Capitulation is certain?

Capitulation is certain?

Unfortunately, the first option is much more certain than the second, believes Mario Galić, the author of the text published on that Croatian portal.

According to his assessments, the problem is that now both sides are stuck in a war of attrition because the Western aid to Ukraine so far was only enough to equalize the balance of power on the battlefield.

A much bigger problem for both sides is that there is no super-strategic goal that would end the war. Namely, in any direction that the Ukrainians would go, towards Zaporizhzia, Melitopol, Mariupol, or towards the Sea of Azov, the Russians would use everything they had to prevent it.

The end result would be a massive operation comparable to similar offensives that took place in the area during World War II. And that would mean, according to the author of the text, the engagement of hundreds of thousands of soldiers, thousands of tanks and other combat vehicles, along with thousands of all available artillery weapons, with the inevitable consequence of thousands of dead and tens of thousands of wounded on both sides.

The Ukrainians hoped that the donations of "supertanks" would enable them to form a force capable of such an operation, but there is more and more news about a reduction in the number of tanks that the Ukrainians will receive, as well as an extension of the delivery period.

On the other hand, the Russians are not in any better position either. Occupying the rest of Donetsk will not end the war victoriously. Even in the case of the occupation of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, the balance of power will not turn in Russia's favor. Putin could claim that all the original goals have been achieved and at the same time hope that the memory of the average Russian is so short that he does not remember how he claimed a year ago that they were going to "liberate" the whole of Ukraine from Nazis and nationalists.

Even a renewed attempt to conquer Kyiv would not significantly shift the balance of power in favor of Russia. First, because for such an operation they would have to allocate at least 300,000 Russian and another 200,000 Belarusian soldiers. And in order for those forces to have a minimal chance of conquering Kyiv, they would have to start with brute force. Second, regardless of the number of Russian-Belarusian forces, the certainty of victory would be very small. Third, the resistance of the Ukrainians would be enormous.

Galić wonders, if Kyiv is not a strategic goal of Russia, do they even have one? "They have and it's called Lviv. It is a city, roughly the size of Zagreb, located in the very west of Ukraine and strategically important because all communications from Poland (and that means from the West) to Kyiv and beyond go through it," he says.

If the Russians move towards that city, with each kilometer of advance, Ukrainian survival would be very uncertain. But there is also a problem here, because the Russians have to travel 200 km to Lviv, and the Ukrainians will not watch that calmly.

The fact that, although they know very well in Moscow that it would bring them victory, there was never any mention that they planned to carry out such a large and difficult operation.

So, both sides entered the second year of the war with not very "good cards". The Russians have a super-strategic goal, but they are aware that they cannot achieve it, so they would be satisfied with the occupation of the rest of Donetsk, even though they cannot conquer the town of Bakhmut for months.

On the other hand, in Kyiv they do not stop hoping that all the new weapons will bring them the much-desired superiority on the battlefield. But the problem is that the best Western "supertanks" cannot fight alone, they have to be manned, and tank crews need 20 weeks to be thoroughly trained.

It takes at least two years to comprehensively train the brigades armed with brand new tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and self-propelled howitzers to act as a powerful strike force.