. The CIA claims that the individuals who destroyed the tapes had the rationale that if the tapes ever saw the light of day, it would endanger the lives of the employees carrying out the interrogations. This may well in part be true, but the true reasons are that anyone watching the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” would probably be horrified and outraged. It would destroy the Administration’s continued defense of these techniques; severely damage the reputation of the CIA for carrying them out; give the Muslim world one more concrete example of why they should hate us; and deal yet another heavy blow to any claim by the United States of having any sort of “moral authority” to tell anyone else in the world how to behave. There is no question that within the CIA, the individuals who took responsibility for destroying the tapes will be seen as heroes, willing to take the fall to protect the CIA and the U.S. government from all of the above repercussions. But the problem is that while they did manage to prevent the graphic display of these interrogation techniques ---or as they deserve to be called, torture---the disclosure of the destruction has created its own problems. First of all, the act of destroying the tapes caused somebody within the CIA to “blow the whistle” and disclose the deed to a journalist, who broke the story. That might not have happened if the tapes would simply have been filed far, far away. But secondly, it has put the CIA squarely in the sights of Congress and the American public for its actions. And this has happened in the midst of an election campaign where the candidates will fall all over themselves to denounce the CIA’s action and call for heads to roll and preventative measures put in place to prevent any further such acts. So the end result is that the reputation of the Agency is damaged in any case, as is that of the United States in the world and in the Muslim world in particular. As a pragmatic former diplomat, I believe that on the whole it probably has somewhat reduced the overall damage by destroying the tapes. But as a human being, I wish that the “highlights” would have been shown on our main news channel. We Americans need to see for ourselves in living color what “enhanced interrogation techniques” means and what our government is deliberately doing to its prisoners. I guarantee that one day after it was shown on national television, the practice would come to a screeching halt. Because we would be horrified and ashamed. As we should be. NIE is victory? Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Beta) During the past two weeks, the intelligence community of the United States has been the center of two separate incidents which have with good reason captured world-wide interest. What they have in common is that they are deeply embarrassing to the Bush Administration and have seriously undermined its credibility. William Montgomery During the past two weeks, the intelligence community of the United States has been the center of two separate incidents which have with good reason captured world-wide interest. What they have in common is that they are deeply embarrassing to the Bush Administration and have seriously undermined its credibility.

Our unique intelligence agencies

The first is the release of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which concludes with “high confidence” that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003. It also states with “high confidence” that Iran will not be technically capable of producing and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015.

Moreover, its assessment is that Iran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to develop a nuclear weapon regardless of the political, economic, and military costs. In other words, it is possible to prevent Iranian nuclear proliferation with the right combination of diplomatic actions and that in any case, the threat is not nearly as imminent as the Bush Administration has portrayed.

While historians may contradict me, I personally know of no other occasion in history where the intelligence agencies of any country have combined to publicly release an assessment that totally undercuts one of the highest foreign policy objectives of its own government.

The reaction of the President seemed to be astonishment, denial, and then almost ignoring it as if it came from some independent, unreliable agency with no relation to his Administration. Sort of “they” have their opinion and we have our own. But as the NIE states in its opening paragraphs, the “NIEs are the Intelligence Community’s most authoritative written judgments on national security issues.”

Over the past several years the Bush Administration has been in the forefront of countries expressing concern about the Iranian program and the intentions of the Iranian government. Along with several key partners in the European Union, it has steadily built a case for more sanctions against Iran. There has been widespread speculation that even military action of some kind was seriously being considered. Enthusiasm around the world for all of the above is now disappearing like air in a balloon that has been punctured with a pin.

The release of the NIE immediately ratified suspicions by many that the Bush Administration had been hyping the same “Weapons of Mass Destruction” scenario in Iran as worked so well in the build-up to the Iraqi invasion. It undercut the work of many allies who had been steadily trying to curtail the Iranian program as well. The United States once again looks like an unreliable partner.

Iran viewed the report as a victory which ratified its own position. They also deliberately ignored many other parts of the NIE far less favorable to them. The fact is that the NIE seems to deliberate highlight certain aspects of the Iranian nuclear program, while ignoring or downplaying many other very serious questions. The overall result is a skewed document.

What this highlights is the tremendous gap (and probably a lot of animosity) which now exists between the intelligence community as a whole and the leadership of the Bush Administration. It is as if the Intelligence Community felt it had been badly compromised by bowing to high level pressure in the case of Iraq and wanted “payback” or wanted to bend over backwards in the opposite direction to restore its credibility.

Finally, I simply cannot comprehend how in the world any Administration could ever get itself in a position where such a devastating report was permitted to reach anywhere near final status. In any sort of normal situation, over a long period of time, the President and his key advisors should have been receiving classified information pointing in the direction of the NIE conclusions. This would have enabled the Administration to take a number of steps.

It could have pointed out the real flaws in the way the report was written and suggested changes in factual content, emphasis, or other areas to be highlighted; it could have slowly and carefully changed its own public comments and positions with key allies to reflect the considered opinions of the intelligence community; and finally, they could have prepared a press strategy in advance of the publication so that it could smoothly evaluate the report.

In short, one way or another, the report would not have been such a bombshell because it would not be such at odds with the Administration. Instead, the President and his policy towards Iran have been routed and are now in disarray. As I said in an earlier column, it truly is the “Gang who could not shoot straight.” This is an American expression for true ineptness.

The other intelligence-related incident was the disclosure that the Central Intelligence Agency had in 2005 deliberately destroyed hundreds of hours of videotapes of the interrogation in 2002 of two Al-Qaeda operatives. While initial reports claim that it was basically a unilateral action by one part of the CIA, there are a plethora of hearings and inquiries underway trying to determine who knew what, when they knew it, and who was involved in the decision-making process both to tape the interrogations in the first place and three years later to destroy them.

The CIA claims that the individuals who destroyed the tapes had the rationale that if the tapes ever saw the light of day, it would endanger the lives of the employees carrying out the interrogations. This may well in part be true, but the true reasons are that anyone watching the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” would probably be horrified and outraged.

It would destroy the Administration’s continued defense of these techniques; severely damage the reputation of the CIA for carrying them out; give the Muslim world one more concrete example of why they should hate us; and deal yet another heavy blow to any claim by the United States of having any sort of “moral authority” to tell anyone else in the world how to behave.

There is no question that within the CIA, the individuals who took responsibility for destroying the tapes will be seen as heroes, willing to take the fall to protect the CIA and the U.S. government from all of the above repercussions. But the problem is that while they did manage to prevent the graphic display of these interrogation techniques ---or as they deserve to be called, torture---the disclosure of the destruction has created its own problems. First of all, the act of destroying the tapes caused somebody within the CIA to “blow the whistle” and disclose the deed to a journalist, who broke the story.

That might not have happened if the tapes would simply have been filed far, far away. But secondly, it has put the CIA squarely in the sights of Congress and the American public for its actions. And this has happened in the midst of an election campaign where the candidates will fall all over themselves to denounce the CIA’s action and call for heads to roll and preventative measures put in place to prevent any further such acts. So the end result is that the reputation of the Agency is damaged in any case, as is that of the United States in the world and in the Muslim world in particular.

As a pragmatic former diplomat, I believe that on the whole it probably has somewhat reduced the overall damage by destroying the tapes. But as a human being, I wish that the “highlights” would have been shown on our main news channel. We Americans need to see for ourselves in living color what “enhanced interrogation techniques” means and what our government is deliberately doing to its prisoners.

I guarantee that one day after it was shown on national television, the practice would come to a screeching halt. Because we would be horrified and ashamed. As we should be.