RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 5, No. 77, Part II, 20 April 2001

Montenegro at a crossroads

By Patrick Moore

Montenegrin voters go to the polls on 22 April in early parliamentary elections. The issue is whether Montenegro will remain in a joint state with Serbia or reclaim the independence it gave up in 1918.

At the bottom of the dilemma facing the voters is the fact that there has never been a broad consensus in Montenegrin society as to whether Montenegrins are a distinct people or a special branch of the Serbian nation. The dispute between these two political camps has dominated Montenegrin politics for most of the past 200 years.

The more recent impetus for seeking a resolution to the dispute is the growing disenchantment of much of the Montenegrin political elite with the leadership in Belgrade. Most of the Podgorica leaders around President Milo Djukanovic supported former Serbian and Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic during his rise to power in the late 1980s and in the Croatian and Bosnian wars that began in 1991 and 1992, respectively. Many observers suggest that Djukanovic and the rest of the Montenegrin leadership profited handsomely from illegal sanctions-busting transactions in gasoline and cigarettes at the time.

But by the mid-1990s, Djukanovic and his allies concluded that they and Montenegro had more to gain by breaking with a Belgrade regime that had become an international pariah. They accordingly parted ways with then- Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic, who went on to become Milosevic's prime minister in Belgrade after Djukanovic won the Montenegrin presidency in 1997.

After winning Montenegro's top office, Djukanovic increasingly struck out on a path that seemed destined to lead to full independence from Belgrade, while still holding out at least some hope that negotiations could lead to a redefinition of relations with Serbia. So long as Milosevic was in power, Djukanovic could count on political and economic support from the international community, which regarded his Montenegro as a less-than-perfect democracy but a democracy nonetheless.

Matters changed abruptly with the victory of the Serbian opposition in two sets of elections at the end of 2000. The international community became increasingly critical of Montenegrin aspirations toward independence and urged Djukanovic to work for "a democratic Montenegro in a democratic Yugoslavia," as Washington and Brussels often put it.

But for Djukanovic, there was no turning back. Whether or not he would have been amenable to a generous deal from a sympathetic leadership in Belgrade is open to dispute. In the event, he has often complained that Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica is as disrespectful toward Montenegro and its interests as Milosevic had been, and that independence is the only alternative for Montenegro.

The 22 April ballot is the first electoral test for Djukanovic and his Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) since the ouster of Milosevic. Polls suggest that Djukanovic's Victory for Montenegro coalition is likely to win the largest bloc of seats in the new legislature. The opposing Together for Yugoslavia coalition of Predrag Bulatovic and his Socialist People's Party (SNP) trails by at least several percentage points in most polls. The much smaller, pro-independence Liberal Alliance can probably be counted on to support Djukanovic on key votes.

The Muslim, Croatian, and Albanian minorities favor independence and could provide the decisive votes to tip the balance in favor of Djukanovic, as many observers think they did in the 1997 election. Ham-fisted efforts by the pro-Belgrade camp to exclude Albanians and Muslims from an eventual referendum on independence have only made those minorities more determined to support Djukanovic and his allies.

And independence is what the 22 April vote is really about. Should the Victory for Montenegro coalition win, Djukanovic has pledged to call a referendum on independence, probably in June. Polls suggest that more important than the timing of a referendum will be its wording. Sentiment among ethnic Montenegrins on maintaining ties with Belgrade continues to be roughly evenly divided, although polls indicate that the pro-independence camp is growing, particularly among young people.

The Belgrade leadership has not been silent during what is ostensibly a Montenegrin election campaign. Kostunica has bluntly reminded Podgorica that Montenegro is a tiny country and that tens of thousands of Montenegrins live in Serbia. He is willing to negotiate with Montenegro about redefining the legal basis of the federation, but not on terms that Podgorica can accept. Djukanovic wants Serbia and Montenegro to set up a new relationship as independent states, but this is unacceptable to Kostunica. And in remarks intended perhaps for the international community, Kostunica has suggested that Montenegrin independence could lead to moves by "extremists" and others in the region to "redraw the map of the Balkans" by declaring independence for their respective areas, such as western Macedonia.

Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic has been less outspoken than Kostunica, but he has made it clear that there can be no "special relationship" between Belgrade and Podgorica if Montenegro opts for independence. Whatever the case may be, neither Djindjic nor any other Serbian politician can agree to Djukanovic's demand for full equality between the two republics, because Serbia's population is roughly ten times that of Montenegro.

But Djindjic may be less opposed to Montenegrin self-determination than Kostunica. This is because Djindjic's power base is in the Serbian government, while Kostunica will be out of a job if Montenegro leaves Yugoslavia, and Yugoslavia ceases to exist. In any event, Djindjic took refuge from Milosevic's police in Montenegro in 1999 and is likely to know conditions and leaders there better than many others in Belgrade do.

Should the Victory for Montenegro coalition win the parliamentary elections and announce a referendum, the international community will have to consider its options. Russia, which traditionally enjoys prestige and influence in Montenegro, may have painted itself into a corner politically by unambiguously backing Kostunica and Together for Yugoslavia. The EU and U.S. have let it be known that they want Montenegro and Serbia to remain together, but have usually qualified their remarks to that effect by adding that they will respect the will of the Montenegrin voters.