"Importance of Serbian resolution"

Belgrade daily Politika writes that although its chances of being adopted seem slim, the Serbian UN General Assembly draft is "not a meaningless act". The draft resolution on Kosovo will be discussed in New York on September 9, and the newspaper writes today that the part of the EU that supports Kosovo's independence cares about having the document either withdrawn or changed. "Importance of Serbian resolution" British Foreign Secretary William Hague, who was here on Tuesday, in effect only repeated what his German colleague Guido Westerwelle told Serbia's officials last week, says the article. Meanwhile, top state officials are saying that they will not drop the resolution, although they're aware it might fail at the UN, something, the paper writes, FM Vuk Jeremic said himself. Therefore, the article wonders, what is the "secret" of this draft: why does Serbia need it so much, and why are her opponents when it comes to Kosovo so eager to get rid of it? A diplomatic source spoke for Politika and said that the adoption of the resolution would mean that Serbia would receive the support of the UN, while those who wish to solve the problem with "imposed solutions and diktat" would lose, since "not even they could ignore the General Assembly's position that would be in favor of negotiations". Their insistence for Serbia to withdraw the draft is simply proof that nobody knows how the voting will go, said the unnamed source, explained that a large number of countries will decide at the last moment, and asserted that Jeremic's comment was "merely a sign of caution". "All combinations and analyses concerning the outcome of the voting are groundless. Serbia is at this point the target of diktat and imposed solutions," said the source. Regardless of the pressure Serbia is being exposed to, former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SRJ) Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic believes that Belgrade is still the one holding the key. "As long as we do not renounce our deed on Kosovo, what the western powers have done with Kosovo is not legitimate, is not final, and cannot ever be finalized. And they know this full well. For this reason they seek our consent, they care so much about us adapting to it, if not all at once, then in parts. However helpless this position might seem at first glance, in essence it is a powerful weapon that the other side is aware of, and wants to take away from us," said Jovanovic, who also believes that "continued fight via the UNGA means our continued resistance". He also believes that Serbia's turning to the UN encourages small countries that care about the principle of territorial integrity, which the ICJ's advisory Kosovo opinion "seriously endangered". "By insisting that secessions are unacceptable, we are reminding those countries that they are in danger too, and at the same time we are strengthening the front that is opposed to it," the former diplomat believes. However, media abroad have reported that Belgrade's insistence on its draft resolution is merely aimed at the domestic audience. German newspaper FAZ wrote after Westerwelle's visit that Serbian politicians said in internal conversations that they needed a last battle at the UN to demonstrate for the domestic audience that they had tried everything when it comes to Kosovo. Once this is over, the newspaper wrote, quoting sources close to Boris Tadic, Belgrade will, irrelevant of the outcome of the voting in New York, have room for making concessions and conducting pragmatic policies. Faculty of Political Science professor and former ambassador Predrag Simic commented on this for Politika by saying such appraisal was "dangerous". He also said that "Richard Holbrooke's and most western diplomats' belief that (Slobodan) Milosevic needed a little bombardment led to the three-month war against Yugoslavia". Therefore, he said, "if we judged by this we could be in a situation like the one in March 1999 (when NATO attacked)". Simic said that the war scenario "would not quite happen", but that it was a very dangerous diplomatic development where Serbia would in effect be confronted with "those countries". According to him, the attempt to gather support for the draft at the UN General Assembly and to in this way make up for the loss at the ICJ was what's known as Plan B. "Whether this is motivated by internal political or national interests, that's known only to those who took part in it. Belgrade is making controversial moves under pressure - at once hinting it is ready to negotiate, while the foreign minister travels to South Africa to lobby for the resolution, in a country on which 20 to 30 African votes depend," said Simic. He believes that William Hague's visit on Tadic's invitation was an attempt to check if the message brought here by Guido Westerwelle was "exactly that, since there are differences among the Quint countries as well". Simic also believes that Hague's trip did not come without Washington's approval.

"Importance of Serbian resolution"

British Foreign Secretary William Hague, who was here on Tuesday, in effect only repeated what his German colleague Guido Westerwelle told Serbia's officials last week, says the article.

Meanwhile, top state officials are saying that they will not drop the resolution, although they're aware it might fail at the UN, something, the paper writes, FM Vuk Jeremić said himself.

Therefore, the article wonders, what is the "secret" of this draft: why does Serbia need it so much, and why are her opponents when it comes to Kosovo so eager to get rid of it?

A diplomatic source spoke for Politika and said that the adoption of the resolution would mean that Serbia would receive the support of the UN, while those who wish to solve the problem with "imposed solutions and diktat" would lose, since "not even they could ignore the General Assembly's position that would be in favor of negotiations".

Their insistence for Serbia to withdraw the draft is simply proof that nobody knows how the voting will go, said the unnamed source, explained that a large number of countries will decide at the last moment, and asserted that Jeremić's comment was "merely a sign of caution".

"All combinations and analyses concerning the outcome of the voting are groundless. Serbia is at this point the target of diktat and imposed solutions," said the source.

Regardless of the pressure Serbia is being exposed to, former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SRJ) Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanović believes that Belgrade is still the one holding the key.

"As long as we do not renounce our deed on Kosovo, what the western powers have done with Kosovo is not legitimate, is not final, and cannot ever be finalized. And they know this full well. For this reason they seek our consent, they care so much about us adapting to it, if not all at once, then in parts. However helpless this position might seem at first glance, in essence it is a powerful weapon that the other side is aware of, and wants to take away from us," said Jovanović, who also believes that "continued fight via the UNGA means our continued resistance".

He also believes that Serbia's turning to the UN encourages small countries that care about the principle of territorial integrity, which the ICJ's advisory Kosovo opinion "seriously endangered".

"By insisting that secessions are unacceptable, we are reminding those countries that they are in danger too, and at the same time we are strengthening the front that is opposed to it," the former diplomat believes.

However, media abroad have reported that Belgrade's insistence on its draft resolution is merely aimed at the domestic audience.

German newspaper FAZ wrote after Westerwelle's visit that Serbian politicians said in internal conversations that they needed a last battle at the UN to demonstrate for the domestic audience that they had tried everything when it comes to Kosovo.

Once this is over, the newspaper wrote, quoting sources close to Boris Tadić, Belgrade will, irrelevant of the outcome of the voting in New York, have room for making concessions and conducting pragmatic policies.

Faculty of Political Science professor and former ambassador Predrag Simić commented on this for Politika by saying such appraisal was "dangerous". He also said that "Richard Holbrooke's and most western diplomats' belief that (Slobodan) Milošević needed a little bombardment led to the three-month war against Yugoslavia".

Therefore, he said, "if we judged by this we could be in a situation like the one in March 1999 (when NATO attacked)". Simić said that the war scenario "would not quite happen", but that it was a very dangerous diplomatic development where Serbia would in effect be confronted with "those countries".

According to him, the attempt to gather support for the draft at the UN General Assembly and to in this way make up for the loss at the ICJ was what's known as Plan B.

"Whether this is motivated by internal political or national interests, that's known only to those who took part in it. Belgrade is making controversial moves under pressure - at once hinting it is ready to negotiate, while the foreign minister travels to South Africa to lobby for the resolution, in a country on which 20 to 30 African votes depend," said Simić.

He believes that William Hague's visit on Tadić's invitation was an attempt to check if the message brought here by Guido Westerwelle was "exactly that, since there are differences among the Quint countries as well".

Simić also believes that Hague's trip did not come without Washington's approval.